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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:microdemocracy",
 "name": "Microdemocracy",
 "termCode": "microdemocracy",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-015",
   "text": "Trust in decentralized legal solutions can be more democratically legitimized than legally created trust because it runs through microdemocratic, individualistic yet technology centric autonomous decision processes, coded guarantees, and machine speed.",
   "abstract": "Trust in decentralized legal solutions can be more democratically legitimized through microdemocratic, individualistic yet technology-centric autonomous decision processes, coded guarantees, and machine speed.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-017",
   "text": "Under a quadratic style microdemocratic allocation, each voter receives a capped number of votes to distribute by priority, so voters concentrate votes on the issues most relevant to them and outcomes track actual preference intensity.",
   "abstract": "Each voter in a given microdemocratic voting scenario may be allocated a maximum number of votes. Such votes may be allocated by priority to any issues the respective voter wants to engage with.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "text": "Microdemocratic vote allocation improves outcome quality because a voter's proportional allocation of votes to an issue is itself evidence of that voter's higher knowledge of the issue, and voters are unlikely to give top priority to issues they know little about.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, part of the power of this microdemocratic approach derives from the higher levels of knowledge a given voter has on a particular issue that is evidenced by the voters' proportional allocation of votes on such issue.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-019",
   "text": "Vote delegation inevitably reintroduces corruption into a microdemocratic system, because representatives may seek to bribe or purchase votes to gain power, so delegation necessitates a policing system.",
   "abstract": "Yet, the delegation of voting power inevitably allows corruptive element back into the system as certain representatives may wish to bribe or purchase votes to provide them with more power in the system.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "applies where microdemocratic systems permit delegation of voting power"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-020",
   "text": "Microdemocracies must confront the tragedy of the commons, because voters acting on self-interest independent of the totality of voters may, without controls, deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.",
   "abstract": "Acting for their own self-interest may be contrary to the common good of all voters. Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-021",
   "text": "Majority rule in a microdemocracy can produce discrimination, because a majority that is itself unaffected by a rule it enacts can impose a disproportionate burden on the minority the rule does affect.",
   "abstract": "Similarly, majority rule may mean discrimination of the minority. A majority that is unaffected by a rule they instantiate may have a discriminatory impact on a minority that is disproportionately affected by the change in the rules.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "applies to majority rule voting in microdemocratic systems"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-023",
   "text": "A blockchain based microdemocracy's key advantage is speed of change: because technology enables incorruptible instantaneous counting and tallying of votes, voting becomes dynamic and incremental and political will is exercised more directly.",
   "abstract": "Because technology enables the incorruptible counting and tallying of votes instantaneously, voting can be more dynamic and incremental and political will is exercised more directly.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-012",
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   "text": "Delegating one's vote to a third party whose ethics and belief system the voter does not truly know produces suboptimal outcomes, and delegated voting on issues that cannot be foreseen is corrupting.",
   "abstract": "The very notion of delegating one's vote to a third party without true knowledge of the ethics and belief system of such a third party creates suboptimal outcomes. Delegated voting on issues one cannot foresee corrupts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "representative democracies in the 21st century"
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-014",
   "text": "Ex ante remedies for the downsides of representative democracy were not technologically possible when democratic representation was designed, so its downsides such as corruption, bribery, and bias had to be tolerated as inevitable tradeoffs.",
   "abstract": "Ex-ante remedies to overcome these downsides of representative democracies were not technologically possible.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-015",
   "text": "Microdemocratic vote allocation improves voting outcomes because the proportion of votes a voter allocates to an issue evidences that voter's higher level of knowledge on the issue, and voters are unlikely to give top priority to issues they know little about.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, part of the power of this microdemocratic approach derives from the higher levels of knowledge a given voter has on a particular issue that is evidenced by the voters' proportional allocation of votes on such issue.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "voting systems that allocate a maximum number of votes per voter across issues",
    "quadratic voting style designs"
   ],
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-016",
   "text": "Microdemocratic systems must solve the tragedy of the commons, because without controls self interested voters acting independently of the totality of voters may deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.",
   "abstract": "Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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    "microdemocratic shared-resource systems",
    "absence of controls"
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-017",
   "text": "Majority rule in microdemocratic systems can produce discrimination against minorities, because a majority that is itself unaffected by a rule it instantiates can impose a discriminatory impact on a minority that is disproportionately affected.",
   "abstract": "Similarly, majority rule may mean discrimination of the minority. A majority that is unaffected by a rule they instantiate may have a discriminatory impact on a minority that is disproportionately affected by the change in the rules.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
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    "majority rule voting systems"
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-018",
   "text": "Microdemocracy's key advantage is the speed of change it can initiate: because technology permits incorruptible instantaneous counting and tallying of votes, voting becomes dynamic and incremental and political will is exercised more directly.",
   "abstract": "Because technology enables the incorruptible counting and tallying of votes instantaneously, voting can be more dynamic and incremental and political will is exercised more directly.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
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    "comparison with representative democracies whose change depended on elections roughly every four years"
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-019",
   "text": "Unlike their centralized predecessors, decentralized technologies enable, for the first time in history, improved incentive designs that help overcome the insufficiencies in the voting outcomes of representative democracies.",
   "abstract": "Unlike their centralized predecessors, decentralized technologies, for the first time in history, enable improved incentive designs that help overcome the insufficiencies in voting outcomes of representative democracies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized voting pools that increase, deepen, and proliferate"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-020",
   "text": "Upgrading existing representative democracies with decentralized supplemental voting systems may require constitutional or democratic support, and the availability of that support is dubious at best.",
   "abstract": "Of course, such upgrades to existing representative democracies may require constitutional or democratic support which is dubious at best.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "adoption of decentralized voting pools as supplements to representative democracy"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-022",
   "text": "Regulating centralized technology conglomerates addresses only part of the problem, because even fully regulated conglomerates retain the power to set standards and norms for emerging technologies that government cannot effectively trace; microdemocratic decision making can set such standards outside their control metrics.",
   "abstract": "Even if fully regulated, centralized technology conglomerates still have the power to set standards and norms for emerging technologies that government cannot effectively trace.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "centralized technology conglomerates that increasingly act like governments"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "16 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'microdemocracy'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}