{
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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/market-equilibrium",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:market-equilibrium",
 "name": "Market equilibrium",
 "termCode": "market-equilibrium",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "value": 2
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   "value": [
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3128900-026",
   "text": "Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept that requester's offers, and a low worker score reduces the worker's likelihood of retention.",
   "abstract": "If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters' offers. In turn, low reputation scores for micro task workers result in a lower likelihood of retention for micro task work on the Semada Network.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "two sided reputation scoring visible to both parties"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "381d72e85d976e2af852e8ec3bba87bc6a05ccb3349a2c3dd6f9e64de96ab4b0",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4755632-036",
   "text": "Reputation scores on the ALE Platform balance supply and demand through a two-sided incentive: requesters with lower reputation scores find workers less likely to accept their offers, and workers with low reputation scores are less likely to be retained for micro task work.",
   "abstract": "If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters' offers. In turn, low reputation scores for micro task workers result in a lower likelihood of retention",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to the ALE Platform reputation scoring system"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'market-equilibrium'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}