# Hard fork

`kaal:entity:hard-fork`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `hard-fork`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2018 to 2019.

**2018**

- [3249860-042](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-042) [empirical/evidenced] -- Tokens launched before 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork governance mechanism or a combination of hardfork and one other governance type.
  > Tokens launched prior to 2015 were overwhelmingly developed on a hardfork or a combination of hardfork and one of the other governance types depicted.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860

**2019**

- [3373393-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-039) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols, and socially optimal hard-forking rules cannot suffice.
  > Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols. Socially optimal hard- forking rules cannot suffice.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
- [3441904-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-024) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Hard forks can reintroduce the double spend problem, because wallets, merchants, and users running the previous code deem the new code invalid and cannot detect spending on it, so coins spent in a new block could be spent again on an old block.
  > Because wallets, merchants, and users running the previous code deem the new code invalid and thus cannot detect the spending on the new code, cryptocurrencies spent in a new block could be spent again on an old block.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-025) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- If a community cannot agree after a hard fork on which chain is the true chain, the result can be two blockchains competing in perpetuity, and the only viable remedy is abandoning one branch, which causes some miners to lose re-allocated transactions.
  > If after a hard fork, the respective community cannot agree on which chain is the true chain, e.g. the chain that provides the most likely survivable protocol, it may result in two blockchains that compete in perpetuity.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/hard-fork.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.