# Limited liability

`kaal:entity:limited-liability`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `limited-liability`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 4 works, 2010 to 2025.

**2010**

- [1558614-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-013) [mechanism/argued] -- Limited liability lets managers and shareholders capture most of the benefits of excessive risk taking while not bearing all of its costs, which is one explanation for why bankers take excessive risk.
  > Accordingly, both managers and shareholders of a corporation enjoy most of the benefits of excessive 62 risk taking but do not bear all of the costs.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2020**

- [3652481-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-002) [condition/argued] -- A jurisdiction is only truly favorable to DAOs if it grants the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring any representative in that jurisdiction.
  > Only a jurisdiction that gives the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without the need for representation may truly be favorable for DAO concepts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-024) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because consumer protection is a core mandate of any legislature, legislatures are unlikely to surrender control and jurisdiction over a DAO, which would mean no legal recourse and no ability to sue in national courts, while at the same time granting the DAO limited liability.
  > Because consumer protection is a core mandate for any legislature, it seems less likely that they will surrender control and jurisdiction over the DAO which includes no legal recourse, inability to sue in national courts etc, while also giving the DAO limited liability in that jurisdiction.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3799320-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-004) [condition/argued] -- Only a jurisdiction that grants a DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring representation can be truly favorable to DAO concepts.
  > Only a jurisdiction that gives the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without the need for representation may truly be favorable for DAO concepts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**2025**

- [5886342-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886342-035) [design/asserted] -- Internal liability among DAO members is capped: members are liable towards each other only up to the amount of their agreed contributions, unless the DAO Agreement stipulates otherwise.
  > (1) DAO Members are liable towards each other only up to the amount of their agreed contributions, unless
  Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Stephan D. Meyer, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886342

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/limited-liability.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.