# Judicial bias

`kaal:entity:judicial-bias`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `judicial-bias`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2004 to 2004.

**2004**

- [617681-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters is cumbersome and confusing and creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers fluent in the language of the proceedings, which is a barrier to exporting adjudication.
  > Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters, however, is cumbersome and confusing, and also creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers who are fluent in the language of the proceedings.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-023) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Fear of judicial bias operates through risk premiums: because investors and managers are uncertain how foreign judges will behave and may assume the worst, they price a decision to incorporate in another Member State higher.
  > Risk premiums charged by actors often reflect both bounded rationality and incomplete information, and managers and investors thus may put a higher price on a decision to incorporate in another Member State.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-024) [mechanism/argued] -- If statutes are unbundled from adjudication the judicial bias problem largely disappears, because statutes are at least facially neutral and discriminatory statutes would violate the EU treaty.
  > If on the other hand, statutes are unbundled from adjudication, this problem largely disappears because statutes are at least facially neutral
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/judicial-bias.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.