# Market evolution `kaal:entity:market-evolution` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `market-evolution`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 5 works, 2012 to 2022. **2012** - [1998455-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-024) [design/argued] -- The combination of demonstrated investor interest and an underdeveloped regulatory structure in the United States presents a unique opportunity to experiment with contingent capital designs and with their application to the corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions. > The combination of investor interest and an underdeveloped regulatory structure in the United States, pertaining to this market segment, could present a unique opportunity to experiment with contingent capital designs and their possible application in corpo- rate governance of SIFIs. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-038) [design/argued] -- Rather than banning purchases by systemically important institutions of each other's contingent capital, which could be detrimental to market evolution, the design should require disclosure of the purchaser's identity and approval by the issuer. > An outright ban of SIFI CCS purchases, or at least purchases in other SIFI CCS issuances, could be detrimental for CCS mar- ket evolution. Perhaps a mechanism that requires disclosure of the identity of the purchaser for SIFIs and approval by the issuer could address these concerns. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 **2017** - [3067615-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-040) [predictive/speculative] -- Through continuous evolution and improvement of ICO practices, the ICO industry and the underlying crypto businesses can become the foundation of the emerging crypto economy. > Through ICOs' evolution and continuous practice improvements, the ICO industry and underlying crypto businesses can become the foundation of the emerging crypto economy. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 **2020** - [3606663-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-001) [mechanism/argued] -- Equity funding and token funding are substitutes: because equity investment in a blockchain startup makes issuing a digital currency both less likely and less necessary as a funding source, a market shift back toward equity funding should shrink the total volume of digital currencies issued. > Because equity investments in blockchain startups make it less likely and less necessary for the respective startups to issue digital currencies, at least as a funding source, the market for digital currencies and the total volume of issued digital currencies is likely to recede Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-002) [empirical/evidenced] -- The funding sources for digital asset and blockchain startups cycled through four stages since 2016 and 2017: equity funding, then initial coin offerings, then equity offerings, then initial exchange offerings, and back to equity funding by the early 2020s. > Since 2016/17, the funding sources for digital asset startups and blockchain startups moved from equity funding to initial coin offerings (ICOs), to equity offerings, and initial exchange offerings (IEOs), just to return back to equity funding in the early 2020s. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-009) [mechanism/argued] -- Initial exchange offerings emerged as a market response to the near disappearance of the ICO market in January 2019, driven by the cryptocurrency exchanges that were most affected by the collapse. > Initial exchange offers ("IEO") 66 evolved as a response to the near disappearance of the ICO market in January 2019. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 - [3606663-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-021) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Cyber security incidents contribute to the volatility of the digital asset market through a specific channel: consumers instantaneously withdraw their assets from an exchange affected by an incident. > Some indicia suggest that cyber security incidents contribute to the volatility of the digital asset market as consumers withdraw instantaneously their assets from an exchange that has been affected by a cyber security incident, among other reasons for this relationship. Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663 **2021** - [3949098-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3949098-032) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without standards for digital assets it will be very difficult to increase regulatory certainty or coordinate market activity, and without regulatory certainty the digital asset market is less likely to evolve. > Without standards for digital assets, it will be very difficult to increase regulatory certainty in the digital asset space and coordinate market activity. Without regulatory certainty the market for digital assets is less likely to evolve. Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 **2022** - [4033886-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-040) [condition/argued] -- Uniform digital asset valuation standards can only evolve over time as the market evolves, because standard setting requires common core practices, and those practices are only slowly emerging. > Such standards can evolve over time as the market evolves. Standard setting requires common core practices what are slowly evolving. Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/market-evolution.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.