{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/governance", "identifier": "kaal:entity:governance", "name": "Governance", "termCode": "governance", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. Kaal", "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X" }, "dateModified": "2026-07-29", "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/governance.md", "sha256": "d6c895d4e3ec8d9c0d414876682b80cc5ecb4f04c64fd152a69c9e4ebceb1c61", "additionalProperty": [ { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "status", "value": "derived" }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "claim_count", "value": 131 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "work_count", "value": 46 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "year_span", "value": [ "2009", "2026" ] }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "non_current_claims", "value": 0 } ], "subjectOf": [ { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:1428387-032", "text": "More disclosure does not always mean better governance, because the information provided may be hard to assess and evaluate.", "abstract": "More disclosure may not, however, always mean better governance if the information provided is hard to assess and evaluate.", "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387", "datePublished": "2009", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "where disclosed valuation and risk data is complex" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6aa3a280dc6750723be2389f3af2aabf3a16c4ce20e49fcdaddd7f2ea95a67aa", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-030", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-030", "text": "Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code let hackers move one third of its total funds to a subsidiary account, and that hack together with further technological limitations destroyed the DAO initiative.", "abstract": "Alas, things went terribly wrong with the DAO. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one-third of the total funds to a subsidiary account.92 This hack in combination with additional technological limitations brought down the DAO initiative.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO as launched in May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2939127-032", "text": "Open legal questions about the DAO, including which regime governs token issuance, minority token holder protection, taxation, the binding force of DAO smart contracts, ownership of intellectual property, and conflict resolution, must be answered before future DAO structures can operate seamlessly.", "abstract": "Open legal issues pertaining to the DAO need to be addressed before future DAO setups can operate seamlessly.", "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "future decentralized autonomous organization setups" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "abcef529c7200261c59eec43018375b3b26e3186239fb9d002bacc298dba26ff", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2992962-002", "text": "The authors stipulate distributed jurisdiction as a regulatory alternative in which conflict resolution for blockchain transactions is supplied by governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself rather than by external legal authorities.", "abstract": "We suggest a regulatory alternative for blockchain-based conflict resolution by way of governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself. We call this alternative \"distributed jurisdiction\".", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "80b92e67594394e38af41b769327936833de8e25d6cf3def966a6ba13bc83d17", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2992962-006", "text": "Because the challenges crypto transactions pose to the existing legal and jurisdictional infrastructure are severe, including good governance in crypto transactions requires instituting governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself.", "abstract": "Because of the severity of these challenges for the existing legal and jurisdictional infrastructure, we conclude that the sensible approach for including good governance in crypto transactions necessitates instituting governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "80b92e67594394e38af41b769327936833de8e25d6cf3def966a6ba13bc83d17", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-007", "text": "The DAO failed because of fundamental flaws in its own code, which allowed hackers to move one third of its funds to a subsidiary account, showing that governance built entirely on smart contracts inherits the defects of its code.", "abstract": "Alas, things went terribly wrong with the DAO. Fundamental flaws in the DAO code enabled hackers to transfer one third of the total funds to a subsidiary account.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033", "datePublished": "2017", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to organizations whose governance and asset control rest entirely on open source smart contract code" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125822-024", "text": "The platform becomes fully autonomous almost immediately after deployment, because once the Ethereum DApp is posted its authors have no more control over the evolution of the expertise tags than any other Ethereum user.", "abstract": "The platform achieves full autonomy almost immediately. Once the Ethereum DApp is posted to the blockchain, its authors have no more control over the evolution of the expertise tags in its forum than any other Ethereum user.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "after the DApp is deployed to the blockchain" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-024", "text": "A healthy expertise will have near unanimous consensus on every evidence of work validation pool, and that very unanimity creates an impediment to development, because honest members risk their stakes by voting for untested changes.", "abstract": "A healthy expertise will continually have near-unanimous consensus on every evidence-of-work validation pool. This creates an impediment to development.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "well functioning expertise where all members run the same validated algorithms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3128900-018", "text": "Unlike its decentralized competitors, the Semada Protocol is claimed to be resistant to both Sybil attacks and Tyranny of the Majority attacks.", "abstract": "However, unlike its decentralized competitors, the Semada Protocol ensures Sybil Attack and Tyranny of the Majority attack resistance.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "comparison with existing decentralized mechanical turk protocols" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "381d72e85d976e2af852e8ec3bba87bc6a05ccb3349a2c3dd6f9e64de96ab4b0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-017", "text": "Many token whitepapers omit information necessary for a full economic analysis, and the research team could not find a single project among the top 100 that had examined blockchain governance fully.", "abstract": "Many whitepapers do not include all the information that would generally be necessary for a full economic analysis. For instance, the researchers could not find a project that had examined blockchain governance fully.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "whitepapers of the top 100 cryptocurrencies by market capitalization as of April 2018" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-042", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-042", "text": "Tokens launched before 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork governance mechanism or a combination of hardfork and one other governance type.", "abstract": "Tokens launched prior to 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork or a combination of hardfork and one of the other governance types depicted.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "top 100 tokens, governance types coded as hard fork, soft fork with tokenholder voting, masternodes, or other" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-043", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-043", "text": "Outlier governance mechanisms rose sharply in the dataset: three per year in 2015 and 2016, then eighteen in 2017, and five in the first six months of 2018.", "abstract": "During 2015 and 2016, three outlier tokens were launched per year. These tokens were Tether, Factom, and Iota; DigixDAO, Gas, and Ark. During 2017, this figure jumped to eighteen tokens.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance types coded as other" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-028", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations have begun to challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because blockchain enables the removal of agents as intermediaries through code, peer-to-peer connectivity, crowds, and collaboration.", "abstract": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-026", "text": "Full hardcoding is impossible: no stable cryptocurrency can encode all required policies and policy actions with full transparency, because future policy needs cannot be anticipated ex ante.", "abstract": "No stable cryptocurrency can hardcode all required policies and policy making actions with full transparency as future policy cannot be fully anticipated ex ante, before the needs occur.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "ef5031b16aa53476ed618f0bdf92601cd4affb893692c701134bd9cba3ea8acf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-027", "text": "Monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies should combine hardcoded transparent rules with protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations, with decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs functioning as the policy makers for what cannot be hardcoded.", "abstract": "monetary policy for cryptocurrencies can additionally be supported by protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs).152 Decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs can help function as policy makers.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "depends on DAO governance designs that address expertise and incentive problems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ef5031b16aa53476ed618f0bdf92601cd4affb893692c701134bd9cba3ea8acf", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-007", "text": "Good governance principles are crucial to every aspect of a long-term stable currency because markets inevitably change and because the Folk Theorems of game theory pose a fundamental obstacle to any fixed protocol.", "abstract": "Most importantly, good governance principles are crucial for every aspect of instituting any long-term stable currency due to inevitable changes in the market and the fundamental obstacle represented by the Folk Theorems of game theory", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "long-term stable currency designs" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-011", "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory imply that no matter how complicated a stable coin protocol becomes, a powerful and patient player has strategies to subvert the system and profit at the expense of the group.", "abstract": "No matter how complicated the protocols become for creating a stable coin, there are strategies that a powerful and patient player can use to subvert the system to profit at the expense of the group", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "any fixed protocol, however complex" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-012", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-012", "text": "Because no fixed rule set can resist a patient adversary, any stable coin scheme requires a nimble and responsive governance process whose rules can always be adjusted to changing market conditions.", "abstract": "This means a nimble and responsive governance process is required for any such stable coin scheme, because the rules must always be ready to be adjusted to respond to the changing conditions of the market", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "stable coin schemes operating over time in changing markets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-032", "text": "The day-to-day stability mechanism can be fully automated by algorithm, but monetary and fiscal policy choices cannot be: the algorithm's parameters must be chosen by hand and adjusted regularly to balance security against efficiency.", "abstract": "However, monetary and fiscal policy choices cannot be fully automated. The parameters for the algorithm must be chosen by hand and adjusted regularly to balance security with maximal efficiency in response to network performance", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "stability mechanisms operating in changing markets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-033", "text": "Parameter and policy choices for a stable cryptocurrency should be made by a decentralized autonomous organization, the Stability DAO or SDAO, which functions as a transparent, decentralized, open analog of the US Federal Reserve.", "abstract": "Such choices need to be made by a decentralized autonomous organization, which we call the Stability DAO or SDAO", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-036", "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate corruption, understood as behavior that profits a minority at the greater expense of the majority.", "abstract": "Finally, we repeat the idea that the Folk Theorems of game theory prove that it is impossible to create protocols, no matter how complex or well- engineered, which can eliminate corruption", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-037", "text": "No static set of rules can prevent the corruption that will eventually cause any stability design to fail, but a changing rule set administered by nimble governance can prevent that failure if enough resources reward anti-corruption effort.", "abstract": "No static set of rules can prevent the corruption that will eventually lead to the failure of any stability design. But a changing set of rules can prevent such failure", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "governance that devotes resources to detecting and rewarding anti-corruption effort" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-038", "text": "Because the Folk Theorems make governance protocols permanently provisional, long-term stability requires that the group be organized around a transcendental value, a goal meaningful and commonly held that cannot be captured by any logical rule set.", "abstract": "Therefore, for long-term stability, a group must be organized around a transcendental value that guides the members' behavior", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "long-term stability of a governed group" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-007", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because a DAO can operate a governance structure built entirely on software, code, and smart contracts.", "abstract": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs instantiated on public blockchain platforms such as Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-028", "text": "Democratized banking is more responsive to regulation than centralized structures because ideas at the edge have greater opportunity to affect policy, unlike the existing global hierarchy in which a single group in Basel provides the dominant voice.", "abstract": "democratized banking is more responsive to regulation because ideas at the edge have a greater opportunity for affecting policy than centralized structures such as the existing global hierarchy which leads to a single group in Basel, Switzerland providing the dominant voice.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized banking and underwriting with well designed governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-039", "text": "A DAO's profit distribution weights across present workers, past workers, protocol designers, and governance designers should match the DAO's current values, since a greater share for new workers attracts new workers, a greater share for older workers signals long term stability, and a greater share for protocol designers attracts innovation.", "abstract": "A greater share for new workers will attract new workers, a greater share for the older workers will signal long-term stability, while a greater share for the protocol designers will attract more innovation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "algorithmic token design in a DAO" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-040", "text": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.", "abstract": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "infinitely repeated games using reputation or stakes", "static rule sets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411110-038", "text": "Private blockchains are the rational transitional vehicle for cautious enterprises, because they let firms experiment at relatively low cost and be better positioned when mass adoption occurs, while allowing the corporation to screen access to transaction records.", "abstract": "By setting companies up on private blockchains, companies can experiment with the technology which allows them to be better positioned when mass adoption occurs while keeping cost relatively low.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "corporations apprehensive about the cost and uncertainty of technology upgrades", "private permissioned chains with a governance system for access" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c7626eeb7642045b79f8745df1f7232a8fe8bc44a1f7e87b592850e35b392b50", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-008", "text": "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, attacking organizational design at a fundamental level rather than merely reforming it.", "abstract": "While it is still difficult to imagine a world without governance structures facilitated by agency constructs, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have started to challenge the core believe that governance necessitates agency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to DAOs built on smart contracting platforms such as Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-009", "text": "The first DAO removed, in essence, all of the core control mechanisms that principals typically employ in agency relationships, having no directors, no managers, and no employees.", "abstract": "Indeed, it had no directors, managers or employees. In essence, all the core control mechanisms typically employed by principals in agency relationships were entirely removed in the DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "refers to the DAO launched in May 2016 on Ethereum" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-022", "text": "DAOs are in their infancy and cannot currently overcome core governance problems while maintaining a decentralized structure; the two objectives are, as of 2019, in tension.", "abstract": "DAOs are in their infancy and cannot currently overcome core governance problems while maintaining a decentralized structure.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "state of DAO technology as of 2019" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-039", "text": "Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last: they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes.", "abstract": "Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last, they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to decentralized systems as to all attempts to organize society" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-040", "text": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static decentralized governance rules can always be gamed and only dynamic, changing rules can address the problem.", "abstract": "For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897", "datePublished": "2019", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "infinitely repeated games with reputation or stake based rules", "static rule sets" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-013", "text": "ICO sale terms are not fixed at launch: promoters can alter the smart contract to change the sales rules mid course during an offering, a risk factor for retail investors that has no analogue in a registered offering.", "abstract": "Promoters can also alter the smart contract to change ICO sales rules mid-course during an ICO.", "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663", "datePublished": "2020", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "ICOs administered through promoter controlled smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-033", "text": "Accountability is a structural concern in DeFi: without a central entity it can become unclear who is responsible for wrongdoing, and when problems arise no central party can freeze transactions, fix problems, or restore normal operations.", "abstract": "\"Without central entity involvement, who should be held accountable for potential wrongdoing can become unclear. Who do you resort to for help? When problems arise, no central party can take actions to freeze transactions, fix problems and restore normal operations.", "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663", "datePublished": "2020", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "fully decentralized finance systems without a central operator" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-004", "text": "Power in a blockchain system is exercised through the consensus protocol, which places control of data with multiple networked parties and thereby creates checks and balances that prevent any single vested interest from controlling the system.", "abstract": "Power is exercised by way of blockchain's consensus protocol. The consensus protocol enables the control of data by multiple networked parties. It facilitates a system of checks and balances that prohibits any vested interest and control of the system.", "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041", "datePublished": "2020", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5216a7bca45a48e3bef11ec524936e66af737c0fd66271e9f6866dc20a4482cc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-011", "text": "Corruption is defined as a minority subgroup collecting the power or wealth of an organization for its own benefit at the expense of the larger group.", "abstract": "Corruption happens when a minority subgroup collects the power or wealth of an or- ganization for its own benefit at the expense of the larger group.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-014", "text": "When the letter of the law becomes more important than the spirit of the law, internal competition for power makes the winning strategy to push behavior to the limit of what is acceptable.", "abstract": "When the letter of the law is more important than the spirit of the law, then internal competition for power within the hierarchy reveals the best strategy is to push your behavior to the limit of what is acceptable.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "formal rule based governance inside a centralized hierarchy", "internal competition for power" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-031", "text": "Western democracies still run on structures developed decades or centuries ago and have no formal interaction with the new data stream produced by modern information technology.", "abstract": "Western democracies are still using the structures developed decades or centuries ago, and lack any formal interaction with this new data stream.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "contemporary Western democracies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-037", "text": "The autonomous element of a DAO comes from its governance system being programmed through smart contracts, which makes a DAO ultimately democratic rather than relying on a benevolent dictator to correct course during black swan events.", "abstract": "The autonomous aspect of a DAO stems from its programmed governance system through smart contracts. A DAO is ultimately democratic, instead of having a benev- olent dictator behind the scenes to efficiently correct course during black swan events.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized autonomous organizations governed by smart contracts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-004", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-004", "text": "The unusual multi-millennial stability of Ancient Egypt and Imperial China, despite their strong political hierarchies, is explained by protocol decentralization rather than by any feature of their political centralization.", "abstract": "Ancient Egypt and Imperial China were relatively stable for millennia despite strong political hierarchies. What distinguished these civilizations from the many others that rose and fell around them? Their stability was due to protocol decentralization.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "comparison against contemporaneous civilizations that rose and fell" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-007", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-007", "text": "The unstoppable power of decentralization is threatened by unregulated competition for profits, but it can be maintained even in extreme circumstances by a secure and meaningful reputational system.", "abstract": "The \"unstoppable power of decentralization\" is threatened by unregulated competition for profits, but can be maintained in the most extreme circumstances by a secure and meaningful reputa- tional system.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized organizations exposed to profit competition", "requires the reputation system to be secure and meaningful" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-010", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-010", "text": "Transcendental values are more stable unifiers of a group than formal secular rules.", "abstract": "From an abstract perspective, transcendental values are more stable unifiers than formal secular rules.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-011", "text": "No set of written rules can be made complete: the Folk Theorems demonstrate that however rules are written, strategies exist that follow those rules yet profit the individual at the expense of the group, so a perfect secular constitution is impossible.", "abstract": "The Folk theories demonstrate that how- ever the rules are written, strategies exist which follow the rules, yet profit the indi- vidual at the expense of the group.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "any static, formally specified set of rules governing a group" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-013", "text": "Because a transcendental value is by definition not rigorously formalizable, people organizing around an eternally unobtainable ideal without clear boundaries are less likely to probe the boundaries of acceptable behavior.", "abstract": "On the other hand, a transcendental value by defini- tion is not rigorously formalizable. When people organize around an eternally unob- tainable ideal without clear boundaries, they are less likely to probe the boundaries of what is acceptable.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "groups organized around an ideal that has no clear formal boundaries" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-018", "text": "The centralized hierarchy built by the Chinese Communist Revolution was extremely successful at the military goal it was designed for, but once the military threat was gone it failed completely at solving other important problems, producing catastrophic reforms such as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.", "abstract": "This centralized hierarchy was extremely successful at the military goal it was designed for, but completely failed at solving other important problems once the military threat was gone.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "China from 1949 until Mao Zedong's death in 1976" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-020", "text": "Without a transcendental spiritual or philosophical principle to unify a society, its rules erode as exceptions to the routine are discovered that improve function temporarily yet violate the founding principles of the culture, and such violations split the population.", "abstract": "With- out a transcendental spiritual/philosophical principle to unify a society, the rules erode as exceptions to the routine are found which improve function temporarily, yet violate the founding principles of the culture. Such violations split the population.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "societies lacking a unifying transcendental principle" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-028", "text": "Almost every blockchain project the authors are aware of is suffering under the centralizing force of competition for equity control and profit, and such projects predictably move toward centralization when unconscious of these forces.", "abstract": "In fact, almost every blockchain project we're aware of is suffering under the central- izing force of competition for equity control and profit.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "contemporary for-profit blockchain and Web3 projects" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-029", "text": "Good ideas will fail to be implemented unless the reward structure is balanced, because people rarely keep working idealistically toward group goals while rent seekers at the top split the rewards unfairly.", "abstract": "Good ideas will fail to be implemented unless the reward struc- ture is balanced.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "projects where rewards are visibly distributed among contributors" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-033", "text": "Reputation permits business with any member of a network regardless of personal acquaintance, but only if the network is closed and its size is limited by the ability to police reputation with the available information technology.", "abstract": "First, reputation allows business dealings with any member of the network, regard- less of personal acquaintance. This requires the network to be closed, however, with a size limited by the ability to police reputation using the information technology available.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "reputation-based networks", "network must be closed", "size bounded by available information technology" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782193-039", "text": "The authors stipulate that functioning democracies are decentralized autonomous organizations: the United States government is a DAO, as are Norway, Mauritius, Uruguay, and South Korea, and every functioning democracy is more akin to a DAO than to a centralized corporation.", "abstract": "The United States government is a decentralized organization, a DAO. Norway is a DAO—the best DAO according to the democracy index.38 Mauritius, Uruguay, and South Korea are also DAOs. Every functioning democracy is more akin to a DAO than to a centralized corporation.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "functioning democracies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-005", "text": "Social networks grow exponentially more powerful through the network effect, but they are stifled by the centralized ownership and governance of the Web 2.0 companies that run them; governing decentralized information flow requires decentralized incentive designs.", "abstract": "But these networks are stifled by the centralized ownership and governance of the Web ).5 companies that run them. Governing decentralized information flow ne- cessitates decentralized incentive designs.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to networks whose value comes from member interaction" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-014", "text": "A truly decentralized organization requires that its rules be transparently available to all members; otherwise the keepers of the knowledge acquire higher status and a hierarchy forms.", "abstract": "In order to have a truly decentralized organization, the rules must be transpar- ently available to all members. Otherwise the keepers of the knowledge have a higher status, creating a hierarchy.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to organizations that claim to be decentralized" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-017", "text": "The Apache Foundation's minimal governance works only because its members are not competing for power and money within the organization, which limits how far the model can be transferred to for profit settings.", "abstract": "But how can they thrive? The Apache Software Founda- tion's near trivial governance system works in an organization whose members are not competing for power and money within the organization.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to non profit open source foundations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-037", "text": "Anonymity should be balanced rather than absolute: a member's power to broadcast should be tied to a pseudonymous account carrying meaningful and valuable reputation that is lost when the broadcasting power is abused.", "abstract": "Therefore, anonymity should be balanced. Your power to broadcast your voice should be tempered by hav- ing that voice tied with a pseudonymous36 account with meaningful and valuable rep- utation. If you abuse your broadcasting power, then you should lose your reputation.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to decentralized networks that permit anonymous participation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782198-038", "text": "The r/place experiment showed that anonymous groups can self correct: each time a hate symbol such as a swastika appeared on the shared canvas, it was replaced with something more positive.", "abstract": "In the end, however, each time a hate symbol cropped up, it was replaced with something more positive.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "based on the r/place experiment run from April 2017" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-008", "text": "Keeping decentralized networks running productively requires a dynamic design with checks and balances combined with the incentive design insights of game theory.", "abstract": "A dynamic design with checks and balances and the incentive design insights of game theory are necessary to keep these networks running productively.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to decentralized networks intended to operate over time" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-009", "text": "The governance architecture designed for one decentralized institution can be ported to many other DAOs with only superficial changes, so institutional design effort is reusable across the ecosystem.", "abstract": "The archi- tecture guiding one institution can be reasonably ported to many other DAOs with superficial changes.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-020", "text": "Ethereum will not be efficient until it operates inside a robust decentralized economy, and it will not last at all unless its governance is fixed.", "abstract": "Like Bitcoin, it won't be efficient until it lives in a robust decentralized economy. It won't last unless its gov- ernance is fixed.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to Ethereum specifically" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-021", "text": "Reputation rather than money is the proper motivator of good behavior in business and governance, because properly accounting for reputation switches incentives from short-term zero-sum thinking to long-term positive-sum behavior.", "abstract": "This is the proper goal, instead of money, for motivating good behavior in business and governance. Properly accounting for reputation switches the incentives from short-term zero-sum thinking to long-term positive-sum behavior.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires a secure and meaningful system for accounting reputation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-023", "text": "Decentralized power regulation has been a conscious goal for centuries, but only now has technology improved enough to account for good and bad behavior on a near infinitesimal scale and to reward and punish fairly.", "abstract": "Decentralized power regulation has been a conscious goal since the FGth century. To- day the technology has improved, so that it is possible to account for good and bad behavior on a near infinitesimal scale and reward and punish fairly.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "depends on contemporary measurement and accounting technology" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-024", "text": "A sophisticated governance system is required for a decentralized organization to adjust effectively to market changes and to maintain stability.", "abstract": "A sophisticated system of governance is required to effectively adjust to market changes and to main- tain stability.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-025", "text": "Decentralized governance design must address all three branches: executive governance as automated policing, legislative governance as non-automated protocol development, and judicial governance as both automated and non-automated dispute resolution.", "abstract": "Executive (automated policing), legislative (non-automated protocol de- velopment), and judicial (both automated and non-automated dispute resolution) governance must be considered.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-026", "text": "Reputation and governance are the two most important institutions missing from the decentralized economy, and once they are solved the remaining missing pieces are relatively easy to supply.", "abstract": "Reputation and governance are the two most important institutions that are lack- ing in the decentralized economy. They occupy the majority of our concern for the remainder of the book. Once they are solved, the rest of the missing pieces are rela- tively easy to supply.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-035", "text": "A fully decentralized structure with proper governance could solve the abuses that pervade the gig economy.", "abstract": "The gig economy is rife with horror stories, but a fully decentralized structure with proper governance could solve such problems.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires proper governance design" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-006", "text": "The failure of many DAOs to date is traceable to their reliance on the good will of network members rather than on engineered incentives.", "abstract": "The failure of many DAOs, so far, has been their reliance on the good will of the members of the network.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized autonomous organizations observed to date" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-022", "text": "Because eternally perfect protocols are impossible, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, the remedy is not a better static ruleset but a system that continually improves its protocols and smart contracts in reaction to market change.", "abstract": "The impossibility of creating eternally perfect protocols, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, is addressed by a sys- tem which continually improves protocols and smart contracts to react to changes in the market.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance systems that must adapt over time" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-029", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-029", "text": "Concentration of power is the greatest threat to any decentralized organization, because a single member or sub-coalition that gains a majority of power in an inherently democratic organization will eventually control it no matter what safeguards are in place, at which point the organization is no longer decentralized.", "abstract": "The idea is that if a single member, or even a sub-coalition, gains j\\% of the power in an inherently dem- ocratic organization, they will eventually control it, no matter what the safeguards are.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "democratic decentralized organizations", "especially profit-devoted and therefore competitive ones" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-033", "text": "One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions.", "abstract": "Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "organizations voting on matters requiring expertise" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-037", "text": "Members should not stake reputation tokens to register an opinion on a contentious topic; strict validation pools should be used only after debate has settled, to verify consensus.", "abstract": "Such con- tentious debate should not use strict validation pools anyway. You should not stake your reputation tokens in order to register your opinion on a contentious topic. Only once the debate has settled, should members risk their reputation to verify consensus with validation pools.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "protocol development debates where votes will not be near unanimous" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-001", "text": "The decentralized economy cannot fully proliferate until it acquires the institutions ordinary commerce depends on, above all a secure and meaningful reputation system for anonymous supranational partners and an effective, dynamic governance system.", "abstract": "the decentralized economy is missing the major institutions that our society relies on to conduct profitable business, especially a secure and meaningful system for evaluating reputation for anonymous supranational partners, and an effective and dynamic governance system", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "the decentralized economy as of the early 2020s" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-008", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-008", "text": "Liquidity has always been a problem on decentralized exchanges because meaningful history and reputation cannot form where there is little or no governance structure, no insurance, no appeals process and no reputable decentralized news service.", "abstract": "But liquidity has always been a problem in decentralized exchanges, as meaning- ful history and reputation are difficult to achieve when there is little to no governance structure, no insurance, no appeals process, and no reputable decentralized news ser- vice", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-014", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-014", "text": "Reputation must be grounded to be meaningful, so reputation tokens should be minted only when policy premia enter the group, reputation should dictate power, and fees should be shared through reputation weighted salaries.", "abstract": "Reputation needs to be grounded to be meaningful, so reputation tokens should only be minted when fees (policy premia) enter the group. Reputation should dictate power in the group. So, reputation should determine how the fees are shared, through reputation-weighted salaries.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "design for an Underwriting DAO" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-033", "text": "Because the tension between efficiency and security demands a careful estimate of the hot money ratio, a sophisticated decentralized governance system is crucial for any efficient stablecoin.", "abstract": "The tension between these two values of efficiency and security motivates a careful esti- mate of the hot money ratio. This means a sophisticated decentralized governance system is crucial for any efficient stablecoin.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-002", "text": "Governance in a decentralized organization depends on meaningful reputation, and the meaning of any reputation is determined by its history and by how that history is analyzed and presented, which makes historiography a governance variable rather than a neutral record.", "abstract": "Governance relies on meaningful reputation to de- cide who or what to focus on. The meaning of reputation is determined by its history and how that history is analyzed and presented.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized organizations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-013", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-013", "text": "Robust decentralized oracles do not yet exist despite well funded proposals, because decentralized oracles are themselves DAOs and therefore inherit the same missing incentive structure, governance processes, and history that all DAOs suffer from.", "abstract": "Put simply, decentralized oracles are DAOs, so they still lack the proper incentive structure and governance processes and history that all DAOs suffer from.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "state of the technology at the time of writing" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-038", "text": "Review creates a decentralized history for a DAO, and that history gives the organization momentum, gives meaning and focus to perception, and is the basis for making governance, understood as steering, more effective.", "abstract": "Review helps create a decentralized history for a DAO, which gives them momentum. History gives meaning and focus to our perceptions. History is the basis for making governance (steering) more effective.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "DAOs with reviewable histories" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-028", "text": "The drift into static power relationships is a universal temptation because centralization is efficient, yet centralized governance is provably flawed.", "abstract": "we must protect the group from falling into static power rela- tionships. The temptation is universal, because of the efficiency of centralization, but it is provably flawed.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "organizations facing the choice between centralized and decentralized governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-001", "text": "The concept of a DAO fails if it becomes centralized, and centralization in governance is the largest single threat to a DAO.", "abstract": "The concept of a DAO fails if it becomes centralized. Centralization is omnipresent in computing systems, economics, and society at large. Yet centralization in governance is perhaps the largest threat to a DAO.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-021", "text": "Governance is the common denominator of the shortcomings in existing DAO infrastructure; it is not a bug or an afterthought in system design but the key feature.", "abstract": "The common denominator of the aforementioned shortcomings in the existing DAO infrastructure is governance. Governance is not a bug or an afterthought in system design. Governance is the key feature.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-020", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808859-020", "text": "The absence of a centralized authority makes open source projects prone to separation movements, because rival developer cliques form their own belief systems about the direction of development with no authority to resolve the dispute.", "abstract": "Because no centralized authority decides the direction of development, open source projects are more prone to cliques of developers that develop their own belief system regarding certain aspects of the development process.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "contrasted with centralized software projects" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808859-021", "text": "An optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool would make separation movements in open source less likely, because voters who know the process rewards truth-seeking are more likely to accept an adverse outcome; emerging decentralization technology makes such a tool theoretically feasible.", "abstract": "Perhaps if the open source movement had an optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool, such separation of interests and development would become less likely.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "speculative", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "conditional on incentive-optimal voting mechanisms being buildable" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808859-025", "text": "The degree of decentralization of an open source project is determined by the degree of hierarchy in its governance: a flat structure with consensus decision-making and no power disparities between developers is the most decentralized form.", "abstract": "The degree of decentralization in open source communities and projects is dictated by the degree of hierarchies in the governance of a given project.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "author stipulates this measure for comparing open source projects" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808859-027", "text": "Meritocratic allocation of power in open source projects is often a fallacy, because rank can reflect timing and one-off contributions, deflation is not built into the perception of merit, and free riding on past reputation is therefore possible.", "abstract": "In other words, deflation is not built into the perception of merit and free riding is possible.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies where rank is awarded on perceived merit and not periodically revisited" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "304ad25d43b5ecea3158e3a2ca04e6e1e3bd2958e2134e2dcefbfedf3b6f3ab7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-021", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-021", "text": "Decentralized voting solutions require political will as well as technology, and governments in existing representative democracies may refuse to surrender control over the voting process, preferring private blockchains to facilitate voting outcomes.", "abstract": "Yet, governments in the existing representative democracies may not wish to surrender control over the voting process and may prefer to use private blockchains to facilitate voting outcomes.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "government controlled voting infrastructure" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eeccf6d0587bd278a96ce6ac8ec5003e26d161c245f6c94b4144d84f374802eb", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-006", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-006", "text": "Platform centralization is especially damaging in developer communities because developers are the channel through which information from the edges of the system and society enters, and through which consensus on emerging technologies is formed.", "abstract": "Platform centralization is particularly detrimental in the developer community because it is the developer community that brings information in from the edges of the system/society and helps form a consensus on emerging technologies for society.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "technology platforms whose direction is controlled centrally" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55a71cdfceb96fadefba1f2fed9563b588825378c91aff644ee7faaccdf31204", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-011", "text": "The delayed voting outcomes and feedback effects created by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting let DAOIC members triangulate their own internal liquidity position against deal feasibility.", "abstract": "At the same time, the delayed voting outcomes and associated feedback effects enabled by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting enable DAOIC members to triangulate their own internal liquidity with deal feasibility.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "two phase loosely coupled and tightly coupled reputation staking votes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-027", "text": "Against the view that firm commitment underwriting is antithetical to decentralization, Kaal argues it in fact further enhances the level of decentralization.", "abstract": "While firm commitment underwriting may be seen as antithetical to decentralization, it in fact further enhances the level of decentralization.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "firm commitment underwriting by the DAOIC member collective" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-034", "text": "Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public.", "abstract": "However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "loosely coupled votes on particular deals are publicly visible" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-039", "text": "Ratio adjustments are the DAOIC's key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall policy, and they should be subject to a member vote conducted through the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms.", "abstract": "Ratio adjustments provide a key tool for strategic increases in profitability and overall DAOIC policy. Ratio adjustments should be subject to DAOIC member vote following the decentralized reputation staking governance mechanisms (Calcaterra & Kaal et al (2019)).", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance metrics subject to dynamic upgrade over the DAOIC life cycle" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-003", "text": "Private foundations exercise plutocratic power because their leaders and trustees are not elected democratically, they are permitted to operate in perpetuity, and their operations lack accountability and transparency.", "abstract": "Private foundations have plutocratic power because such organizations' leaders or trustees are not elected democratically, they are allowed to work in perpetuity, and their operations lack accountability and transparency.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "private foundations", "jurisdictions permitting perpetual foundations" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-022", "text": "Any exercise of the multisig endowment wallet keys ultimately depends on a vote in the assembly of the DAO association that serves as legal wrapper, so a donor holding one key among many is involved in endowment payment decisions without controlling them.", "abstract": "The exercise of the multisig wallet keys will ultimately always depend on a CHARITYxDAO vote in the assembly of the CHARITYxDAO association (the legal wrapper – if chosen to be a Swiss Association). As a multisig key holder, the donor will be involved in multisig endowment payment", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "endowment wallets held in a DAO legal wrapper such as a Swiss Association" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-003", "text": "The foundation model for token issuance is a core form of centralized top-down governance, and most ICO projects were governed by a small group of individuals rather than by the community at large or a DAO.", "abstract": "The foundation model for token issuance is a core form of centralized top-down governance in the context of token offerings.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "ICO era token issuance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-022", "text": "The more decentralized the governance of a fair launch protocol, the less likely the project will be seen as treating public users unfairly, which makes a decentralized autonomous organization design advisable for fair launch projects.", "abstract": "The more decentralized the governance of a fair launch protocol, the less likely the project will be seen as not treating the public users unfairly. In this context, it may be advisable for fair launch projects to be launched in a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) design.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "governance design is transparent and decentralized" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-027", "text": "Founders may hold significant influence over DAO votes initially depending on the DAO design, but higher levels of governance decentralization mitigate these centralization effects quickly through the onboarding of new DAO members.", "abstract": "Depending on the DAO design, the founders may have significant influence over the DAO votes initially. However, higher levels of DAO governance decentralization mitigate these centralization effects quickly via the onboarding of new DAO members.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "early stage of DAO formation", "DAO design permits ongoing member onboarding" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-041", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-041", "text": "Rug pull practices can take the form of a whale guaranteeing an inside developer or business head a percentage participation if that insider changes the code governing the project to produce an outcome that benefits only the whale and its associates.", "abstract": "example, a whale may guarantee an inside developer or business head a percentage participation if the insider changes the code that governs the project for a beneficial outcome that only benefits the whale and its associates.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "insiders retain the ability to change project code" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-005", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-005", "text": "Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized governance, and selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens creates the risk of hostile takeover or looting.", "abstract": "Governance through fungible tokens in fundraiser DAOs allows whales to control the DAO, which is antithetical to the idea of DAOs overall and decentralized governance of DAOs specifically. More specifically, selling purchasable voting power via fungible tokens risks hostile takeovers or looting.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "governance rights attached to fungible, purchasable tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-011", "text": "Insider rug pulls are not the only exploit path: a DAO can also be attacked from the outside whenever its governance grants voting power through fungible tokens.", "abstract": "But these inside rug pulls are not the only exploitative mechanism within DAOs. DAOs can also be exploited from the outside if the DAO's governance allows fungible voting power.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "governance voting power is denominated in fungible tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-028", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-028", "text": "True anonymity remains eternally difficult to attain with existing web3 technology, yet anonymity in DAO governance is the holy grail of decentralized web3 business and society.", "abstract": "while it is eternally difficult with existing technology to attain true anonymity in web3 systems, anonymity in DAO governance is the wholly grail of decentralized web3 business and society.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "given existing web3 technology" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-002", "text": "Each DAO in the dataset was given a score between zero and ten by the analyzing teams on each of six factors: Decentralization, Work to Earn, Attack Resistance, Regulatory Compliance, Governance, and Organizational Communication.", "abstract": "The six factors considered are: Decentralization, Work to Earn, Attack Resistance, Regulatory Compliance, Governance, and Organizational Communication. Each DAO was given a score between zero (0) and ten (10) by the analyzing teams", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "scores assigned by the analyzing teams" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-009", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-009", "text": "Governance scores across the studied DAOs average 3.81 out of 10, with only a couple of DAOs scoring 7 or higher and the vast majority scoring 5 or less.", "abstract": "The average DAO scores for governance is 3.81 out of 10. With only a couple DAOs scoring 7 or higher, the vast majority of DAOs scored at 5 or less.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715", "datePublished": "2023", "claim_type": "empirical", "confidence": "evidenced", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-023", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4685567-023", "text": "Donor community votes have no binding legal effect on the 501c3 that holds the assets, yet the board will in practice follow the publicly visible voting and staking outcomes because departing from them puts the board and its long term client base at risk.", "abstract": "in effect it will adhere to the publicly visible voting and staking outcomes of the donor community on their chosen blockchain or centralized database. Not adhering to the choices made by the donor community risks the 501c3 board and its long-term client base.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "donor community does not pool assets or take custody", "voting and staking outcomes are publicly visible" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "87fb1be89d2661967ed2b0b673fe26448ded3bc3119b122177a4fc13ae5c085c", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4855607-033", "text": "The RLHF process is exposed to failure because participants may hold potentially adversarial and misaligned interests, so the vulnerability lies in the incentive structure of feedback provision rather than in the learning algorithm.", "abstract": "Currently, the RLHF process, which involves training AI models based on human preferences and feedback, can face challenges due to the potentially adversarial and misaligned interests of participants.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "RLHF systems where feedback providers have divergent stakes" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "eb0b3e62374b45a8fa888c6bde9725e606bcb46cf4b5e74a6e851d9f25099113", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900878-027", "text": "Decentralized governance models such as DAOs answer the criticism that micro level quantum properties do not scale to the macro level, because DAOs demonstrate participatory governance structures that operate effectively in large, complex economies.", "abstract": "Additionally, the use of decentralized governance models in tokenomics, such as DAOs, can address the criticism that quantum properties observed at the micro level do not scale up to the macro level.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "large scale decentralized economies with DAO governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "75bf96d3b751b4ad0a6ca4a32591cf026094f113e3a372aa6c61790941b391f7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900878-036", "text": "A reputation governance layer that awards reputation tokens for contributions and behavior fosters trust and drives positive engagement within a token community, complementing DAO based token holder voting.", "abstract": "the VOW ecosystem incorporates a reputation governance system, which rewards users with reputation tokens based on their contributions and behavior.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the VOW ecosystem as a case study" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "75bf96d3b751b4ad0a6ca4a32591cf026094f113e3a372aa6c61790941b391f7", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-034", "text": "Traditional hierarchical organizational structures are too slow to adapt to rapid technological change and stifle innovation through rigid control mechanisms, which is why they are unsuited to governing the quantum economy.", "abstract": "Traditional hierarchical structures are often slow to adapt to rapid technological changes and can stifle innovation through rigid control mechanisms.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-036", "text": "DAO accountability comes from the recording mechanism itself: because all transactions and decisions are written to an immutable blockchain that every stakeholder can inspect, no single actor can easily manipulate or obscure organizational activity.", "abstract": "All transactions and decisions are recorded on an immutable blockchain, accessible to all stakeholders. This transparency ensures accountability by making it difficult for any single actor to manipulate or obscure organizational activities.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-037", "text": "Encoding compliance and operational procedures in smart contracts removes discretionary human steps from execution, which minimizes human error and bias and raises the reliability and integrity of economic interactions.", "abstract": "By automating compliance and operational procedures through smart contracts, DAOs can minimize human error and bias, thereby enhancing the reliability and integrity of economic interactions.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880", "datePublished": "2024", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "64ea6e8b7cfb3d9a83801eba54f9b87182b842a963273ddab7f2d5305639db73", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5454054-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5454054-027", "text": "A disciplined, jurisdiction-specific controls framework should be treated as a condition precedent to launching LER, not as a matter to be resolved after deployment.", "abstract": "A disciplined, jurisdiction-specific controls framework should therefore be treated as a condition precedent to LER launch.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5454054", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "cross-border LER deployments" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9f53a865e6f0e5424640779df8f9b50923cd7d05649301dd4cc727144749b6e6", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5454054-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5454054-036", "text": "Before launch, an LER program requires a defined governance package: classification memoranda, financial promotions review, data protection impact assessments, an MSB or EMI evaluation, and consumer terms and conditions.", "abstract": "This involves several key preparatory steps before launch: drafting classification memoranda, conducting reviews of financial promotions, performing data protection impact assessments (DPIAs),", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5454054", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "pre-launch stage of an LER program" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9f53a865e6f0e5424640779df8f9b50923cd7d05649301dd4cc727144749b6e6", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5541658-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5541658-025", "text": "The fragmented United States approach to regulating legal AI, resting on voluntary federal standards and a patchwork of state initiatives, prioritizes innovation but fails to address systemic risks comprehensively.", "abstract": "The U.S. approach prioritizes innovation but struggles to address systemic risks comprehensively.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Morgan A. Gray, The Evolving Role of Artificial Intelligence in Law (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5541658", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "United States federal and state oversight of AI in legal and judicial contexts" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "e543a2d698fcd522d4d02e034cc9ee1344d0015d2c824b40b9e05ab7c0728c60", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-018", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-018", "text": "Escrow based enforcement is effective for automation only if it is supported by reliable oracles and robust governance, without which the mechanism is open to manipulation.", "abstract": "Escrow mechanisms, while effective for automation, require reliable oracles and robust governance to prevent manipulation, as emphasized by Zhao and Chen.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "escrow arrangements embedded in smart contracts", "real world conditions that must be verified off chain" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-019", "text": "The code is law paradigm departs from existing legal systems in three linked ways: it shifts authority from sovereign institutions to technical protocols, replaces interpretive flexibility with deterministic enforcement, and substitutes technological neutrality for normative deliberation.", "abstract": "fundamentally contrasts with existing legal systems by shifting authority from sovereign institutions to technical protocols, replacing interpretive flexibility with deterministic enforcement, and substituting normative deliberation with technological neutrality.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "blockchain and smart contract architectures presented as self-sufficient regulation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-024", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-024", "text": "The deterministic execution of smart contracts rigidly enforces coded terms and thereby incentivizes participants to exploit loopholes for immediate gain, because no mechanism exists to adapt the rules contextually.", "abstract": "Conversely, smart contracts' deterministic execution rigidly enforces coded terms, incentivizing participants to exploit loopholes for immediate gain, as there is no mechanism to adapt rules contextually.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "smart contracts without on chain amendment or human review mechanisms" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5554218-040", "text": "The Universal Digital Law Codex is a continuously evolving project whose first draft was scheduled for publication in autumn 2025, after which its institutional structures would be established as a DAO.", "abstract": "UDLC is a project that is constantly evolving. The first draft will be published in the autumn 2025, after which the corresponding institutional structures will be set up based on a DAO.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "predictive", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "as of the August 2025 version of the paper" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "55738b4035a91b70aa2ddaa127552fe4b373ec641afee2719fbdcabebdcbea44", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-001", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-001", "text": "The Universal Digital Law Codex is proposed as a neutral legal framework for digital interactions, assets, contracts, dispute resolution and governance that is built to adapt to technological change rather than be rewritten after each technological shift.", "abstract": "The Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) is a pioneering legal initiative that aims to create a neutral legal frame- work for digital interactions, assets, contracts, dispute resolution and governance, which can adapt to technological changes.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "proposed as a private framework for digital systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-032", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-032", "text": "A DAO is formed on the basis of a DAO Agreement setting out its terms and rules, and that agreement may consist of digital contracts, of written documents, or of a combination of the two.", "abstract": "(1) A DAO shall be formed on the basis of a DAO Agreement, which sets out the relevant terms and rules of the DAO in question. This agreement may consist of Digital Contracts, written documents, or a combination of the two.", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-033", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-033", "text": "Membership in a DAO follows from consent, explicit or implicit, given on the basis of a sufficiently accessible DAO Agreement, so accessibility of the agreement is a precondition for binding members who joined by interacting with the code.", "abstract": "(1) Any Legal Identity who have consented to join the DAO based on a sufficiently accessible DAO", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "the DAO Agreement is sufficiently accessible", "consent may be given by interacting with the DAO digital contracts or governance systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-037", "text": "Every DAO member must have a real possibility to exit the DAO under the rules of the DAO Agreement without incurring unreasonable costs, which makes exit a mandatory feature of a compliant DAO rather than a matter of design choice.", "abstract": "(1) A DAO Member must have the possibility to exit", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "exit follows the rules of the DAO Agreement" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-038", "text": "Amendments to any one Book of the Codex must be consistent with the overall objectives and principles of the Codex, so internal coherence constrains the amendment power itself.", "abstract": "Any amendments made to one Book of UDLC Co- dex must be consistent with the overall objectives", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-039", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-039", "text": "Amendment authority is centralized: the UDLC Governing Council holds the exclusive authority to amend any Book or provision of the Codex, while proposals may originate from the association bodies, registered legal experts, stakeholders or other authorities.", "abstract": "(1) UDLC Governing Council according to holds the exclusive authority to amend any Book or provision", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-040", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886342-040", "text": "In exceptional situations requiring urgent action the Governing Council may enact emergency amendments, which must be narrowly focused, well justified and reviewed within a defined timeframe.", "abstract": "(4) In exceptional situations requiring urgent action, the Governing Council may enact emergency", "citation": "Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "exceptional situations requiring urgent action", "emergency amendments must be narrowly focused and reviewed within a defined timeframe" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "dc456a1ce2ea4a356dbcb35dc900ec36be94b8c9b6da4a2c8c268d6301f66359", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-002", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-002", "text": "Kaal stipulates two constructs: Agentic Decoupling, the progressive severance of value creation from human labor and consumption, and the Coasean Singularity, the point at which the theoretical justification for hierarchical governance disappears.", "abstract": "The analysis introduces Agentic Decoupling, described as the progressive severance of value creation from human labor and consumption. And the Coasean Singularity, described as the point at which the theoretical justification for hierarchical governance disappears.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-017", "text": "When hyper rational agents can write and execute complete state contingent contracts at negligible cost, the Williamsonian justification for hierarchical governance evaporates.", "abstract": "hyper-rational agents can write and execute complete state-contingent contracts at negligible cost, the Williamsonian justification for hierarchical governance evaporates", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "requires that contracting and calculation costs for agents be negligible" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-025", "text": "Policymakers who cling to Nashian ideals risk obsolescence, because the future demands governance that orchestrates agentic plenitude rather than governance that mitigates human imperfection.", "abstract": "Policymakers clinging to Nashian ideals risk obsolescence. The future demands governance that orchestrates agentic plenitude, not mitigates human imperfection.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "normative", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-027", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-027", "text": "When all five drivers of positive transaction costs approach zero at once, transaction costs themselves asymptotically approach zero, a point the author names the Coasean Singularity: the point at which the rationale for the firm, for hierarchical governance, for relational contracting and for most formal institutions disappears.", "abstract": "When all five drivers of positive transaction costs approach zero simultaneously, transaction costs themselves asymptotically approach zero. This is what I have termed the Coasean Singularity herein, that is, the point at which the very rationale for the firm", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires simultaneous elimination of opportunism, asset specificity, bounded rationality, uncertainty and costly information" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-036", "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-036", "text": "When the five drivers of positive transaction costs are simultaneously eliminated, the theoretical justification for firms, contracts and most formal institutions disappears, and the task of governance shifts from minimizing frictions to orchestrating abundance.", "abstract": "When the five drivers of positive transaction costs are simultaneously eliminated, the theoretical justification for firms, contracts, and most formal institutions disappears. Governance shifts from minimizing frictions to orchestrating abundance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442", "datePublished": "2025", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6192998-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6192998-003", "text": "The tension between the need for regulation and the desire for decentralization produces what the author terms the pacing problem: regulatory frameworks cannot keep pace with technological innovation, so the remedy lies in dynamic autonomous governance rather than static centralized control.", "abstract": "this tension between the need for regulation and the desire for decentralization creates what I term the \"pacing problem\"—regulatory frameworks cannot keep pace with technological innovation.10 The solution lies not in static centralized control but in dynamic, autonomous governance", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Domain-Specific Reputation Systems From Binary Validation to Citation-Weighted Knowledge Attribution (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6192998", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "definitional", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "b04292561ee041e0c9eaa7eca28a410ed440e76a95743a539361a3f76c97f2b3", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-031", "text": "The governance apparatus New Institutional Economics developed to counteract opportunism, including vertical integration, relational contracting, reputation mechanisms, hostage taking, and third party arbitration, becomes superfluous in the AI2AI economy.", "abstract": "The entire governance apparatus that NIE developed to counteract opportunism, including vertical integration, relational contracting, reputation mechanisms, hostage-taking, and third-party arbitration, becomes superfluous.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "conditional on the elimination of opportunism among autonomous agents" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "0f4f68e56ee48bb8b2d73d3ab7fd96fa572e76c195694ffa740360704c1b172d", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-031", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-031", "text": "Static regulatory frameworks calibrated to legislative timescales cannot govern technologies evolving on exponential timescales, so dynamic regulation that self-adjusts through built-in feedback mechanisms is a precondition for effective governance of the computative domain.", "abstract": "Dynamic regulation, institutional architecture that self-adjusts in response to technological change through built-in feedback mechanisms, is a precondition for effective governance of the computative domain.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies to technologies that change on exponential timescales" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6655138-022", "identifier": "kaal:claim:6655138-022", "text": "Reflection reputation must be bounded above as a fraction of total agent reputation, otherwise a meta-reputation aristocracy emerges in which agents specialize entirely in reflecting on others' allocations without contributing to the first-order surfaces.", "abstract": "Third, Σ_R reputation REP_R is bounded above as a fraction of total agent reputation by INV5, preventing the emergence of a meta-reputation aristocracy in which agents specialize entirely in reflecting on others' allocations without contributing to the prior five surfaces.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6655138", "datePublished": "2026", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "architectures that isolate cross-surface reflection on its own surface" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "52cb210167f06f0c7a2581214b156326216543de80b8394320b629c045c9e214", "status": "current" } ], "description": "131 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'governance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }