# Institution specific information

`kaal:entity:institution-specific-information`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `institution-specific-information`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2013 to 2014.

**2013**

- [2273857-049](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-049) [mechanism/argued] -- Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information, including information on how financial institutions and their decision makers actually act and are expected to react to unforeseen contingencies.
  > Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-059](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-059) [mechanism/argued] -- A contingent capital triggering event signals that management was unable to manage the entity so as to avoid the trigger, and therefore signals to rulemakers that regulatory action may be needed, information regulators cannot obtain by monitoring debt to equity and capital adequacy ratios alone.
  > While regulators have other means of monitoring debt/equity ratios and capital adequacy ratios, a CoCo triggering event signals that management was unable to manage the entity to avoid the triggering event, suggesting that regulatory action may be needed.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Self reporting supplies institution specific information from which the government can identify governance shortcomings in the reporting entity and draw conclusions about regulatory needs across the entity's industry.
  > Based on the additional institution-specific information made available through self- reporting, the government can identify institution-specific governance short- comings and draw conclusions about regulatory needs in the respective indus- tries.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-038) [mechanism/argued] -- Three mutually reinforcing phases of governmental contracts, investigation and self reporting, negotiation of terms, and execution and enforcement, raise the quality and quantity of institution specific information and the extent to which insights transfer to other firms.
  > Three mutually reinforcing core phases of governmental contracts increase the quality and quantity of institution-specific information and the corre- sponding extent of transferability of insights.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/institution-specific-information.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.