# Governmental contracts `kaal:entity:governmental-contracts` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 14 claims that carry the concept tag `governmental-contracts`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 14 claims across 1 works, 2014 to 2014. **2014** - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-022) [definitional/asserted] -- Governmental contracts are contractual arrangements between the government and a corporate entity under which the government imposes sanctions and institutional changes in exchange for foregoing further investigation and corporate criminal indictment. > Governmental contracts are contractual arrangements executed between the government and a corporate entity that allow the government to impose sanc- tions against the respective entity and set up institutional changes in exchange for the government's agreement to forego further investigation Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- Targeted use of governmental contracts allows the government to successfully reform corporate governance not only in individual public corporations but across entire industries. > Empirical evidence suggests that the targeted use of governmental con- tracts allows the government to successfully reform corporate governance in public corporations and entire industries70. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-025) [empirical/argued] -- The governance improvements documented in governmental contracts counteract or at least discount the standard criticisms of them, including unequal bargaining power, the government's lack of governance expertise, and the potential for prosecutorial abuse. > Concerns that may be dis- counted include the unequal bargaining power between the contracting par- ties78, the government's lack of governance expertise and training79, the po- tential for prosecutorial abuse80 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-027) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The effectiveness of existing preemptive remedial measures is in question, because the majority of governmental contracts are executed only after those measures have already proved unsuccessful. > the majority of governmental contracts are executed after preemptive remedial measures have proved unsuccessful85, calling into question the effectiveness of existing preemptive remedial measures. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-028) [predictive/argued] -- If governmental contracts increasingly mandate replacement of boards and senior management, boards will have stronger incentives to make preemptive remedial measures effective. > Should future governmental contracts increasingly mandate re- placement of boards and senior management (38% of governmental contracts from 1993 to 2013 replaced boards and management)86, boards may be fur- ther incentivized to optimize the effectiveness of preemptive remedial measures. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Because a governmental contract is executed only after wrongdoing has been identified and assessed, the parties can contract for governance improvements with relative precision, which reduces the amount of institution specific experimentation required and its transaction costs. > The assessment of corporate wrongdoing enables the parties to contract for governance im- provements with relative precision, allowing for less overall institution- specific experimentation and lower associated transaction costs. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-030) [mechanism/argued] -- Entity specific rulemaking via governmental contracts rests on a higher overall level of relevant and decentralized information than ordinary rulemaking, because the regulatory action follows an entity specific investigation of wrongdoing. > Because regulatory action associated with governmental contracts is based on an entity-specific investigation of wrongdoing, entity- specific rulemaking via governmental contracts is usually based on a higher overall level of relevant and decentralized information for rulemaking. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts lower contractual incompleteness, because they raise the availability, timeliness, and quality of information while lowering the cost of contracting. > Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts can lower contractual incompleteness because the feedback processes increase the degree of availability, timeliness, and quality of information and lower the cost of contracting. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Governmental contracts generate multilevel feedback processes across a sequence of stages: corporate self investigation, self reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of the contract. > Governmental contracts facilitate multi- level feedback processes by way of corporate self-investigation, self- reporting, preemptive remedial measures, negotiation of governmental con- tracts, continuing wrongdoing, and execution of governmental contracts Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Negotiation of a governmental contract produces indirect information transfers, because the government can deduce from where the corporate wrongdoer places negotiating emphasis which governance shortcomings most need remedying. > Indirect information transfers and feedback effects may exist because the government may be able to deduce from the emphasis of the corporate wrongdoer's negotiations what particular governance shortcomings need par- ticular remedying. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-036) [mechanism/argued] -- Regulators can extract industry specific guidance for rulemaking from the quantity of governmental contracts executed in a given industry and from the frequency of particular industry specific terms in those contracts. > Regulators may receive industry-specific guidance for rulemaking from the quantity of exe- cuted governmental contracts pertaining to a particular industry and the quan- tity of particular (industry-specific) terms in the governmental contracts per- taining to that industry. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Tailoring regulatory solutions to identified regulatory necessities through governmental contracts and then observing how those solutions perform over time lets rulemakers anticipate regulatory demands, which is institution specific ex ante experimentation. > Tailor- ing regulatory solutions to ascertainable regulatory necessities via govern- mental contracts and observing how these regulatory solutions function over time in governmental contracts allows rulemakers to anticipate regulatory demands Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-038) [mechanism/argued] -- Three mutually reinforcing phases of governmental contracts, investigation and self reporting, negotiation of terms, and execution and enforcement, raise the quality and quantity of institution specific information and the extent to which insights transfer to other firms. > Three mutually reinforcing core phases of governmental contracts increase the quality and quantity of institution-specific information and the corre- sponding extent of transferability of insights. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-040) [definitional/argued] -- Dynamic governance structures involving governmental contracts are backward looking because the multilevel feedback effects they generate require an exchange of information about past events in order to anticipate future regulatory contingencies. > Dynamic governance structures involving governmental contracts are back- ward-looking because multilevel feedback effects associated with govern- mental contracts necessitate an exchange of information pertaining to past events to anticipate future regulatory contingencies. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/governmental-contracts.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.