{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/governance-capture",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:governance-capture",
 "name": "Governance capture",
 "termCode": "governance-capture",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/governance-capture.md",
 "sha256": "70b7a0237e4fea18e9332c53c80c874424c134680e08d00eb8fe978fd061641c",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 2
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2021",
    "2022"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-014",
   "text": "When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.",
   "abstract": "When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fungible assets used as the dominant governance incentive",
    "actors who are identifiable"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-023",
   "text": "If the DAO governing a fair launch is controlled by a handful of people in a foundation setting, decentralized governance metrics are less likely to take hold and the public is correspondingly less likely to benefit from decentralized community governance over the launch.",
   "abstract": "controlled by a handful of people in a foundation setting, it is less likely that decentralized governance metrics take hold in the DAO. Accordingly, it is less likely that the public can benefit from the decentralized community governance over the fair launch.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAO controlled by a small group in a foundation setting"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'governance-capture'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}