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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-028",
   "text": "A standard objection to indirect regulation is that counterparty credit risk management will not work effectively unless the lending bank has an exclusive relationship with the hedge fund that lets it control the relationship.",
   "abstract": "CCRM will not work effectively unless the bank has an exclusive relationship with the hedge fund that allows it to control the relationship.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a hedge fund borrows from more than one bank, so no single bank sees its overall risk exposure"
   ],
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-029",
   "text": "Contesting the exclusivity objection, exclusivity of a banking relationship is not the only effective way to exercise control and manage risk: the intensity, endurance, and quality of the relationship also influence how much control a bank can exercise over a hedge fund.",
   "abstract": "The exclusivity of a banking relationship is perhaps not the only effective way to exercise control and manage risk. The intensity, endurance, and quality of the relationship also influence the level of control a bank may exercise over a hedge fund.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-016",
   "text": "If a market evolves in which contingent capital designs appear to provide sufficient protection against systemic risk and contagion, decision makers may come to rely on the design of those securities and neglect their own role as monitors.",
   "abstract": "it seems theoretically possible that decision makers could rely on the design of CCS and neglect their role as monitors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "speculative",
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    "theoretical possibility flagged by the author",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-040",
   "text": "An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increases executives' incentives to lower risk-taking.",
   "abstract": "Contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for executives to lower their risk-taking.282",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-016",
   "text": "The less prevalent categories of governance change mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements are increased monitoring at 46 percent of the sample, board changes at 38 percent, business changes at 30 percent, and senior management changes at 30 percent.",
   "abstract": "include increased monitoring re- quirements (46 percent of the sample), N/DPA mandated board changes (38 per- cent of the sample), business changes (30 percent of the sample), and changes in senior management (30 percent of the sample).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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    "sample of 271 publicly available N/DPAs, 1993 to 2013"
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "Any prescriptive regulatory regime for hedge funds risks leaving the financial system less stable rather than more stable, because counterparties relax vigilance when they believe authorities are monitoring and constraining fund risk taking.",
   "abstract": "A risk of any prescriptive regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the marketplace, it leaves the system less rather than more stable.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "applies to prescriptive position reporting and monitoring regimes"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3249860-005",
   "text": "DAOs can replace the coordination and monitoring functions supplied by the firm, because they can measure each member's contribution to the finished work product more efficiently and allocate rewards accordingly.",
   "abstract": "Arguably, DAOs can replace the otherwise needed functions that are supplied by the firm that acts as the coordinator and monitor of a team because DAOs can more efficiently measure the contribution of each DAO member to the finished work product and allocate respective rewards accordingly.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "supported by trust enhancing technologies such as reputation verification in decentralized anonymous systems"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-001",
   "text": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology builds the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance, which over time creates an environment in which the internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance can be removed.",
   "abstract": "As a foundational technology, blockchain technology creates the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance that, over time, creates the environment that enables the removal of internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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    "over a multi-decade time horizon",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "The interests of manager agents and shareholder principals are never fully aligned despite best efforts at monitoring and bonding, so agency losses in the form of residual loss inevitably arise.",
   "abstract": "Despite best efforts at monitoring and bonding, the interest of manager agents and shareholder principals in corporate governance are never fully aligned and agency losses inevitably arise from conflicts of interest between principals and agents, known as residual loss.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-017",
   "text": "Supervisory tasks traditionally performed by principals to control their agents can be delegated to decentralized computer networks that are reliable, secure, immutable, and independent of fallible human input and discretionary human goodwill.",
   "abstract": "Supervisory tasks that were traditionally performed by principals to control their agents can be delegated to decentralized computer networks that are highly reliable, secure, immutable, and independent of fallible human input and discretionary human goodwill.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "assumes a functioning decentralized network"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-021",
   "text": "Because governance guarantees are embedded in code, there is no need in the blockchain infrastructure for the principal to institute oversight and monitoring, and the associated agency costs disappear.",
   "abstract": "Hence, in the blockchain infrastructure, there is no need for the principal to institute oversight and monitoring with the associated agency costs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-024",
   "text": "Cryptographic hashes increase blockchain security and remove the trust barriers in agency relationships that otherwise require monitoring of agents and generate agency costs.",
   "abstract": "Cryptographic hashes used in blockchain technology further increase blockchain security and removes trust barriers in agency relationships that require monitoring of agents and create agency costs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3373393-027",
   "text": "The removal of checks and balances, agent monitoring, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, and executive compensation schemes produces a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship and in corporate governance overall.",
   "abstract": "The removal of checks and balances in corporate governance, monitoring of agents, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, executive agent compensation schemes, among many others, provides a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agency relationship",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3411897-017",
   "text": "Because governance guarantees are embedded in blockchain code, there is no need for a principal to institute oversight and monitoring, which eliminates the associated agency costs.",
   "abstract": "Hence, in the blockchain infrastructure, there is no need for the principal to institute oversight and monitoring with the associated agency costs.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "assumes guarantees are genuinely enforced by the protocol"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-003",
   "text": "Because blockchain guarantees prevent any participant from circumventing the coded set of governance rules, a lower level of oversight and monitoring of agents is needed, which changes the cost structure of the principal agent relationship.",
   "abstract": "Hence, in the blockchain infrastructure, a lower level of oversight and monitoring of agents changes the cost structure of the principal agent relationship.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "blockchain infrastructure with consensus verified contract execution"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-012",
   "text": "Barzel's rationale for the firm, the added efficiency of a centralized production monitoring agency, becomes largely irrelevant under efficient smart contracting, because the smart contract performs the production monitoring function and largely removes agents.",
   "abstract": "is also largely irrelevant with efficient smart contracting as the smart contract performs the production-monitoring function and largely removes agents.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "efficient smart contracting environments"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-039",
   "text": "Community driven audits work in DAOs and rarely in centralized systems because the users of the system typically know best how to assess other members, whereas centralized incentive design does not enable incorruptible internal controls.",
   "abstract": "The decentralized nature of DAOs enhances efficiency of coordination because the users of the system, e.g. DAO members, typically know best how to assess other users / DAO members.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "DAO governance equipped with an effective incentive design"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808852-032",
   "text": "The degree of success in governmental decentralization is tied to the level of accountability instituted in the process, and accountability in turn depends on the availability of transparent public information that lets the community monitor local government performance.",
   "abstract": "The degree of success in governmental decentralization is often associated with the level of accountability instituted in the process. Accountability depends on the availability of information.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "31e91158fdeefebc2f0be54ebf89751f7cdd4c89ecea932888f5ba9be6b1caba",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-035",
   "text": "Blockchain based guarantees remove agency costs because principals are less required to institute oversight and monitoring of agents, which addresses inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.",
   "abstract": "Blockchain-based guarantees remove agency costs because principals are less required to institute oversight and monitoring of agents which addresses the inherent agency problems in modern finance and corporate governance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "contracts whose parameters are verified by a majority of miners or nodes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "eeccf6d0587bd278a96ce6ac8ec5003e26d161c245f6c94b4144d84f374802eb",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5245185-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5245185-009",
   "text": "Integrating AI with blockchain does not by itself eliminate security exposure: cyberattacks and privacy breaches remain possible absent rigorous monitoring.",
   "abstract": "Security vulnerabilities persist, as blockchain integration does not wholly preclude cyberattacks or privacy breaches absent rigorous monitoring.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How can we Best Monitor AI Agents (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5245185",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "blockchain integrated AI systems without rigorous monitoring"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "4d7adba83ec722480e97bde6528cbe9ce98c709e45cb18794f157a64b8fe7da2",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "20 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'monitoring'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}