# Hedge fund returns `kaal:entity:hedge-fund-returns` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 14 claims that carry the concept tag `hedge-fund-returns`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 14 claims across 5 works, 2011 to 2019. **2011** - [1806252-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-010) [mechanism/argued] -- Because hedge fund trading strategies depend on confidentiality, required disclosures that let other market participants trade along or anticipate a fund's transactions can negatively affect the fund's absolute returns. > If other market participants trade along or are enabled to anticipate certain transactions by a hedge fund because of required disclosures, the disclosing hedge fund may not be able to fulfill its mandate to maximize shareholders' value Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 **2014** - [2389416-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-003) [empirical/evidenced] -- The hedge fund adviser registration requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date of March 30, 2012. > The registration requirement for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date, March 30, 2012. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-005) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs reduce the profitability of hedge fund advisers' investment management companies, but registration and disclosure requirements do not appear to reduce the returns of the hedge funds themselves. > However, while Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs affect the profitability of hedge fund advisors' investment management companies, registration and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act do not seem to affect the returns of hedge funds (Kaal 2013a). Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-007) [empirical/evidenced] -- Hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects adviser returns in March 2012, but the effect does not persist in the months after the registration effective date. > We find evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects hedge fund adviser returns in March 2012, but this effect is not persistent in the subsequent months after the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-016) [empirical/evidenced] -- In simple linear regressions of monthly returns on log AUM across the full sample, the AUM coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level only during March through August 2012. > When considering the entire sample and no dummy variable, the estimated beta for the logarithm of the AUM are statistically significant at 5% level only in the period March-August 2012. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-020) [empirical/evidenced] -- Under the sharp regression discontinuity design, the estimated treatment coefficient exceeds one only in March 2012, at 1.104 with a p-value of 0.015, and is close to zero and insignificant in every other month. > Only in March 2012, i.e. the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers, the estimated coefficient has value larger than one, while it is always close to zero in the other periods. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-021) [empirical/evidenced] -- The March 2012 discontinuity coefficient is the only estimate with a p-value below 5 percent; all subsequent monthly estimates are statistically insignificant. > Moreover, the coefficient in March 2012 is the only one with p-value smaller than 5%, while all the estimates in the following months are not significant. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- The March 2012 discontinuity effect is not persistent and is completely absorbed in the months following the registration effective date for private fund advisers. > However, this discontinuity effect we observe in March 2012 is not persistent and is completely absorbed in the months following the registration effective date for private fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-034) [empirical/evidenced] -- The difference-in-differences interaction term identifying treated funds in 2012 is positive and statistically significant in March, April, and May 2012. > Table 9 also shows that the dummy variable that identifies the treatment group univocally (year 2012 and AUM>150M) is positive and statistically significant in March, April and May 2012. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-037) [empirical/evidenced] -- Despite the great volatility of hedge fund adviser returns over the observation period, the empirical evidence for a discontinuity at the $150 million AUM threshold is robust, but the discontinuity does not persist beyond the registration effective date. > Despite the great volatility of hedge fund adviser returns displayed over the period under examination, the empirical evidence is robust. The discontinuity is not persistent and dissipates in the subsequent months after the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-038) [empirical/argued] -- The finding that Dodd-Frank Act registration does not depress hedge fund returns is consistent with prior evidence that higher administrative costs are only a second-order effect of the regulation. > Kaal (2013a) finds non-robust evidence that the higher administrative costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act are a second-order effect of the regulation, thereby not affecting the overall returns of hedge funds. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 **2016** - [2816408-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-024) [empirical/evidenced] -- Around the registration effective date, whether a fund's AUM sits above or below the $150 million regulatory threshold does not play a significant role in explaining hedge fund returns for the entire sample. > close to the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act, the size of AUM, above or below the regulatory threshold of $150 million, does not play a significant role in explaining hedge fund returns of the entire sample. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408 **2017** - [2959730-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-035) [empirical/evidenced] -- A blockchain enabled fund delivers performance competitive with traditional funds: LendingRobot claims average performance of 6.86% to 9.66% depending on strategy, against an average 8.89% annualized return for a broad range of traditional hedge funds as of March 2017. > LendingRobot claims an average performance of from 6.86% to 9.66% depending on the investment strategy selected by the clients.68 As of March 2017 an analysis of a broad range of traditional hedge funds shows an average of 8.89% annualized return. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730 **2019** - [3405660-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-008) [mechanism/evidenced] -- The same leverage that produced LTCM's high returns magnified its losses, so leverage is a symmetric amplifier rather than a one directional source of performance. > In spite of the fact that leverage was key to LTCM ́s high returns, it also magnified LTCM ́s losses. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/hedge-fund-returns.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.