# Impossibility results `kaal:entity:impossibility-results` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `impossibility-results`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 7 claims across 4 works, 2018 to 2021. **2018** - [3125827-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- No single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution can completely prevent independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming block production to advantage some parties over others. Any consensus protocol that relies on a permanently fixed rule set will therefore be gamed as conditions change. > In fact it is obvious there can be no single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution which completely prevents independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming the system by producing blocks with transactions that advantage some parties over others1. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 **2021** - [3782203-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-008) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Impossibility results establish that no static set of rules can eternally sustain a DAO, which is why DAOs must be set up to run with a dynamic set of rules from the very beginning. > The impossibility results show we can never design a static set of rules which will eternally sustain a DAO. But that just means we need to set up DAOs to run from the beginning with a dynamic set of rules. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782203-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-009) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Condorcet's paradox demonstrates that it is impossible to construct any democratic voting method that will faithfully discover the will of a group, because cyclic preferences can leave no clear winner. > Condorcet's paradox5 demonstrates it is impossible to construct any method that will faithfully discover the will of a group, with any type of democratic voting system. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782203-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Finding a correct by construction algorithm that incorporates all possible or even all practical assumptions about network status is not possible, because for any set of assumptions about network behavior an actor can break those assumptions by valuing some other result. > Finding a correct by construction algorithm that incorporates all possible, or even practical, assumptions of possible network statuses, is not possible. Given any set of assumptions about how the network will behave, you can always break those assump- tions by valuing some other result. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782203-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-029) [predictive/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The authors hold that the Bitcoin proof of work algorithm is ultimately flawed, that every consensus algorithm is flawed, and that it is not possible to create an algorithm that is not flawed. > However, we suspect that the Bitcoin PoW algorithm is ultimately flawed. In fact, we believe that every consensus algorithm is flawed. Further we are confident it is not possible to create an algorithm that is not flawed. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782214-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-003) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Every governance process ever implemented is flawed, and no perfect governance system is possible even under very minimal assumptions such as non dictatorship; the goal must therefore be practical and effective structures rather than perfect ones. > There are flaws with every governance process that has ever been implemented. In fact, it seems clear no perfect governance system is possible under very minimal assumptions, such as non-dictatorship (cf., Chapter a). Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782220-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The drift into static power relationships is a universal temptation because centralization is efficient, yet centralized governance is provably flawed. > we must protect the group from falling into static power rela- tionships. The temptation is universal, because of the efficiency of centralization, but it is provably flawed. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/impossibility-results.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.