# Legal enforcement

`kaal:entity:legal-enforcement`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `legal-enforcement`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2019 to 2021.

**2019**

- [3441904-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Traditional jurisdictional principles cannot directly apply to blockchain technology because the blockchain is merely a collection of agreed upon calculations by decentralized computer systems, and no particular node holds the entire blockchain.
  > Traditional jurisdictional principles cannot directly apply to blockchain technology because the blockchain is a mere collection of agreed-upon calculations by decentralized computer systems.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2021**

- [3782193-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-030) [empirical/evidenced] -- The strong trust that sustained Maghribi trade, in which embezzlement was rare despite extreme information asymmetry, cannot be explained by a strong centralized government, since the Maghribis could not form a centralized legal or political hierarchy and the official legal channels were slow and unreliable.
  > In point of fact, the records show that such embezzlement was rare. Instead, a strong sense of trust pervaded. So what mechanism protected the principals from their agents' asymmetric information? The answer was not a strong centralized gov- ernment.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193
- [3782210-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-003) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Strict legal enforcement is an inefficient remedy for opportunism because every unit of energy devoted to policing is energy that could instead have been used to cooperate productively.
  > Strict legal enforcement is not efficient, because all energies devoted to policing are ener- gies that could be used to cooperate productively.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782210-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Strict legal enforcement becomes impossible once a market is sufficiently complex and dynamic, because law cannot keep pace with the creative contracts that leading experts continually invent.
  > Strict legal enforcement is not pos- sible when the market becomes sufficiently complex and dynamic—laws cannot keep up with the creative contracts that arise when leading experts are continually improv- ing business arrangements.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/legal-enforcement.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.