{
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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/litigation-risk",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:litigation-risk",
 "name": "Litigation risk",
 "termCode": "litigation-risk",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "value": 6
  },
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  },
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   "value": [
    "2010",
    "2025"
   ]
  },
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  }
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1664809-018",
   "text": "Applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 together with the fraud on the market theory substantially increases the potential liability of issuers and can lead to questionable results, which is why EU jurisdictions may not want that rule applied to their securities markets.",
   "abstract": "theory substantially increases the potential liability of issuers and",
   "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "securities markets subjected to US antifraud litigation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d5c8c30f969f8eb613bfa1fe6888a7cfa1a452e1027bcda0489618ceac62c20",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-031",
   "text": "The market values N/DPA governance changes during the term because those changes effectively address the underlying corporate wrongdoing and its damage to goodwill and reputation while reducing the likelihood of continuing fines and litigation.",
   "abstract": "The market assesses the governance changes during the term of the N/DPA as beneficial for market value because it effectively addresses corporate wrongdoing and the associated negative effects on goodwill and reputation while lowering the likelihood of continuing fines and litigation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451",
   "datePublished": "2015",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during the term of the N/DPA"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-011",
   "text": "Private party litigation against hedge fund managers stays minimal because well counseled managers make extensive disclosures to investors who are presumed sophisticated, unlike mutual fund advisers who face ongoing high value investor suits.",
   "abstract": "By contrast, private-party litigation involving hedge fund managers is minimal because of the extent and nature of the disclosures well-counseled hedge fund managers provide to their investors",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. hedge funds and offshore vehicles chartered in the Caymans or BVI",
    "assumes industry standard disclosure practice"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-035",
   "text": "The data suggest that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engage in investor due diligence in order to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.",
   "abstract": "The data provided in this study seems to suggest that private fund advisers since 2010 increasingly engage in private fund IDD to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers",
    "since 2010"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-029",
   "text": "Since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in investor due diligence partly to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits, rather than in response to regulatory mandate.",
   "abstract": "the data provided in the author's study suggested that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in private fund investor due diligence, partially in an effort to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.163 Since",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC Form ADV Part II filings 2007 to 2014, N=100392",
    "due diligence litigation record 1995 to 2015, N=572"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5583610-034",
   "text": "Delaware fiduciary standards create litigation exposure for LER: if distributions are judged disproportionate under Unocal or Blasius, boards face court invalidation and roughly $1 to $3 million in cost per dispute.",
   "abstract": "Delaware fiduciary standards, including Unocal and Blasius, add litigation risks if distributions are deemed disproportionate, potentially leading to court invalidations and associated costs of $1–3 million per dispute.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "distribution deemed disproportionate",
    "Delaware enhanced scrutiny litigation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "2d73609d95ddb1573acc2a9e7af617fbe6283d6e591deb6317f6d5d804517c62",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "6 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'litigation-risk'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}