# Long termism

`kaal:entity:long-termism`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `long-termism`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 3 works, 2012 to 2021.

**2012**

- [2097160-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Before conversion, executives holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon payments have incentives to manage the company with debt-holders' interests in mind.
  > Because executives would be holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon payments, executives would have incentives to manage the company with the interests of debt-holders in mind.184
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**2017**

- [2922176-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Corporate governance initiatives designed to encourage long-term thinking rarely work as policymakers expect them to.
  > Corporate governance initiatives that encourage long-term thinking rarely work as expected by policymakers.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176
- [2922176-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2922176-017) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Code guidance assigning the board responsibility for long-term value creation, as in the 2016 Dutch Corporate Governance Code, is difficult to implement because neither long-term value nor the intended beneficiary of that value is defined.
  > Implementation of such code guidance is rather difficult in practice as definitions of long-term value, and the beneficiary of the value creation, are unclear.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

**2021**

- [3782210-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-019) [design/argued] -- Each new post should be able to reference older posts, so that when a new post is validated it can raise or lower the reputational value of past posts depending on how users come to perceive the precedent.
  > If the new post is validated, their value can affect the value of past posts positively or negatively. Old posts can have their reputational value change, depending on how important users perceive the precedent for the system.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782210-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-023) [definitional/argued] -- Reputation dilates time: it slows immediate transfers of wealth so that past and future enter present decisions, with future-oriented incentives supplied by reputation-based salaries and past-oriented incentives supplied by the editability of reputation.
  > Reputation dilates time. It allows us to slow down immediate transfers of wealth, allowing us to consider the future and the past. Future-oriented incentives come from reputation-based salaries. Past-oriented incentives come from the editability of repu- tation.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/long-termism.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.