{
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 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/monopoly",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:monopoly",
 "name": "Monopoly",
 "termCode": "monopoly",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3227933-034",
   "text": "DAOs will replace many organizations that lack their incentive structures and efficiencies, and because DAOs are cheap and straightforward to clone, their proliferation will increase competition while their distributed and anonymous nature prevents natural and political monopolies.",
   "abstract": "When we look at the strengths and advantages, we can conclude that DAOs will replace many organizations that lack these incentives and efficiencies. Moreover, DAOs are cheap and straightforward to \"clone,\" which will potentially lead to more competition.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "a9e9660c4dc25a2202f1da4e762f5885256e05f68c53ca51942f5833a7a4c108",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782191-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782191-036",
   "text": "Centralization is dangerous in any market because monopolies ruin market efficiency by impairing liquidity, while the most efficient and liquid markets have high transaction rates of many goods moving between many small players.",
   "abstract": "In any market, centralization is dangerous. Monopolies ruin the efficiency of a mar- ket—they impair its liquidity.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Preface to (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782191",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "markets"
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "b0bf0529c3cf69839879bc4da476714efee2717a4beb768bd5c859b810e6174e",
   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-032",
   "text": "Geographical monopolies over traffic control create information silos and constrain knowledge exchange, and the resulting lack of competition and cooperation impedes innovation, including at the protocol level, while diminishing consumer protection and rights.",
   "abstract": "These monopolies cre- ate information silos and constrain knowledge exchange. The resulting lack of compe- tition and cooperation impedes innovation, including at the protocol level and dimin- ished consumer protection and rights.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782216-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782216-020",
   "text": "Concentration of power, especially monopolies or trusts, decreases market liquidity, while decentralization of power improves it.",
   "abstract": "Concentration of power (especially monopolies or trusts) decreases liquidity; decentralization of power improves liquidity.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782216",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-037",
   "text": "Centralization and monopolies are a threat to market liquidity because they can carry too much mass or too much velocity, and an imbalance in either direction, too much mass and too little velocity or too little mass, damages the market.",
   "abstract": "When there is too much mass and not enough velocity, it can gunk up the engine - when there is too little mass in the market, it can be cleared too quickly. Centralization and monopolies are a threat to market liquidity as they can have too much mass or too much velocity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900878-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900878-011",
   "text": "In a quantum game model of a two firm market, monopoly emerges once informational asymmetry passes a threshold, and the result is lower total quantity and reduced economic efficiency.",
   "abstract": "monopoly appears when the informational asymmetry reaches a certain threshold, leading to a decrease in total quantity and economic efficiency.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and Tokenomics (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900878",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "two firm market with informational asymmetry",
    "within the quantum game model of Du, Ju, and Li"
   ],
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4900880-016",
   "text": "In a quantum game model of a market with informational asymmetry between two firms, monopoly emerges once the informational asymmetry passes a threshold, and total quantity and economic efficiency fall as a result.",
   "abstract": "The model shows that monopoly appears when the informational asymmetry reaches a certain threshold, leading to a decrease in total quantity and economic efficiency.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "two firm market with informational asymmetry",
    "asymmetry above the threshold"
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 ],
 "description": "7 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'monopoly'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}