# Hedge fund regulation `kaal:entity:hedge-fund-regulation` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `hedge-fund-regulation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 5 works, 2009 to 2019. **2009** - [1428387-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Post-1998 hedge fund regulatory proposals were misdirected because LTCM was unique among its peers in leverage, position size, and market-making ability, so the proposals mostly addressed LTCM as a single case rather than the range of issues affecting all hedge funds. > Because LTCM was so unique among its peers due to its leverage, the size of its positions and its market making abilities, regulatory proposals mostly addressed LCTM as a single case119 rather than the range of issues pertaining to all hedge funds. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 - [1428387-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-016) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The regulatory proposals that appeared soon after LTCM did not adequately take valuation problems into account. > The regulatory proposals appearing soon after LTCM did not adequately take valuation problems into account. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 **2011** - [1806252-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-002) [design/argued] -- Because hedge funds play a large role in the credit derivatives market and that market recently failed, an increased regulatory emphasis on banks' lending exposure to hedge funds is justified. > Because of hedge funds' role in the credit derivatives market, in combination with the market's recent failure, this Article suggests that an increased emphasis on hedge fund lending exposure could be justified. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-017) [normative/argued] -- The SEC would be better advised to interpret the rulemaking authority it received from Congress than to increase requirements on hedge funds in order to address concerns over potential systemic risk. > Perhaps the SEC would be well advised to interpret the authority it received from Congress rather than to increase the requirements on hedge funds to address concerns over potential systemic risk. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Legislators had disincentives to impose harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry before the crisis, because harsher regulation could have driven franchise taxes and other business to offshore centers. > Legislators also had disincentives to impose harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry, because harsher regulation could have resulted in a loss of franchise taxes and other business to offshore centers. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 **2012** - [2150377-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Before Dodd-Frank the perimeter of hedge fund regulation was set by SEC no-action letters on client counting and by courts that gave very limited and sometimes contradictory guidance, so compliance rested on an unstable and uncertain base rather than on rules. > However, the SEC continued to provide guidance mostly in the form of no-action letters to help investment advisers determine the counting of clients to stay exempt from securities regulation.44 Courts also provided very limited and sometimes contradictory guidance.45 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 **2014** - [2389416-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-009) [empirical/asserted] -- No prior study had analyzed the performance implications of hedge fund adviser regulation, making this the first estimate of the causal effect of the Dodd-Frank Act registration requirement on hedge fund returns. > To our knowledge, no other study has analyzed the implications of hedge fund adviser regulation. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 **2019** - [3405660-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Direct hedge fund regulation faces a two sided trap: strong direct rules push hedge funds offshore where they escape regulation altogether, while weak rules leave investors without adequate protection. > Yet, regulators are faced with the problem of jurisdictional arbitrage, i.e. if they regulate directly, hedge funds may relocate offshore and escape from regulation altogether. If regulators impose weak regulations, investors may not be afforded adequate protection. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-005) [design/argued] -- Indirect regulation of hedge funds attains most regulatory objectives while still leaving the industry the operating freedom it needs, which makes it preferable to the direct alternatives. > The chapter shows that indirect regulation of the hedge fund industry attains most regulatory objectives while providing the industry with the needed freedoms. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-017) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- There is currently no precise formula for devising effective integrated prudential hedge fund regulation, so the prudential model remains underspecified. > Currently, no precise formula exist for devising effective integrated prudential hedge fund regulation. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/hedge-fund-regulation.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.