# Jurisdictional competition `kaal:entity:jurisdictional-competition` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `jurisdictional-competition`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 3 works, 2012 to 2013. **2012** - [1998455-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-026) [design/argued] -- Harmonization and coordination can facilitate experimentation and learning, but experimentation is most effective when several different approaches are tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions. > Harmonization and coordination can help facilitate experimentation and a learning process, but experimentation is probably most effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in dif- ferent jurisdictions. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [2029983-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-002) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate that Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competition in which jurisdictions compete on substantive legal rules to attract contracting parties ex ante, with adjudication of disputes a secondary consideration. > Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competi- tion. The emphasis in Choice of Law Competition is on substantive legal rules to attract contracting parties. Adjudication of disputes may be of secondary importance in Choice of Law Competition. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-003) [definitional/asserted] -- The authors stipulate that jurisdictions which take steps only to expand the jurisdiction of their courts as venues for litigation, rather than to attract transactions, engage in Forum Competition. > Jurisdictions that take steps only to expand the jurisdic- tion of their courts as venues for litigation engage in "Forum Competition." Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-004) [mechanism/argued] -- Most Forum Competition turns on a jurisdiction's attractiveness to lawyers ex post: such jurisdictions ignore the preferences of transacting parties at the time of contracting and appeal only to the preferences of some parties and their lawyers after a dispute has arisen. > but most Forum Competition turns on a jurisdiction's attractiveness to lawyers ex post. These jurisdictions ignore the preferences of transact- ing parties ex ante and appeal only to the preferences of some transacting parties and their lawyers after a dispute has aris- Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-006) [mechanism/argued] -- Jurisdictional competition adapts legal rules to changed economic circumstances faster than harmonization does, because a single jurisdiction can change its rule unilaterally whereas harmonized regimes require all jurisdictions to agree on a rule before it can change. > When underlying economic circumstances change, it is more likely that a jurisdiction will change its rules if there is juris- dictional competition than if all jurisdictions are bound to agree upon the same rule before they change it. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Harmonization can fail on the merits: the harmonious rule may be the wrong rule for the problem it addresses, or it may become the wrong rule later as circumstances change. > "harmonious" rule may be the wrong rule for solving a particu- lar problem, or the rule could become wrong later based on changing circumstances. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-011) [mechanism/argued] -- Jurisdictional competition in global securities litigation after Morrison will be bifurcated, because some jurisdictions recognize private rights of action while others do not, and some, including the United States, extend government enforcement extraterritorially where private suits are barred. > Bifurcated jurisdictional competition will characterize global securities litigation after Morrison because some juris- dictions recognize private rights of action whereas others do not, Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-040) [normative/argued] -- Although many jurisdictions may protect investors less well than the United States, it is not at all certain that U.S. law does a better job of deterring securities fraud. > While many jurisdictions could be worse than the United States at protecting investors, it is not at all certain that U.S. law does a better job of deterring securities fraud. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 **2013** - [2273857-051](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-051) [condition/argued] -- Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches is effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions. > Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches can be effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/jurisdictional-competition.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.