{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/issuance-volume",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:issuance-volume",
 "name": "Issuance volume",
 "termCode": "issuance-volume",
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "value": 5
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   "value": [
    "2011",
    "2012"
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-009",
   "text": "The volume of contingent capital issuance should be large enough that conversion produces sufficient dilution, and the trigger timeframe should be roughly ninety days.",
   "abstract": "The volume of CCS issuance should probably be large enough to result in sufficient dilution upon conversion,47 and the timeframe for the trigger should probably be around ninety days.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Stated as a probable rather than settled design choice"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-020",
   "text": "Requiring financial institutions to sell high volumes of contingent capital securities, on the order of four to nineteen percent of risk weighted assets, could raise pricing pressure and increase their cost of funding.",
   "abstract": "High volumes sold by financial institutions—some estimates suggest between four and nineteen percent of risk-weighted assets of financial institutions104—could lead to increased pricing pressure and increased cost of funding.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Applies at the issuance volumes contemplated by the EU Commission working document"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-030",
   "text": "The authors posit an inverse relationship between trigger uncertainty and market development: as the uncertainty generated by trigger designs increases, issuance volume of contingent capital securities falls, while the risk and the pre-conversion interest rate on those securities rises.",
   "abstract": "Line 1 shows that, as the uncertainty generated by the trigger designs increases, the volume of CCS could decrease. Line 2 suggests that risk and the interest rates of CCS (before conversion) will increase with the level of uncertainty in the trigger design",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "speculative",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "the interplay of trigger structure, uncertainty and market development has not been systematically studied"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-004",
   "text": "The conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds affects corporate governance in a SIFI only if issuance volumes are sufficient and design features are adequate, because the governance effect runs through the threat of dilution of existing equity positions.",
   "abstract": "If sufficient volumes of contingent convertible bond issuances are combined with adequate design features, the conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds and the threat of dilution of equity positions in SIFIs could affect corporate governance in SIFIs.108",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sufficient volume of contingent convertible bond issuance",
    "adequate design features"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-012",
   "text": "Contingent convertible bonds issued to executives are typically too small in volume to dilute investors' equity holdings or to supply a meaningful equity infusion during a crisis, so copying investor CoCo designs for executive pay produces suboptimal outcomes.",
   "abstract": "contingent convertible bonds may be issued to executives in volumes that may not suffice to dilute investors' equity holdings. The lower volume of contingent convertible bonds issued to executives may not provide a sufficiently strong equity infusion during a crisis.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "contingent convertible bonds issued only to executives",
    "volumes smaller than investor issuances"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "5 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'issuance-volume'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}