# Intermediation `kaal:entity:intermediation` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `intermediation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 8 works, 2017 to 2021. **2017** - [2992962-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because of the fees attached to its extra verification layer, the OpenBazaar dispute resolution mechanism creates substantial transaction costs that pure Ethereum based self executing smart contracts avoid. > Because of these fees, the OpeanBazaar dispute resolution mechanism creates substantial transaction costs that can be avoided by pure Ethereum-based self-executing smart contracts. Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962 **2018** - [3128900-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-006) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The cost structure of centralized micro task systems, which require intermediation, produces significant overpricing that does not benefit the workers themselves. > First and foremost, the cost structure for micro task work in centralized systems that necessitate intermediation results in significant overpricing without benefiting the micro task workers directly. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3128900-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Centralized mechanical turk marketplace leaders operate as rent seeking intermediaries that generate numerous inefficiencies in the market and deprive freelance workers of a share in the profits the platforms capture. > Similarly, centralized mechanical turk marketplace leaders act as rent seeking intermediaries that create numerous inefficiencies in the market. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3227933-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-006) [mechanism/argued] -- A platform creates value not by producing goods itself but by facilitating exchanges between two distinct but interdependent groups, and it then captures profit for its owner-shareholders from the interactions it mediates. > the platform creates value by facilitating exchanges between two different but interdependent groups Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933 - [3227967-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-007) [definitional/argued] -- A transaction engineer is a crucial intermediary who brings together, in a safe environment, parties holding different but mutually compatible interests and expertise. > In this sense, we can see how lawyers functioned as "transaction engineers," i.e., crucial intermediaries that brought together in a "safe" environment various parties with different but mutually compatible interests and expertise. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967 - [3227967-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Lawyers have often failed to perform the function of active transaction engineer and have instead become a hindrance or obstacle to transactions. > The problem, however, is that lawyers have often failed to perform this function of being active transaction engineers and have become a hindrance or obstacle to transactions. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967 **2020** - [3606663-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-010) [design/asserted] -- The IEO reinserts an intermediary into token offerings: the exchange screens the offering and the issuer no longer interacts with investors directly, reversing the direct issuer to investor structure of the ICO. > In an IEO, the cryptocurrency exchange acts as a screening device for token offerings. In an IEO the issuer does no longer interact with investors directly. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3808852-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-023) [definitional/argued] -- Decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges epitomize market decentralization because they let users interact and trade anonymously in a secure environment without third party intermediation. > DEX epitomize market decentralization because they allow users to interact and trade anonymously in a secure environment without the need for third party intermediation. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852 - [3936876-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-002) [mechanism/asserted] -- The more digital assets are held by their owners in self-custody, the less likely intermediation by custody service providers becomes, so self-custody is the key driver of decentralization in emerging blockchain networks. > In other words, the more digital assets are held by their owners in self-custody, the less likely intermediation of custody service providers becomes. Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876 - [3981021-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-013) [normative/asserted] -- Charitable giving has to be fully transparent and hosted by a group of charity experts who have hands on experience fostering common good outcomes directly, rather than acting as an intermediary or sponsor. > The basic concept of the CHARITYxDAO derives from the basic insight that charitable giving has to be fully transparent and hosted by a group of charity experts who have hands-on experience in fostering common good outcomes directly – not as an intermediary or sponsor. Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/intermediation.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.