# Market manipulation `kaal:entity:market-manipulation` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `market-manipulation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 7 works, 2012 to 2022. **2012** - [2061166-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Dual trigger proposals draw their central strength from reliance on market prices, but the index leg is a major disadvantage because it can create incentives to manipulate the index or to force an entity into bankruptcy before conversion occurs. > A central strength of the dual trigger proposals is their reliance on market prices. A major disadvantage is the index trigger, which could potentially create incentives to manipulate the index or to try to force an entity into bankruptcy. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2097160-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Market-based trigger measures are vulnerable to market manipulation and bank runs, while accounting-based measures are updated too infrequently to respond adequately in a financial crisis. > However, market-based measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs.156 Accounting-based measures in institution- specific automatic triggers are arguably too infrequently updated to respond adequately in a financial crisis. Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 **2013** - [2273857-060](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-060) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Contingent capital triggers have significant design limitations: accounting based triggers may not respond adequately in financial crises because they are updated too infrequently, while market based triggers are susceptible to market manipulation and bank runs. > accounting-based measures in institution-specific automatic triggers may not be able to respond adequately in financial crises because they are arguably too infrequently updated. Market-based measures, on the other hand, could be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 **2017** - [3002908-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-012) [empirical/evidenced] -- The SEC rejected the Winklevoss Bitcoin ETF application on the ground that the unregulated nature of Bitcoin made the proposed fund susceptible to fraud. > In rejecting the application, the SEC reasoned that, because of the unregulated nature of Bitcoin, the proposed fund was susceptible to fraud. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908 **2019** - [3411110-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-010) [mechanism/argued] -- Naked or out of the box short selling is possible only because settlement takes three days, so eliminating the window between trade and settlement on a blockchain eliminates that abuse. > This tactic is only possible because it takes three days to settle a trade. By eliminating the window between trade and settlement, the blockchain eliminates out-of- the-box shorting. Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110 **2021** - [3808852-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Automation and the absence of a human backstop in compliance, back office, and settlement create new risks to market integrity on decentralized exchanges, including wash trading, frontrunning, and insider trading. > The code may also create new risks to market integrity because of its automation and lack of a human backstop in compliance, back office, and settlement. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852 **2022** - [4015908-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Whale purchases that soak up token supply at the earliest possible time in a launch are the key problem fair launch platforms address, because they can be the origin of significant centralization that harms the project for the entirety of its active market engagement. > of whale token purchases that soak up supply at the earliest possible time in the token launch. Such whale purchases can be the origin of significant centralization of a token launch that may harm the project for the entirely of its active market engagement. Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908 - [4015908-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-035) [mechanism/argued] -- An auction mechanism for fair launch tokens avoids pricing tokens below their underlying market value, which in turn helps remedy the problems that derive from large whale token holders who can later manipulate the market. > An auction mechanism for fair launch tokens ensures avoids that tokens are priced cheaper than the underlying market value of the token. This, in turn, helps remedy the problems that derive from large whales token holders that can manipulate the market in the Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/market-manipulation.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.