# Incentive structure

`kaal:entity:incentive-structure`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `incentive-structure`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 3 works, 2013 to 2021.

**2013**

- [2273857-050](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-050) [mechanism/asserted] -- The social and mental properties of decision makers in financial institutions, combined with the incentive structure of the respective institutional setup, determine a financial institution's adaptive capability.
  > Social and mental properties of decision makers in financial institutions together with the incentive structure in the respective institutional setups can help determine a financial institution's adaptive capability.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**2017**

- [3067615-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Legacy businesses own their code and can sue competitors who copy it, whereas open source crypto start-ups rely only on licenses, and this weaker incentive structure makes ICO investments riskier.
  > While open-source crypto start-ups have licenses that help protect them from competitor companies who may be using their code for profit, legacy businesses that own their code and can sue competitors who copy such code which provides a different incentive structure and makes ICO investments riskier.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615

**2021**

- [3782217-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Robust decentralized oracles do not yet exist despite well funded proposals, because decentralized oracles are themselves DAOs and therefore inherit the same missing incentive structure, governance processes, and history that all DAOs suffer from.
  > Put simply, decentralized oracles are DAOs, so they still lack the proper incentive structure and governance processes and history that all DAOs suffer from.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/incentive-structure.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.