# Institutional investors `kaal:entity:institutional-investors` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `institutional-investors`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 4 works, 2011 to 2021. **2011** - [1908473-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-025) [design/argued] -- To balance constituent incentives and prevent abuse, the voting rights increase should be calibrated so that contingent capital holders obtain a majority stake only in combination with the largest institutional shareholder. > To balance the constituents' incentives and avoid abuse,194 the voting rights increase could be calibrated to give CCS holders a majority stake in the company only with, for instance, the largest institutional shareholder. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 - [1908473-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-034) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A substantial voting rights increase at the second trigger could raise the cost of contingent capital securities, with issuers demanding premiums that push primary issuance toward institutional investors interested in the change of control possibility. > Especially if the voting rights increase could reach the level of change of control over the entity, the premium charged by the issuers could rise dramatically and could result in a primary issuance to institutional investors who have an interest in the change of control possibility. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 **2016** - [2739479-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-007) [mechanism/evidenced] -- As the private fund investor profile shifts toward institutional investors, fees fall; institutional investors made up 65 percent of hedge fund AUM in 2015 compared with roughly 20 percent a decade earlier. > As the investor profile for private funds shifts toward institutional investors, fees fall. Institutional investors constituted 65% of hedge fund AUM in 2015, compared to just 20% a decade ago. Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479 - [2739479-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-008) [mechanism/argued] -- Underperformance combined with the influx of institutional money means that pension funds, endowments and other institutions, which now outnumber wealthy individuals as private fund investors, hold more bargaining power over fees. > of underperformance in the private fund industry, combined with the rush of new investors into alternative investments—pension funds, endowments, and other institutions now outnumber rich individuals as private fund investors— means that those investors have more bargaining power regarding fees. Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479 **2020** - [3606663-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regulatory uncertainty is curtailing the growth of the digital asset industry because investor classes across the spectrum, from retail investors to the largest institutions, are hesitant to participate while the legal treatment of digital assets remains unclear. > The regulatory uncertainty in the market for digital assets is curtailing the growth of the industry. Many investor classes - from retail to the largest institutions - are hesitant to participate in the market because of the regulatory uncertainty. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Institutional investors face a distinct barrier beyond volatility: fiduciary responsibility to their clients limits the type of risk they may take on, and the lack of custody solutions recognized by regulators compounds the problem. > While larger institutional players face the same issues, they are also limited by their fiduciary responsibility to their clients, which limits the type of risk they can be exposed to. Compounding these challenges is the lack of stable custody solution(s) that are recognized by the regulators. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Immature markets such as the market for digital assets in 2020 often cannot attract the institutional investors and venture capitalists who have sufficient operating experience in that market, which is a self reinforcing constraint on market development. > Immature markets, such as the market for digital assets in 2020 often cannot attract institutional investors and venture capitalists that have sufficient operating experience in that market. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3936876-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-003) [condition/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Without the ability to rely on proven custody providers, mainstream and legacy institutional investors are restrained from making digital asset investments for legal or business reasons. > Without the ability to rely on proven custody providers, mainstream and legacy institutional investors are restrained from making digital asset investments for legal and / or business reasons. Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876 - [3936876-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-022) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Institutional investors are less likely to engage in digital asset investments where custody solutions for digital assets are underdeveloped, and they find it difficult to commit fully until a reliable and respected custody solution exists. > Institutional investors are less likely to engage in digital asset investments if the custody solutions for digital assets are underdeveloped. Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876 - [3936876-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-023) [condition/asserted] -- Self management of private keys or passphrases for individual digital assets is too cumbersome for institutional investors, so institutional custody solutions must be as robust as those provided for traditional assets. > Private keys or maintaining passphrases for individual digital assets is too cumbersome for institutional investors. Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/institutional-investors.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.