# Market entry `kaal:entity:market-entry` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `market-entry`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 7 works, 2009 to 2019. **2009** - [1428387-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-014) [mechanism/argued] -- Because new hedge fund managers concentrate on highly complex and profitable instruments where pricing and valuation problems are most prevalent, it becomes very difficult for managers to guarantee investors standard or accurate pricing procedures. > Most of these new managers focus their attention on highly complex and profitable instruments where pricing and valuation issues are most prevalent. This trend can make it very difficult for hedge fund managers to guarantee their investors standard or accurate pricing procedures. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 **2010** - [1558614-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Dodd-Frank Act is notable for what it omits: it does not break up the largest banks, does little to help smaller and regional banks compete, and because compliance is burdensome and expensive may actually have raised the barrier to entry into financial services. > It does little to help smaller and regional banks compete with the big banks. Because complying with regulation is burdensome and expensive, the Act may have raised the barrier for entry into the financial services industry. Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614 **2014** - [2389423-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-003) [empirical/asserted] -- Anecdotal evidence suggests that Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act more than doubled the market entry threshold requirements for smaller hedge fund advisers. > Anecdotal evidence suggests that Title IV more than doubled the market entry threshold requirements for smaller hedge fund advisers. Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423 - [2389423-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-004) [empirical/asserted] -- Before Title IV, launching a hedge fund could be accomplished by raising roughly $25 to $50 million, whereas after the Dodd-Frank Act the required initial amount may have risen to around $100 million. > Setting up a hedge fund before the enactment of Title IV could be accomplished by raising around $25-50 million. After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, this number may have increased to around $100 million. Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423 **2016** - [2732915-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-038) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The long-term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is likely to be characterized by increasing additional expenses and associated barriers to entry for new market entrants. > Given these survey results, it seems possible that the long- term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is characterized by increasing additional expenses and associated levels of barriers to entry for market entrants. Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915 **2017** - [2959730-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-038) [predictive/argued] -- Lower operating costs enabled by blockchain platform models will especially enable new and future managers to enter the market because start up and compliance costs can be significantly reduced. > the lower operating costs enabled by the platform models will especially enable new and future managers to enter the market because the start-up costs and compliance costs can be significantly reduced. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730 **2019** - [3396542-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396542-037) [predictive/argued] -- The proposed DAO design is likely to lower barriers to entry in insurance, since non traditional firms and even individual investors can buy tokens at auction and then either underwrite with them or hold them passively. > In addition, the particular design outlined above is likely to facilitate the entry of new players to the insurance market. It is possible for a DAO to allow the participation of non-traditional firms and even individual investors. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Decentralized Underwriting (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396542 - [3411110-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-008) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The compliance burden attached to operating an alternative trading system, including fees, consumer protection, examination, and books and records requirements, is typically cost prohibitive for startups. > ATS compliance costs are typically cost prohibitive for startups. Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/market-entry.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.