# Lobbying `kaal:entity:lobbying` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `lobbying`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 7 works, 2010 to 2025. **2010** - [1664809-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-028) [mechanism/argued] -- Non-US individuals and companies are expressly prohibited by US law from contributing to US political campaigns and have a relatively weak lobby in Washington, which places EU financial intermediaries at a competitive disadvantage in the US political system. > prohibited by US law from contributing to US political cam- Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 **2014** - [2486570-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-032) [condition/argued] -- Regulation by prosecution denies corporations the channels of influence available under legislative and administrative rulemaking, since it offers no comment process and no opportunity to lobby regulations in their favor. > Regulation by prosecu- tion also does not allow corporations to influence regulations in their favor through the comment process and lobbying. Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570 **2019** - [3396522-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Central bank price stability is elusive for two structural reasons: central banks are constantly lobbied to move money supply away from equilibrium, and even absent lobbying they face information asymmetries that prevent them from determining the optimal supply at any given moment. > Central banks are constantly being lobbied to increase or decrease money supply away from equilibrium.149 Moreover, even without lobbying, Central banks are subject to information asymmetries that do not allow them to determine the optimal amount of supply at any given point in time. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Stable cryptocurrencies escape part of the lobbying problem by hardcoding their policy rationales and outcomes into the protocol, which limits the amount of lobbying that can influence policy decisions. > By making part of their policy rationales and outcomes hardcoded solutions, stable cryptocurrencies limit the amount of lobbying that can affect policy decisions. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3405660-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-004) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Neither national nor international regulators have the resources to fully investigate or regulate hedge fund activity, and the industry actively lobbies to preserve the resulting information asymmetries. > National and international regulators do not have the resources to fully investigate or regulate the activities of hedge funds. Hedge funds are lobbying to preserve information asymmetries as far as possible and avoid enhanced transparency. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 **2024** - [4685567-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-035) [design/argued] -- Impact 3.0 can replace the political compromise and years of lobbying that Impact 2.0 standardization required with WEB3 precedent setting in weighted directed acyclical graphs, in which a smart contract itself becomes the standard. > Where standardization in Impact 2.0 required political compromise and years of lobbying, Impact 3.0 can use new WEB3 forms of standardization via precedent-setting in weighted 107 directed acyclical graphs. In this system, a smart contract can become the standard. Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567 - [4957318-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-035) [mechanism/asserted] -- The WDAG system suppresses rent seeking by internalizing advocacy: there are no external costs or lobbying pressures because any advocacy occurs transparently within the system's forums, where all user actions and preferences are recorded. > The WDAG system prevents such behavior by integrating all stakeholders into the decision-making process. There are no external costs or lobbying pressures, as any advocacy or lobbying occurs transparently within the system's forums, where all user actions and preferences are accounted for. Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318 **2025** - [5583610-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5583610-031) [design/asserted] -- Boards can use LER to build shareholder backing for corporate political activity, airdropping utility rewards to holders who vote for management-backed PAC funding or lobbying resolutions. > LER enables incumbent boards to incentivize shareholder support for corporate PACs or lobbying efforts by airdropping utility rewards to shareholders who vote in favor of management-backed initiatives. Wulf A. Kaal, Liquid Equity Rewards in Corporate America (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5583610 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/lobbying.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.