{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/information-deficit",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:information-deficit",
 "name": "Information deficit",
 "termCode": "information-deficit",
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-025",
   "text": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.",
   "abstract": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, de-centralized, and institution-specific information.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-026",
   "text": "Congressional studies do not remedy regulators' informational disadvantage because they mostly follow after Congress has already identified concerns and may not provide real-time relevant information before regulatory action is necessary.",
   "abstract": "However, these studies mostly follow after Congress identified particular concerns in the regulatory structure or in financial markets. These studies may not provide real-time and relevant information before regulatory action by public rule-makers is necessary.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-014",
   "text": "The current regulatory framework contains no mechanism that succinctly and anticipatorily informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas, which is the specific informational gap the article proposes to fill.",
   "abstract": "The current regulatory framework lacks a mechanism that succinctly and anticipatorily informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "notice and comment rulemaking under the existing framework"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-010",
   "text": "The current regulatory framework contains no mechanism that informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas succinctly and in advance, so regulators learn about innovation only after the fact.",
   "abstract": "The current regulatory framework lacks a mechanism that succinctly and anticipatorily informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "asserted",
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7",
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  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'information-deficit'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}