{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/mechanism",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:mechanism",
 "name": "Mechanism",
 "termCode": "mechanism",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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 "sha256": "8e41d8f12ccf662bf185a910649aeb7d19aa2848364ae2e5902b4be7f11f7923",
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   "name": "status",
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   "value": 4
  },
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   "value": [
    "2015",
    "2016"
   ]
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  }
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2629451-031",
   "text": "The market values N/DPA governance changes during the term because those changes effectively address the underlying corporate wrongdoing and its damage to goodwill and reputation while reducing the likelihood of continuing fines and litigation.",
   "abstract": "The market assesses the governance changes during the term of the N/DPA as beneficial for market value because it effectively addresses corporate wrongdoing and the associated negative effects on goodwill and reputation while lowering the likelihood of continuing fines and litigation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451",
   "datePublished": "2015",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during the term of the N/DPA"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "507404d641abb922ab6d8e3a0b032e35ead2befd7b88746d09d178a8fa816957",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-005",
   "text": "Regulation could depress reported private fund performance through a compliance cost channel: because monthly performance is reported net of fees, a significant increase in compliance costs would show up immediately in monthly performance figures.",
   "abstract": "First, regulation could decrease performance by increasing compliance costs. Because private fund advisers' monthly performance is reported net of fees, a significant increase in compliance costs could have an immediate effect on monthly performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "performance reported net of fees",
    "compliance costs borne at the fund level"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-007",
   "text": "A second channel by which Title IV could lower performance is risk reduction: private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk and therefore earn lower returns.",
   "abstract": "Second, some private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk (Kaal 2013a), therefore lowering performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers subject to registration and disclosure"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-008",
   "text": "A third channel is measurement rather than economics: if regulation curbs misreporting, private fund advisers' performance would appear to decrease simply because managers are less able to inflate their monthly returns.",
   "abstract": "It is possible that similar results apply to private fund advisers, e.g. private fund advisers' performance appeared to decrease because managers were less able to inflate their monthly returns.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "if misreporting was upward biased before regulation",
    "inferred by analogy to findings at public companies and hedge funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'mechanism'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}