# Knowledge inference

`kaal:entity:knowledge-inference`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `knowledge-inference`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2013 to 2013.

**2013**

- [2317580-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-033) [mechanism/evidenced] -- In re Pfizer stipulates that for a company that executed a CIA the court will allow an assumption that the directors were fully informed and therefore willing participants in the corporate malfeasance, so that the CIAs themselves became the court's proof that the directors could have breached their fiduciary duties.
  > The court stipulates that in the case of a company that executed a CIA, it will allow an assumption that the directors were fully informed, and thus, willing participants in the corporate malfeasance.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-034) [empirical/evidenced] -- Abbott Labs set the stage for the Pfizer holding: although Abbott's Voluntary Compliance Plan was not a CIA, the Seventh Circuit used it as evidence that the directors knew of and should have stopped noncompliant activities.
  > Although the Voluntary Compliance Plan was not a CIA, the Seventh Circuit used it as evidence that the directors knew of and should have stopped noncompliant activities.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control, and therefore hold those directors to a heightened fiduciary duty, rejecting directors' claims of ignorance because executing a CIA or a CIA like agreement means directors do know or should know about the noncompliance.
  > To summarize, courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control and should thus act with a heightened fiduciary duty. Directors are held to a higher standard if the company executed a CIA.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/knowledge-inference.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.