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   "text": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and thereby improve institutional design.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process may increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and may improve institutional design.",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed, despite an existing economics literature applying dynamic regulation to telecommunications, learning by doing, and principal-agent problems.",
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   "text": "The institutional infrastructure for rulemaking was designed for a relatively stable society and stable economic and market environments, and it therefore fails to keep pace with rapidly evolving and increasingly complex modern markets.",
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   "text": "Rules with suboptimal characteristics are themselves the product of institutional arrangements and reinforce those suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes, creating a self-perpetuating feedback loop.",
   "abstract": "Rules with suboptimal characteristics are the results of institutional arrangements and reinforce suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes.",
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   "text": "Even institutional arrangements that produce optimal governance solutions generate solutions that become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.",
   "abstract": "Even if institutional arrangements produce optimal governance solutions, these solutions can become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.",
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   "text": "Rules that lack adaptability to future states of the world reinforce the very institutions and processes that produce suboptimal outcomes.",
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   "text": "Rules can be adaptable only if the institutions and rulemaking processes that produce them integrate dynamic elements that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Rules can be adaptable if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate dynamic elements that produce timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation is a form of Popper's piecemeal social engineering rather than holistic or utopian social engineering, because it is a piecemeal optimization process for institutional design with a largely private character.",
   "abstract": "The largely private character of dynamic regulation in combination with its piecemeal optimization features for rulemaking underscores its affiliation with piecemeal social engineering.",
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   "text": "The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking are likely to persist, which makes alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking more relevant.",
   "abstract": "The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking (Coffee 2012) are likely to persist, making alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking even more relevant.",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation should supplement existing institutional designs for rulemaking in order to counteract the negative consequences of cyclical rulemaking and improve corresponding institutional designs.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic regulation can supplement existing institutional designs for rulemaking, help counteract negative consequences of cyclical rulemaking, and improve corresponding institutional designs.",
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   "text": "The social and mental properties of decision makers in financial institutions, combined with the incentive structure of the respective institutional setup, determine a financial institution's adaptive capability.",
   "abstract": "Social and mental properties of decision makers in financial institutions together with the incentive structure in the respective institutional setups can help determine a financial institution's adaptive capability.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.",
   "abstract": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, regulatory agencies, self- regulatory bodies, and the literature on regulation, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.84",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
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   "text": "The historically evolved rulemaking infrastructure could cope with its own collective action problems, regulatory cycles, and trial-and-error rulemaking without major disruption because the scope of regulatory issues was limited and institutional designs were consensus driven.",
   "abstract": "issues.80 Because of the limited scope of regulatory issues and the need for consensus- driven institutional designs, the historically evolved infrastructure for rulemaking could cope with its inherent collective action problems,81 regulatory cycles,82 and trial-and-error",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
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   "text": "The doctrine of stare decisis and judicial adherence to precedent decided decades or centuries earlier mean the court system is structurally a suspension system for rapid change, built to supply stability and predictability rather than speed.",
   "abstract": "The doctrine of stare decisis and the courts' adherence to and application of precedent decided decades or centuries earlier illustrate that the court system is actually structured as a suspension system for rapid change in order to provide stability and predictability.",
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   "text": "Money and contracts are worthless in business with counterparties who cannot be trusted to keep a bargain, so decentralized commerce requires a system in which reputation means something.",
   "abstract": "Money and contracts are worthless in business with barbarians who can't be trusted to keep a bargain. To do business, we need a system where reputation means something.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192",
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   "text": "A radically decentralized economy cannot be achieved incrementally: eight institutional problems that centralized business solved centuries ago must all be solved simultaneously, and their solutions must be integrated with one another.",
   "abstract": "Before the vision of a radically decentralized economy can be achieved, engineers and architects need to solve eight big problems that business solved centuries ago. All eight problems need to be solved simultaneously, and the solutions need to be inte- grated with each other.",
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   "text": "Core institutions are perceived as leaching from the economy only because of corruption, and well designed systems eliminate those economic frictions.",
   "abstract": "It is only corruption that leads them to be perceived as leaching from the economy. Well-designed systems eliminate those economic fric- tions.",
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   "text": "The governance architecture designed for one decentralized institution can be ported to many other DAOs with only superficial changes, so institutional design effort is reusable across the ecosystem.",
   "abstract": "The archi- tecture guiding one institution can be reasonably ported to many other DAOs with superficial changes.",
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   "text": "Corruption has arisen in every organizational circumstance in recorded history, including the least extreme case of identified members of a single culture interacting face to face with deep community ties, so governance design cannot assume corruption can be eliminated.",
   "abstract": "Throughout history, however, people have repeatedly failed to organize effectively, and corruption has arisen in every circumstance, even without anonymity, in the less extreme situation involving identified members of the same culture under face-to-face circumstances with deep community ties.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
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   "text": "Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run, in order to defeat rational and opportunistic attempts to game the design.",
   "abstract": "Human nature and any effective machine derivatives of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
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   "text": "There is no consistent standard for DAO governance, which pushes each DAO to invent its own structure, and because decentralized governance is complex many of those structures fail to become truly decentralized, autonomous, or organized.",
   "abstract": "There is no consistent standard for DAO governance. This leads many DAOs to develop their own governance structure. However, because of the complex nature of decentralized governance, many DAO governance structures fail to become truly decentralized, autonomous, or organized.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715",
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   "text": "The author concedes that the institutions he previously advocated, including dynamic regulation, contingent capital, agile sandboxes and Web3 reputation systems, become at best transitional bridges for the remaining human layer and at worst unnecessary frictions in a substrate that has engineered human frailties away.",
   "abstract": "The institutions I once advocated to mitigate human frailties become, at best, transitional bridges for the remaining human layer and, at worst, unnecessary frictions in an economic substrate that has engineered those frailties away.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442",
   "datePublished": "2025",
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   "text": "Realizing the post Coasean horizon without succumbing to algorithmic feudalism requires deliberate institutional design, including equitable data governance, symbiotic human and machine constitutions and robust anti enclosure mechanisms.",
   "abstract": "Realizing this horizon without succumbing to algorithmic feudalism will require deliberate institutional design. This may include equitable data governance, symbiotic human–machine constitutions, and robust anti-enclosure mechanisms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442",
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   "text": "Contemporary AI's incapacity for authentic judgment under irreducible uncertainty is an institutional deficit rather than a computational one: an agent that bears no consequence for its errors cannot develop genuine discernment, no matter how capable it becomes.",
   "abstract": "This Article argues the limitation is institutional, not computational: agents bearing no consequence for error cannot develop genuine discernment.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6244278-002",
   "text": "Correctly designed institutional incentive structures produce emergent properties that are functionally equivalent to ethical agency, without requiring consciousness or programmed morality.",
   "abstract": "Correctly designed institutional incentive structures produce emergent properties functionally equivalent to ethical agency.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "incentive structures must be correctly designed",
    "properties are functional equivalents, not claims about consciousness"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "53533cdcc081184e7a376516ad4fece0a64ce49f6c8931b6a2c2e98ed914a84b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6244278-008",
   "text": "Rather than trying to endow AI with consciousness, embodiment, or sentience, the proposed framework engineers the institutional conditions under which consequence becomes a structural feature of agent participation, using the reputation-driven decentralized autonomous organization as the mechanism.",
   "abstract": "my proposal engineers the institutional conditions under which consequence becomes a structural feature of probabilistic agent participation. The mechanism is the reputation-driven decentralized autonomous organization.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "consciousness and embodiment are treated as capacities probabilistic AI manifestly lacks"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "53533cdcc081184e7a376516ad4fece0a64ce49f6c8931b6a2c2e98ed914a84b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6421319-012",
   "text": "The correct response to the binding constraint cascade is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure underpinning AI production, pursued through decentralized compute networks, energy decentralization, open source models, and antitrust enforcement of compute markets.",
   "abstract": "The appropriate response is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure that underpins AI production.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "required to prevent scarcity from migrating rather than dissolving"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0f4f68e56ee48bb8b2d73d3ab7fd96fa572e76c195694ffa740360704c1b172d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6607458-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6607458-030",
   "text": "The AI alignment problem is, within this framework, a foundational policy problem of Computative Economics rather than an adjacent engineering concern, because objective function governance determines what agents generate toward.",
   "abstract": "Objective function governance determines what agents generate toward. The alignment problem in artificial intelligence (Russell 2019; Kaal 2026c) is, in this framing, a foundational policy problem in Computative Economics rather than an adjacent engineering concern.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "normative",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "75cca35350378eb8904866d068b5d2f3e1504629e6031457ce6c12152a88e3e8",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "28 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'institutional-design'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}