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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-028",
   "text": "Mandating the issuance of contingent capital does not guarantee that a viable market in contingent capital securities will develop.",
   "abstract": "Mandatory issuance of contingent capital does not guarantee that a viable market in contingent capital securities will develop.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2337268-025",
   "text": "Form PF requires disclosure of the reporting fund's positions and how long it would take to liquidate them, because the SEC needs a view of portfolio liquidity rather than positions alone.",
   "abstract": "To help the SEC understand the liquidity of the reporting fund's portfolios, Form PF requires the investment adviser to disclose the reporting fund's positions and how long it would take to liquidate them.78",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-006",
   "text": "Hedge funds threaten the financial system through two distinct channels: directly, by damaging systemically important financial institutions, and indirectly, by generating liquidity shocks and raising volatility in key markets.",
   "abstract": "In addition to posing a direct systemic risk by damaging systemically important financial institutions, hedge funds can also pose an indirect threat to the financial system by generating a liquidity shock and increasing market volatility in key markets.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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    "hedge funds active in key markets",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2748096-020",
   "text": "The systemic risk of hedge fund leverage comes from its capacity to amplify liquidity losses and to contribute to asset overvaluation during bull markets, not from leverage as such.",
   "abstract": "Systemic risks associated with hedge funds' use of leverage stems from its ability to amplify liquidity losses and contribute to the overvaluation of assets during bull markets.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-008",
   "text": "ICOs filled the void left by constrained bank and non-bank start-up financing and enabled a democratization and inclusion process that facilitated banking disintermediation.",
   "abstract": "ICOs filled a void and enabled a democratization and inclusion process that facilitated banking disintermediation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
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   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "start-up fundraising environment at the inception of the ICO market"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-020",
   "text": "The only real control power available to token holders is the decision to hold or sell their tokens, and even that exit right may be unavailable until the token is fully listed on an exchange.",
   "abstract": "The only real control power for token holders is their decision to hold or sell their tokens and even that may be limited until the token is fully listed on an exchange.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "typical ICO token structures",
    "period before full exchange listing"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3067615-025",
   "text": "ICOs provide the highest possible liquidity for investors at the very beginning of a platform's lifecycle, before the reporting, accounting, and legal infrastructure that gives the investing public assurance of underlying business success, so investors trade on very limited information and volatility of the tokens and the whole cryptocurrency market increases.",
   "abstract": "Because ICOs typically take place at the beginning of the lifecycle of a crypto business/platform, ICO investors typically invest - and the token exchange - on very limited information which increases volatility of the tokens and the entire cryptocurrency market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3117224-001",
   "text": "Initial Coin Offerings provide unprecedented liquidity and efficiency for capital formation while minimizing transaction cost.",
   "abstract": "Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) provide unprecedented liquidity and efficiency for capital formation while minimizing transaction cost.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224",
   "datePublished": "2018",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-036",
   "text": "Unlike a conventional corporate loyalty program, company or industry tokens offer liquidity, because platform participants can sell and transfer them on crypto exchanges or secondary markets, which integrates the token and the platform into the mainstream economy.",
   "abstract": "Platform participants can sell and transfer them to other interested parties on crypto exchanges or secondary markets. These parties could be the \"public\" or a more restricted and pre-defined group of people. Either way, it integrates the token (and the platform) into the mainstream economy.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-010",
   "text": "Fiat currency collateralization is expensive and inefficient because the entire backing value must be held liquid; anything less opens arbitrage opportunities of the Soros type.",
   "abstract": "Fiat currency collateralization is expensive and inefficient because all of the value that is backing the cryptocurrency needs to be liquid, otherwise arbitrage opportunities, such as the Soros attack, are possible.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "assumes the backing must remain fully liquid to prevent arbitrage"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-015",
   "text": "A well established stable cryptocurrency and a universal exchange form a positive feedback loop: the exchange's liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency, and the stable currency's stability and adoption are enhanced by the exchange.",
   "abstract": "In essence, the combination of a well- established stable cryptocurrency with a universal exchange create a positive feedback loop. The exchange liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency and the stability and adoption of the stable currency is enhanced through the exchange.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "requires a universal exchange bridging traditional and crypto assets"
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396522-020",
   "text": "Leverage offered by cryptocurrency exchanges worsens rather than cures the market's illiquidity, because borrowed money rather than genuine demand is driving the price.",
   "abstract": "Cryptocurrency exchanges such as Bitmax, Kraken, among others, offer 5-10x leverage for cryptocurrency trades. This exacerbates the problem of illiquidity as borrowed money is driving the price.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3396542-026",
   "text": "The burden of maintaining sufficient liquidity to meet claims does not rest on the DAO but on the individual underwriters that make it up.",
   "abstract": "We note that the burden of maintaining sufficient liquidity in order to meet claims is not on the DAO, but rather on the individual underwriters that make up the DAO.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3402701-002",
   "text": "Fiat currency collateralization is expensive and inefficient because the entire backing value must be held liquid; anything less opens arbitrage attacks of the kind Soros used against the Bank of England.",
   "abstract": "Fiat currency collateralization is expensive and inefficient because all of the value that is backing the cryptocurrency needs to be liquid, otherwise arbitrage opportunities, such as the Soros attack, are possible",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "fiat-backed pegs claiming full collateralization"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-005",
   "text": "ICOs changed the venture funding market because they provide investors liquidity far faster than the traditional venture capital path to a late IPO or acquisition, letting venture funds capitalize on profits early.",
   "abstract": "By contrast, ICOs provide liquidity to investors much faster and allow venture capital funds to capitalize on existing profits early.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "venture capital funds invested in crypto start-ups"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-027",
   "text": "Democratized decentralized underwriting is more secure and stable than centralized underwriting because diversifying lenders and underwriters adds liquidity in all states of the economy and silos losses so that there is less cascading during economic crises.",
   "abstract": "it diversifies lenders and underwriters, which adds liquidity in all states of the economy; 2. this diversity silo losses so there is less cascading during economic crises;",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized underwriting organized through an underwriting DAO"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3409548-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3409548-033",
   "text": "The legacy private investment fund model delays liquidity: the investment process is long, complex and time intensive and leads up to a very late liquidity event in the form of an IPO or acquisition, which is why funds seek the early liquidity cryptocurrencies provide.",
   "abstract": "In the existing legacy business for private investment funds, the investment process is subject to long, complex, and time intensive processes leading up to a very late liquidity event in the form of an IPO or acquisition.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Financial Technology and Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3409548",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private investment funds investing in blockchain start-ups"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411110-018",
   "text": "Neither the Overstock offering nor the Linq based offerings were structured to support widespread ownership or trading through blockchain, and no major exchange or inter-dealer market permits or will foreseeably permit trading of blockchain issued securities.",
   "abstract": "no major exchange or inter- dealer market permits, or will permit in the foreseeable future, trading of securities issued through blockchain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. exchanges and inter-dealer markets as of the time of writing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c7626eeb7642045b79f8745df1f7232a8fe8bc44a1f7e87b592850e35b392b50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411110-019",
   "text": "A blockchain based offering routed through a single broker produces a specific cluster of risks, including limited price discovery, no market making and therefore less liquidity, constrained short selling, impaired best execution, and no print to a tape or national exchange.",
   "abstract": "Several additional risks are associated with the limited trading and associated limited material liquidity that results from a blockchain-based offering involving only one broker.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "offering structures with only one authorized broker-dealer",
    "single non-scalable ATS"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c7626eeb7642045b79f8745df1f7232a8fe8bc44a1f7e87b592850e35b392b50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411110-034",
   "text": "Validating blockchain as a cost effective means of supporting securities offerings does not by itself increase capital raising for private companies, because outside of unicorns there is unlikely to be broad retail interest in privately placed digital securities or in securities trading on a single non-scalable ATS.",
   "abstract": "Hence, capital-raising opportunities for private companies likely would not be materially increased despite the validation of blockchain technology as a means of cost-effectively supporting securities offerings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "privately placed digital securities",
    "securities trading on a single non-scalable ATS",
    "issuers other than unicorns"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c7626eeb7642045b79f8745df1f7232a8fe8bc44a1f7e87b592850e35b392b50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3606663-006",
   "text": "By 2019 the ICO market had lost its defining advantage over venture capital: because most ICOs between 2018 and 2019 imposed one to three year lockups, neither market offered early liquidity to investors or issuers, making the two substantively similar.",
   "abstract": "Most ICOs during that period required one to three-year lockup period for their investors. Accordingly, the ICO market in 2019 is very similar to the venture market in the sense that neither of these markets offers early liquidity to investors and issuers.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ICOs conducted between 2018 and 2019",
    "lockup periods of one to three years"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d1d4a15a293b715bb6a5a32e689f59c3a1587915039ba9a1cf4eeb8ee2a1e57c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782191-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782191-036",
   "text": "Centralization is dangerous in any market because monopolies ruin market efficiency by impairing liquidity, while the most efficient and liquid markets have high transaction rates of many goods moving between many small players.",
   "abstract": "In any market, centralization is dangerous. Monopolies ruin the efficiency of a mar- ket—they impair its liquidity.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Preface to (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782191",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "markets"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b0bf0529c3cf69839879bc4da476714efee2717a4beb768bd5c859b810e6174e",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-018",
   "text": "Removing the middlemen who serve as business catalysts would kill the economy: liquidity would dry up because after a few people unfairly lose on business deals, no one will take the risk of initiating one.",
   "abstract": "Remove the middlemen business catalysts and the economy will soon die. Liquid- ity will dry up. A few people will unfairly lose on business deals, then no one will take the risk to initiate a business deal.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where no automated substitute performs the catalyst function"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700",
   "status": "current"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-005",
   "text": "Decentralizing the power structures of core institutions improves them in both effectiveness and efficiency, because decentralization supplies transparency and liquidity.",
   "abstract": "All of these institutions will be improved, in effectiveness and efficiency, due to the benefits of transparency and liquidity provided by decentralizing their power structures.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-033",
   "text": "Every type of economic action becomes more efficient when decisions are hedged, because hedging lets participants confidently change investments and keeps the market liquid, and lending and insurance therefore require someone to underwrite the risk.",
   "abstract": "Every type of economic action is made more efficient when decisions are hedged, so we can confidently change our investments, keeping the market liquid. Lending and insurance are essential catalysts for business, that require someone to underwrite the risk.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-008",
   "text": "Liquidity has always been a problem on decentralized exchanges because meaningful history and reputation cannot form where there is little or no governance structure, no insurance, no appeals process and no reputable decentralized news service.",
   "abstract": "But liquidity has always been a problem in decentralized exchanges, as meaning- ful history and reputation are difficult to achieve when there is little to no governance structure, no insurance, no appeals process, and no reputable decentralized news ser- vice",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-023",
   "text": "Decentralized derivatives must be capitalized at least fully because the platform and its anonymous users cannot be trusted, a requirement that would be impossibly onerous in traditional markets and that leaves the market for decentralized options extremely shallow.",
   "abstract": "the inability to trust the platform or the anonymous users requires these decentralized derivatives to be capitalized at least c::%, which would be impossibly onerous in traditional markets.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized options and derivatives markets at the time of writing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-036",
   "text": "The inability of anonymous participants to trust one another is crippling the DeFi market and forces decentralized markets into overcollateralization, giving traditional markets a fundamental advantage.",
   "abstract": "the inability to trust each other due to the requirements of anonymity is crippling the deFi market. So traditional markets have a fundamental advantage. Decentralized markets are overcollateralized.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "current decentralized markets, before decentralized reputation exists"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f1739743aa06bbc1641cd65da790d531b69d8628ea3f5cc3fcad1bf5a1242373",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-001",
   "text": "Market liquidity depends on trustworthiness, and trustworthiness depends on observed momentum: isolated instances of motion are insufficient, because the observations must be collected into a history before they carry weight and meaning.",
   "abstract": "To achieve liquidity, marketplaces must be trustworthy. They need momen- tum. It's not enough to achieve motion in any particular instance. Momentum must be observed to give trust to the marketplace. These observations need to be collected in a history to give them weight and meaning.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "marketplaces seeking liquidity"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-014",
   "text": "Overhead institutions such as insurance and policing act as catalysts supplying the activation energy that guarantees liquidity in both government and private business.",
   "abstract": "Overhead institutions, like insurance or policing, provide the catalyst activation energy to guarantee liquidity in business—both government and private.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-025",
   "text": "Most decentralized exchanges have struggled with liquidity and price discovery.",
   "abstract": "Most DEX have been struggling with liquidity and price discovery.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3936876-012",
   "text": "Cryptocurrency exchanges store digital assets or private keys in internet connected hot storage because their main function is to provide liquidity rather than custody, unlike registered legacy stock exchanges which facilitate trading without taking custody.",
   "abstract": "Because the main function of digital asset exchanges is to provide liquidity – not to provide custody - cryptocurrency exchanges typically store digital assets or private keys in hot storage, that is in wallets that are connected to the Internet.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "centralized cryptocurrency exchanges"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9bc0903d01910460298e754c451f027df4324367359800a98ee8e638d94aff55",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-001",
   "text": "Decentralized finance is structurally disadvantaged against traditional finance because decentralized products must be backed with full collateral, typically 100 percent and 200 percent on secondary layers such as MakerDAO, a collateralization burden that would be unthinkable in traditional markets.",
   "abstract": "Decentralized markets are overcollateralized, giving traditional markets a fundamental advantage. To enable a decentralized financial transaction, such as a loan or insurance policy, decentralized products typically need to be backed with 100% collateral.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "digital asset markets as of 2021",
    "decentralized loans, insurance and similar products",
    "absence of alternatives to collateral"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-007",
   "text": "The more reputation replaces capital, the less capital must be allocated, tied and encumbered, which raises the ratio of unencumbered capital available to be newly deployed.",
   "abstract": "The more reputation replaces capital the less capital has to be allocated, tied, and encumbered. In turn, the ratio of capital becoming unencumbered through reputation increases the deployment of capital ratio, e.g. a higher proportion of unencumbered capital can be newly encumbered.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "reputation is encumbered and tied to an asset in place of capital"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-008",
   "text": "Reputation can underwrite tokenized assets and provide immutable guarantees for them, and with reputation staked guarantees tokenized assets can over time function like real assets.",
   "abstract": "Reputation can be used to underwrite tokenized assets and provide immutable guarantees for tokenized assets. With reputation staked guarantees on tokenized assets such tokenized assets can, over time, exist like real assets.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "reputation is meaningful and secure",
    "guarantors stake reputation and associated cashflow streams"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-009",
   "text": "The liquidity benefits of reputation underwriting can only materialize if the underlying reputation is meaningful and secure.",
   "abstract": "Again, the benefits for liquidity can only materialize if reputation is meaningful and secure.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "reputation is meaningful",
    "reputation is secure"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-010",
   "text": "Replacing capital with reputation gives DAOIC members a permanent option and a right of first refusal on deals, because a member can stake reputation non fungible tokens on a deal without joining the purchase commitment.",
   "abstract": "The replacement of capital with reputation gives the DAOIC members a permanent option and right of first refusal on deals. DAOIC members can merely stake RNFT on a deal without participating in the purchase commitment for such a deal.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAOIC operating model with RNFT staking separated from capital commitment"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-011",
   "text": "The delayed voting outcomes and feedback effects created by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting let DAOIC members triangulate their own internal liquidity position against deal feasibility.",
   "abstract": "At the same time, the delayed voting outcomes and associated feedback effects enabled by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting enable DAOIC members to triangulate their own internal liquidity with deal feasibility.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "two phase loosely coupled and tightly coupled reputation staking votes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-012",
   "text": "Because reputation staking carries no ex post capital commitment, the removal of capital makes capital calls and other liquidity limiting measures less relevant for DAOIC members.",
   "abstract": "The removal of capital through RNFT staking also makes capital calls and other liquidity-limiting measures less relevant. There are no ex post capital commitments associated with an RNFT staking participation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "best efforts style RNFT staking participations, not firm commitment deals"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-026",
   "text": "Misjudging the public commitment portion of a firm underwriting engagement would neutralize the liquidity the DAOIC previously gained through reputation staking.",
   "abstract": "Getting the public commitment part on a firm underwriting engagement wrong would neutralize the prior gained liquidity from RNFT staking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "firm commitment underwriting engagements"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3949098-040",
   "text": "Replacing capital with reputation increases liquidity because reputation takes over part of the role of capital and frees otherwise locked capital, letting decentralized investment vehicles deploy capital more effectively since reputation staking on deals requires no capital deployment.",
   "abstract": "When reputation takes over part of the role of capital it frees up otherwise locked capital that cannot fully be utilized. Decentralized investment vehicles are able to deploy capital more effectively because reputation staking on deals does not require the deployment of capital.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized investment vehicles using reputation staking"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "04297905564a6092b2db7640561f58fd374d3114c79527357bad09d11b909819",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-003",
   "text": "Lack of liquidity is one of the biggest problems in the traditional venture capital ecosystem, and the traditional VC model disincentivizes generating early profits because capital is locked in for an extended period of time.",
   "abstract": "One of the biggest problems in the traditional VC ecosystem is lack of liquidity.4 The traditional VC model disincentivizes generating early profits.5 Capital is \"locked in\" or \"locked up\" for an extended period of time.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "traditional fiat venture capital funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-043",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3962614-043",
   "text": "Reputation as capital has the potential to lower capital requirements for VC businesses significantly and to increase liquidity at unprecedented levels, because VCs can sell their fungible reputation tokens to the market as needed.",
   "abstract": "Reputation as capital has the potential to lower capital requirements for VC businesses significantly and increase liquidity at unprecedented levels because VCs fungible reputation tokens can be sold to the market as needed by.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a functioning market for fungible reputation tokens"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c6e202e77fd08db801f932774026458b94e5d103abf30cb1189fe6a1c5edf391",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-013",
   "text": "Small market cap launches at very cheap initial prices carry the potential for team and whale purchase abuses, which is why equitable treatment of the public requires significant project-controlled liquidity.",
   "abstract": "Small market cap launches at very cheap initial prices bring with them the potential abuses of team and whale purchases.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "small market capitalization",
    "very low initial token price"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-014",
   "text": "The larger the market capitalization controlled by the DAO, the less likely it becomes that whales and insiders can purchase inexpensive tokens on the market.",
   "abstract": "The larger the market capitalization that is controlled by the DAO, the less likely it becomes that whales and insiders can purchase inexpensive tokens on the market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAO governance over project liquidity"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-020",
   "text": "Without significant marketing a fair launch token is less likely to reach a diverse set of market participants, and projects reaching only a few hundred investors with small million dollar market caps are much more prone to abuse and manipulation.",
   "abstract": "Without significant marketing of the project, it is less likely the token will reach a diverse set of market participants. Projects that only reach a few hundred investors and only small million-dollar market caps are much more prone to abuse and manipulation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "token launches with limited marketing reach"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-025",
   "text": "Community DAO governance makes any form of rug pull much less likely, because rug pulls typically benefit only a few select individuals who retained control over the project code or liquidity.",
   "abstract": "Community DAO governance also makes any form of rug pulls much less likely as rug pulls typically only benefit a few select individuals who retained control over the project code or liquidity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "community DAO oversees project code and liquidity"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e0925afde0c42a16cd5310983789fae3eb3d1f121e2954a72afa64191d00fe37",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-005",
   "text": "Dual listing narrows bid ask spreads in traditional markets by injecting liquidity, but crypto markets behave differently: price differences between two exchanges can reach upwards of five percent during peak trading times.",
   "abstract": "For traditional markets, when a security is dual- listed, we see the bid-ask spread decrease because additional liquidity is being injected into the market. This differs from the crypto market where the difference between the two exchanges can reach upwards of 5% during peak trading times.5",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "peak trading times",
    "assets listed on multiple crypto exchanges"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-022",
   "text": "When the bid ask spread grows too wide while trades occur at high volume, the market begins to lose liquidity and the asset's value starts to fall, forcing investors who unload positions to surrender unrealized gains.",
   "abstract": "Historically, in an exchange context, if the spread between bid and ask price becomes too large and trades are occurring at high volumes, the market will start to lose liquidity and the value of the asset will start to fall.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "exchange traded context",
    "wide spreads combined with high trading volume"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-026",
   "text": "The main obstacle to digital asset market liquidity may be that the number of token holders has not continued to expand exponentially year over year; a larger stakeholder base would deepen liquidity and permit seamless entry and exit.",
   "abstract": "The main issue may be that the number of token holders have not continued to expand exponentially year over year. Having a greater number of stake holders may result in the deeper liquidity in the market, which would in turn allow for seamless movement in and out of the market.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "centralized digital asset exchange markets"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-027",
   "text": "Digital assets become less liquid precisely when large amounts are moved at once, because a large sell order floods the exchange and drives the price down.",
   "abstract": "Digital assets are less liquid when individuals try to move large amounts at once. If an individual wants to sell a large number of tokens through an exchange, they have to ensure they do not flood the market with token, causing price to drop on the exchange.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "large block sales through a single exchange"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-029",
   "text": "Legal uncertainty about crypto exchanges exerts a chilling effect on the market, and increased liquidity may follow once the market gains greater clarity on the legal issues surrounding this asset class.",
   "abstract": "Once the market gains greater clarity on the legal issues surrounding this new asset class, increased liquidity in the market may follow.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "resolution of broker dealer status and securities law classification questions"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-030",
   "text": "Market liquidity in digital assets is not only about exchanging crypto for fiat: allowing crypto to be used as a means of transacting for any good or service may itself increase market liquidity.",
   "abstract": "Increasing liquidity does not mean only being able to exchange crypto for fiat currency, but also the ability to exchange for any good or service. By allowing for transactions to use crypto as a means of transaction may increase market liquidity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "buy in from the business community"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-037",
   "text": "Centralization and monopolies are a threat to market liquidity because they can carry too much mass or too much velocity, and an imbalance in either direction, too much mass and too little velocity or too little mass, damages the market.",
   "abstract": "When there is too much mass and not enough velocity, it can gunk up the engine - when there is too little mass in the market, it can be cleared too quickly. Centralization and monopolies are a threat to market liquidity as they can have too much mass or too much velocity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-038",
   "text": "Decentralized structures outperform centralized ones on liquidity because in them market mass and velocity are uncorrelated, which yields more stable and predictable liquidity.",
   "abstract": "Decentralized structures are better because mass and velocity are uncorrelated",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900878-037",
   "text": "Tokenizing physical and digital assets enables fractional ownership and supplies liquidity, which broadens access to investment opportunities that were previously out of reach.",
   "abstract": "Furthermore, the tokenization of physical and digital assets within the VOW ecosystem enables fractional ownership and provides liquidity, democratizing access to investment opportunities.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "the VOW ecosystem as a case study"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "75bf96d3b751b4ad0a6ca4a32591cf026094f113e3a372aa6c61790941b391f7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5454054-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5454054-006",
   "text": "Because LER requires no lock-up of the underlying equity or token, it increases liquidity and reduces sell pressure on the underlying asset, unlike conventional staking-style loyalty schemes.",
   "abstract": "But, LER does not require lock-ups for the underlying equity or token assets, thus increasing liquidity and reducing sell pressure on the underlying equity or token assets.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5454054",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rewards accrue on the basis of verified holding duration rather than escrowed assets"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9f53a865e6f0e5424640779df8f9b50923cd7d05649301dd4cc727144749b6e6",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-004",
   "text": "LER produces shareholder loyalty by using smart contracts to distribute consumptive utilities such as merchant vouchers or platform credits, so retention is encouraged without imposing any lock-up on the shareholder's liquidity.",
   "abstract": "LER employs smart contracts to distribute consumptive utilities, such as merchant vouchers or platform credits, fostering shareholder loyalty without imposing liquidity constraints.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rewards are consumptive utilities, not cash or tradable instruments"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "58 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'liquidity'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}