# Lehman brothers

`kaal:entity:lehman-brothers`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `lehman-brothers`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2010 to 2012.

**2010**

- [1558614-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Director independence does not produce effective risk monitoring: as the failure of independent director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S. financial firms shows, independent directors cannot monitor risk when managers, accountants and lawyers keep them in the dark.
  > independent directors cannot effectively monitor for risk if they are kept in the dark by the firm's managers, accountants, lawyers, and other persons familiar with its business
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1558614-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-029) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Routine engagement in highly complex transactions lets public companies conceal risky transactions from investors and even from their own directors, which is a structural weakness in the supposedly rigorous U.S. disclosure regime.
  > Public companies that engage in highly complex transactions as a matter of course can easily conceal risky transactions from investors. Indeed, management can also conceal these transactions from the company's own direc- 160 tors.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614
- [1664809-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-007) [mechanism/evidenced] -- The Lehman Repo 105 transactions, consummated in London but booked as sales in Lehman's US securities filings, underscore the effect that conduct in one country can have on markets elsewhere.
  > the affect that conduct in one country can have on markets
  Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809

**2012**

- [2097160-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Contrary to Gordon's view that contingent convertible bonds do not address the Fuld Problem, if executive packages do not include a large equity portion, managers have no incentive to block an equity infusion in order to preserve the value of their own equity.
  > If executives' compensation packages do not include a large equity portion, managers have no incentive to avoid an equity infusion to preserve the value of their own equity.257
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/lehman-brothers.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.