# International cooperation `kaal:entity:international-cooperation` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `international-cooperation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 6 claims across 2 works, 2011 to 2019. **2011** - [1765901-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-036) [design/argued] -- Because of the ambiguities in Morrison and Dodd-Frank and the consequences of a broad reading for persons and companies in European and other jurisdictions, Congress should clarify its intent in Section 929P(b) with respect to SEC and DOJ suits over securities transactions outside the United States. > Congress should also clarify its intent in Section 929P(b) with respect to SEC and DOJ suits over securities transac- tions outside the United States. Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901 - [1765901-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-037) [predictive/argued] -- A clear and restrained U.S. approach to extraterritoriality will bring predictability to global securities markets and avoid a downturn in international economic cooperation. > A clear and restrained approach to extraterri- toriality in the U.S. will bring predictability to global securities markets and avoid a downturn in international economic cooperation. Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901 **2019** - [3405660-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A single global financial regulator is not a serious policy option because national political interests are incoherent and cannot readily be united to establish such a body. > Given national incoherent political interests and the problem of uniting them to set up an international body, the idea of a single global regulator is not on any serious agenda. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Coordinated international cooperation in hedge fund regulation will ultimately be hindered by administrative costs, immense transaction costs, setup costs and, above all, the divergent interests of offshore havens and the resulting jurisdictional arbitrage, so it may never become a realistic regulatory option. > The administrative costs, the immense transaction costs as well as the costs of setting up such a venture and, most importantly, the differing interests especially of off-shore heavens and, hence, jurisdictional arbitrage will ultimately hinder such actions. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-016) [predictive/argued] -- If coordinated international regulation forces hedge funds out, the funds can absorb the costs of relocating offshore while the market segments and jurisdictions they leave will inevitably suffer. > Hedge funds may be able to afford to relocate off- shore with all its detrimental repercussions, i.e. costs, client losses etc. but certain market segments and jurisdictions will inevitably suffer when all its hedge funds are forced out. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-040) [mechanism/argued] -- Indirect regulation through Basel banking supervision removes the need for joint regulatory action and avoids each national regulator's transaction and implementation costs, because an international framework requires only one implementation and compliance then falls to participating banks. > Indirect regulation of hedge funds via the banking supervision in the Basel Framework also removes the need for joint regulatory action and individual regulators' transaction costs and implementation costs. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/international-cooperation.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.