# German law

`kaal:entity:german-law`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `german-law`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 1 works, 2013 to 2013.

**2013**

- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-011) [empirical/argued] -- Germany has taken a much stricter approach than the United States to cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight, even though the German business judgment rule formally requires a showing of the same elements as the American one.
  > For instance, Germany has taken a much stricter approach to cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-012) [condition/evidenced] -- Under German law, directors' business decisions lose the protection of the business judgment rule where the business risk taken was inappropriately excessive, a standard German courts announced in ARAG/Garmenbeck.
  > explained that if the "business risk was inappropriately excessive," directors' business decisions are not protected under the 23 German business judgment rule.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013) [empirical/evidenced] -- German commentators, whose expertise German courts rely on heavily, concluded after the financial crisis that managers do not act reasonably under the German business judgment rule if the risks they take on behalf of the corporation result in the demise of the corporation.
  > German commentators (contrary to their counterparts in the United States, German courts rely heavily on the expertise of commentators) concluded that managers do not act reasonably in terms of the German business judgment rule if risks
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014) [empirical/argued] -- The German ARAG/Garmenbeck holding is diametrically opposed to In re Citigroup, where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate the duty of oversight.
  > This holding is diametrically opposed to the holding in In re Citigroup where the Delaware Chancery Court declared that directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk did not violate directors' duty of oversight.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-015) [empirical/evidenced] -- The German Federal Court of Justice held in Mannesmann that directors breached their fiduciary duty by awarding a bonus of roughly seventeen million dollars to a chief executive whose tenure had substantially increased shareholder value, whereas Delaware courts imposed no liability for the far larger Ovitz payout in Disney.
  > decision in Mannesmann28 determined that the directors of the German Mannesmann AG breached their fiduciary duty to the company by awarding a bonus of approximately $17 million to the Mannesmann CEO whose tenure at Mannesmann resulted in a substantial increase of shareholder value.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-017) [empirical/argued] -- Despite the limits of the comparison, had In re Citigroup and Disney been decided in Germany the allocation of liability would have been different, because German courts are generally more willing than Delaware courts to second-guess directors' decisions.
  > it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that had the two American cases, In re Citigroup and Disney, been decided in Germany, the liability allocation would have been different. German courts generally seem more willing to second-guess directors' decisions than Delaware courts.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/german-law.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.