# Informal rules `kaal:entity:informal-rules` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `informal-rules`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 7 claims across 2 works, 2009 to 2013. **2009** - [1428387-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-025) [mechanism/argued] -- Qualified investors have strong incentives to accept valuation problems rather than contest them, because contesting would jeopardize their relationships with management and other industry participants and damage their own reputations. > Even though their preference may be to obtain accurate valuation when needed, they have strong incentives to accept valuation problems in order to maintain the relationships with management and other industry participants and protect their reputations. Managers are also dependent on their Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 - [1428387-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-026) [normative/argued] -- Because industry practices and informal rules already protect their relationships and investments, qualified investors may neither desire nor require extended investor protection rules to optimize hedge fund valuation. > Given their role in the industry, and the industry practices and informal rules that protect their relationships and investments, qualified investors may not desire nor require extended investor protection rules to optimize valuation of hedge funds. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 - [1428387-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-027) [normative/argued] -- Retail investors are more likely to benefit from investor protection rules that optimize hedge fund valuation, because their minority position in the industry, the absence of informal rules, and management's lack of incentive to protect them leave them unprotected. > Given their minority position in the industry and the lack of informal rules and management's disincentives to protect their investments, retail investors are more likely to benefit from investor protection rules that optimize valuation of hedge funds. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 **2013** - [2267560-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-021) [design/asserted] -- Opportunities for integrating dynamic elements into the rulemaking process include intra-jurisdictional feedback processes, feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, inter-jurisdictional feedback processes, informal rules, and organizational culture. > (i) intra-jurisdictional feedback processes such as (i) exchanges and synergies between public rulemakers and regulators, (ii) feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, (iii) inter-jurisdictional feedback processes, (iv) informal rules, and (v) organizational culture. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 - [2267560-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-022) [mechanism/argued] -- Parties subject to informal rules signal their preferences and efficient solutions to the public rulemaker, so informal rules and practices supply additional information that modifies rulemakers' actions and improves rulemaking. > Parties who are subject to informal rules signal their preferences as well as efficient solutions to the public rulemaker. Informal rules and practices therefore provide additional information that can help modify the actions of rulemakers and improve rulemaking. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 - [2267560-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-023) [definitional/argued] -- Unenforceable rules are irrelevant for purposes of economic analysis because they provide neither incentives nor sanctions, and legal rules without enforcement mechanisms do not qualify as institutions in the NIE framework. > Unenforceable rules are generally irrelevant for purposes of economic analysis because they do not provide incentives and sanctions. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 - [2267560-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Unlike ordinary private ordering, where formalization of informal rules can be a lengthy process that is never finalized, formalization of informal rules in the dynamic process happens sooner and is more likely to succeed if those informal rules provide relevant information for public rulemaking. > the formalization of informal rules in the dynamic process may happen sooner and is more likely to succeed and be finalized if the informal rules provide relevant information for the public rulemaking process. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/informal-rules.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.