# Market structure `kaal:entity:market-structure` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 13 claims that carry the concept tag `market-structure`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 13 claims across 8 works, 2004 to 2024. **2004** - [617681-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-039) [condition/argued] -- Europe has no equivalent of Delaware with which arbitration would have to compete, since incorporation theory is only beginning to take hold and no Member State has established a commanding lead in marketing its corporate law abroad. > Europe, however, has no equivalent of Delaware with which arbitration would have to compete. Incorporation theory is just beginning to take hold on the Continent and no Member State has yet established a commanding lead in marketing its corporate law outside its borders. Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 **2016** - [2739479-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-040) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Barriers to entry for small firms are becoming an increasing problem in the private fund industry under the evolving post-Dodd-Frank legal environment, with references to such barriers rising from 24 percent of respondents in 2012 to 33 percent in 2015. > The 2015 survey responses suggest that barriers to entry for small firms are becoming increasingly a problem for the private fund industry in the continuously evolving post-Dodd-Frank-Act legal environment. Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479 **2017** - [2959730-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-039) [predictive/speculative] -- By enabling low set up requirements and low costs of running a portfolio, blockchain platform models may create an unprecedented competitive environment for asset management strategies. > By enabling low set-up requirements and low costs of running a portfolio, platform models may be able to create an unprecedented competitive environment for asset management strategies. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730 **2019** - [3396522-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-015) [mechanism/argued] -- A well established stable cryptocurrency and a universal exchange form a positive feedback loop: the exchange's liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency, and the stable currency's stability and adoption are enhanced by the exchange. > In essence, the combination of a well- established stable cryptocurrency with a universal exchange create a positive feedback loop. The exchange liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency and the stability and adoption of the stable currency is enhanced through the exchange. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The cryptocurrency market structure is fundamentally convoluted because each project requires its own volatile token, which is equivalent to forcing grocery shoppers to buy a different currency for every store and every product. > The market structure of cryptocurrencies from its inception to 2019 can be compared to mandating customers who wish to purchase groceries to purchase a different currency for each store they visit and for each product chosen in such store. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Leverage offered by cryptocurrency exchanges worsens rather than cures the market's illiquidity, because borrowed money rather than genuine demand is driving the price. > Cryptocurrency exchanges such as Bitmax, Kraken, among others, offer 5-10x leverage for cryptocurrency trades. This exacerbates the problem of illiquidity as borrowed money is driving the price. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-029) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The interoperability deficit in cryptocurrency markets is partly intrinsic to blockchain technology itself, because the consensus mechanism that allows block propagation on one chain in some ways negates interoperability with other chains and their consensus. > The lack of interoperability can in part be traced back to blockchain technology itself. The consensus created to allow block propagation in some ways negates interoperability with other chains and their consensus. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-030) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The lack of interoperability is a very serious threat to the survivability of cryptocurrency projects, as the crypto winter of 2018 and 2019 demonstrated when thousands of competing, non interoperable projects failed. > The lack of interoperability is a very serious threat of survivability of cryptocurrency projects. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-036) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Mass adoption fails at the user level: the average user will not identify, research, and purchase diverse sets of tokens even where those tokens would create value, because the existing cryptocurrency market structure is simply too cumbersome. > The average user is unwilling to identify, research, and purchase diverse sets of tokens, even if their application and use cases would create value. The existing market structure for cryptocurrencies is simply too cumbersome for the average user. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3411110-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Neither the Overstock offering nor the Linq based offerings were structured to support widespread ownership or trading through blockchain, and no major exchange or inter-dealer market permits or will foreseeably permit trading of blockchain issued securities. > no major exchange or inter- dealer market permits, or will permit in the foreseeable future, trading of securities issued through blockchain. Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110 **2021** - [3936876-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3936876-009) [empirical/evidenced] -- Traditional custody has become highly concentrated, with four large banks holding roughly $114 trillion in assets under custody at the end of the first quarter of 2018, and barriers to entry make it likely that this concentration continues. > At the end of the first quarter of 2018, these four banks had approximately $114 trillion in assets under custody.48 Recent trends suggest this highly concentrated model will continue, as ongoing barriers to entry have prevented other firms from challenging these incumbents. Wulf A. Kaal, Hayley Howe, Custody of Digital Assets (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3936876 - [3995709-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-019) [empirical/asserted] -- The code review industry is dominated by a cartel formed by the top five code audit firms, and that cartel creates high barriers to entry for new players in the code review market. > The top five code audit firms form a cartel. The cartel of the top 5 audit firms also creates high barriers to entry for new players to enter into the code review market. Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709 **2024** - [4755632-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The code review market is self-undermining: one of the strongest forms of exploitation and centralized economies of scale is being created in a market whose purpose is to support the decentralization of other industries. > it is a bit ironic that one of the strongest forms of exploitation and centralized economies of scale are being created in a market that is, from the outset, supposed to help support the decentralization of disparate industries. Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/market-structure.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.