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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:lehman-brothers",
 "name": "Lehman brothers",
 "termCode": "lehman-brothers",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-020",
   "text": "Director independence does not produce effective risk monitoring: as the failure of independent director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S. financial firms shows, independent directors cannot monitor risk when managers, accountants and lawyers keep them in the dark.",
   "abstract": "independent directors cannot effectively monitor for risk if they are kept in the dark by the firm's managers, accountants, lawyers, and other persons familiar with its business",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. style independence defined by lack of financial ties to the company",
    "information flow to the board controlled by insiders"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-029",
   "text": "Routine engagement in highly complex transactions lets public companies conceal risky transactions from investors and even from their own directors, which is a structural weakness in the supposedly rigorous U.S. disclosure regime.",
   "abstract": "Public companies that engage in highly complex transactions as a matter of course can easily conceal risky transactions from investors. Indeed, management can also conceal these transactions from the company's own direc- 160 tors.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "companies whose ordinary business consists of highly complex transactions"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1664809-007",
   "text": "The Lehman Repo 105 transactions, consummated in London but booked as sales in Lehman's US securities filings, underscore the effect that conduct in one country can have on markets elsewhere.",
   "abstract": "the affect that conduct in one country can have on markets",
   "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "cross-border transactions structured to exploit differences in national law"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d5c8c30f969f8eb613bfa1fe6888a7cfa1a452e1027bcda0489618ceac62c20",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-037",
   "text": "Contrary to Gordon's view that contingent convertible bonds do not address the Fuld Problem, if executive packages do not include a large equity portion, managers have no incentive to block an equity infusion in order to preserve the value of their own equity.",
   "abstract": "If executives' compensation packages do not include a large equity portion, managers have no incentive to avoid an equity infusion to preserve the value of their own equity.257",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a large part of equity-based executive compensation is replaced with contingent convertible bonds"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'lehman-brothers'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}