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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:market-manipulation",
 "name": "Market manipulation",
 "termCode": "market-manipulation",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-033",
   "text": "Dual trigger proposals draw their central strength from reliance on market prices, but the index leg is a major disadvantage because it can create incentives to manipulate the index or to force an entity into bankruptcy before conversion occurs.",
   "abstract": "A central strength of the dual trigger proposals is their reliance on market prices. A major disadvantage is the index trigger, which could potentially create incentives to manipulate the index or to try to force an entity into bankruptcy.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dual trigger designs combining a firm stock price trigger with a financial institutions index trigger"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-016",
   "text": "Market-based trigger measures are vulnerable to market manipulation and bank runs, while accounting-based measures are updated too infrequently to respond adequately in a financial crisis.",
   "abstract": "However, market-based measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs.156 Accounting-based measures in institution- specific automatic triggers are arguably too infrequently updated to respond adequately in a financial crisis.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-060",
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   "text": "Contingent capital triggers have significant design limitations: accounting based triggers may not respond adequately in financial crises because they are updated too infrequently, while market based triggers are susceptible to market manipulation and bank runs.",
   "abstract": "accounting-based measures in institution-specific automatic triggers may not be able to respond adequately in financial crises because they are arguably too infrequently updated. Market-based measures, on the other hand, could be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "accounting based institution specific triggers",
    "market based institution specific triggers"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3002908-012",
   "text": "The SEC rejected the Winklevoss Bitcoin ETF application on the ground that the unregulated nature of Bitcoin made the proposed fund susceptible to fraud.",
   "abstract": "In rejecting the application, the SEC reasoned that, because of the unregulated nature of Bitcoin, the proposed fund was susceptible to fraud.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC Release No. 34-80206, March 10, 2017"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411110-010",
   "text": "Naked or out of the box short selling is possible only because settlement takes three days, so eliminating the window between trade and settlement on a blockchain eliminates that abuse.",
   "abstract": "This tactic is only possible because it takes three days to settle a trade. By eliminating the window between trade and settlement, the blockchain eliminates out-of- the-box shorting.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "multi-day settlement regimes such as T+3"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-029",
   "text": "Automation and the absence of a human backstop in compliance, back office, and settlement create new risks to market integrity on decentralized exchanges, including wash trading, frontrunning, and insider trading.",
   "abstract": "The code may also create new risks to market integrity because of its automation and lack of a human backstop in compliance, back office, and settlement.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-028",
   "text": "Whale purchases that soak up token supply at the earliest possible time in a launch are the key problem fair launch platforms address, because they can be the origin of significant centralization that harms the project for the entirety of its active market engagement.",
   "abstract": "of whale token purchases that soak up supply at the earliest possible time in the token launch. Such whale purchases can be the origin of significant centralization of a token launch that may harm the project for the entirely of its active market engagement.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "whales able to buy large amounts at the earliest moment of a launch"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-035",
   "text": "An auction mechanism for fair launch tokens avoids pricing tokens below their underlying market value, which in turn helps remedy the problems that derive from large whale token holders who can later manipulate the market.",
   "abstract": "An auction mechanism for fair launch tokens ensures avoids that tokens are priced cheaper than the underlying market value of the token. This, in turn, helps remedy the problems that derive from large whales token holders that can manipulate the market in the",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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 "description": "8 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'market-manipulation'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}