# Moral hazard `kaal:entity:moral-hazard` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 27 claims that carry the concept tag `moral-hazard`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 27 claims across 13 works, 2009 to 2026. **2009** - [1428387-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-021) [mechanism/argued] -- The principal-agent problem in complex financial products is exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions, which create multiple layers of agency relationships between the traders using the products and the principals bearing the real economic risk. > The principal-agent problem is further exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions that often create multiple layers of agency relationships to trade and invest in complex financial products. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 - [1428387-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-022) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Moral hazard is worsened when the financial products traded are so complex that the agents, mostly on the buy side, do not entirely understand them and trade for the principal on the basis of incomplete and asymmetric information. > The moral hazard problem is further exacerbated when the financial products involved in many of these transactions are so highly complex that the agents, mostly on the buy side, do not entirely understand them and trade for the principal based on incomplete and asymmetric information. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 **2011** - [1806252-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-011) [mechanism/argued] -- Banks' lending practices and counterparty credit risk management can curtail hedge funds' excessive risk taking because banks can use the threat of cutting off future lending to change a fund's behavior. > counterparty credit risk management (CCRM) may allow them to curtail excessive risk taking, because they are in a position to use the threat of cutting off future lending to improve a hedge fund's behavior. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-012) [design/argued] -- Banks are ideally positioned to deal with asymmetric information, moral hazard, and systemic issues pertaining to hedge funds, which is why hedge fund regulation should run through bank regulation. > Banks are ideally positioned to deal with asymmetric information, moral hazard, and systemic issues pertaining to hedge funds. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-013) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because banks expect to be bailed out with taxpayer funds, they may have less incentive to monitor their hedge fund lending activities, even though hedge funds are not themselves counterparties in government bailouts. > Hedge funds are not counterparties in government bailouts, but if banks get bailed out, they may have less incentive to monitor their hedge fund lending activities or other hedge fund-related business. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1806252-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-035) [design/asserted] -- Registering hedge funds with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information could help minimize the moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry. > Recent attempts at regulating hedge funds by registering them with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information could help to minimize moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 - [1908473-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The incentive effects of corporate governance controls may not operate in systemically important financial institutions, because managers and owners who anticipate a bailout commitment adjust their risk preferences upward. > the incentives originating from corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs. SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out.108 If that is the case, SIFI principals-managers-owners may anticipate a bailout commitment and adjust their risk preferences upwards. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 - [1908473-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Switching to contingent capital financing may reinforce rather than reduce risk incentives, and whether the risk incentives generated by contingent capital outweigh its risk reduction potential remains unresolved. > In effect, however, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk incentives. Additional research may be needed to determine if risk incentives generated by CCS113 may outweigh their potential for risk reduction. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 - [1908473-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-016) [mechanism/argued] -- By internalizing the costs of bank failure, contingent capital can reduce moral hazard, and because a contingent debt security with a conversion trigger would presumably not default, it helps avoid contagion and systemic spillovers. > By internalizing bank failure costs, contingent capital may contribute to minimizing moral hazard. A contingent debt security with a conversion trigger would presumably not default and could thus help avoid contagion and systemic spillover effects, which in turn may limit systemic risk. Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 **2012** - [1998455-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-001) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Government bailouts of systemically important financial institutions create strong incentives for those institutions to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers. > Government bailouts create strong incentives to externalize the cost of SIFIs' risk taking onto taxpayers. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-002) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The implicit guarantees contained in a bailout multiply the incentives for systemically important financial institutions to increase leverage, because those guarantees make debt cheaper than equity. > The implicit guarantees in a bailout may also multiply the incentives for SIFIs to increase leverage because the guarantees could make debt cheaper than equity. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-008) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital contributes to minimizing moral hazard by internalizing bank failure costs, that is, by placing those costs on the institution's own security holders rather than on the public. > By inter- nalizing bank failure costs, contingent capital could contribute to minimizing moral hazard. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [1998455-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-035) [empirical/argued] -- Treating the price of contingent capital securities as an indicator of how much people care about market integrity and moral hazard would require altruistic motives on the part of purchasers, and the author doubts this: the nascent market appears to have been built on investors' expectation of above average returns. > This would imply, however, altruistic motives of CCS purchasers. It is unclear if altruism in CCS purchases would be realistic. The nascent market in CCS seems to have been built on investors' expectation of above- average returns. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [2061166-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-010) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Reliance on public bail-outs, unaccompanied by any threat that management, shareholders and creditors would share significant losses, created an asymmetric incentive for excessive risk taking by financial institutions. > The reliance on a public bail-out without the threat of any significant losses shared by management, shareholders and creditors may have created an asymmetric incentive for excessive risk taking by financial institutions. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2061166-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-021) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital supports general risk control and reduces moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing the costs of bank failure rather than externalizing them onto taxpayers. > Contingent capital may also support general risk control in financial institutions454 and may contribute to minimizing moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing bank failure costs. Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 - [2097160-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Ordinary SIFI creditors have suboptimal incentives to monitor management because they implicitly expect that the government will provide bailout funding given the nature of the entity. > Because of an implicit expectation that the government will provide bailout funding due to the nature of the entity, ordinary SIFI creditors may have suboptimal incentives to monitor the performance of management.177 Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 **2016** - [2714974-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Direct regulation of hedge fund leverage increases moral hazard costs, because lenders and counterparties relax their own vigilance once they rely on government rules to constrain fund risk taking. > Direct regulation could also increase moral hazard costs as lenders and counterparties may relax their vigilance in reliance on the government rules. Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 - [2714974-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Any prescriptive regulatory regime for hedge funds risks leaving the financial system less stable rather than more stable, because counterparties relax vigilance when they believe authorities are monitoring and constraining fund risk taking. > A risk of any prescriptive regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the marketplace, it leaves the system less rather than more stable. Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 **2017** - [2957645-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-007) [mechanism/argued] -- By internalizing the costs of bank failure, contingent capital may be able to minimize moral hazard, avoid financial contagion, and limit systemic risk. > By internalizing bank failure costs, contingent capital may be able to minimize moral hazard,14 avoid financial contagion,15 and limit systemic risk.16 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 - [2957645-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-021) [condition/argued] -- Appropriate use of contingent capital triggers can further lower the default risk of the contingent capital securities themselves, on top of the moral hazard reduction that comes from internalizing bank failure costs. > contingent capital can minimize moral hazard,43 and appropriate use of contingent capital triggers can further lower default risk of CCS.44 Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645 **2019** - [3405660-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-002) [mechanism/argued] -- Moral hazard in hedge fund lending persists even when the lender is fully informed, because high enforcement costs can make prevention too costly for the lender. > Moral hazard can also occur because high enforcement costs might make it too costly for the lenders to hedge funds to prevent moral hazard even when the lender is fully informed about the hedge fund's activities. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-026) [mechanism/argued] -- Banks can restrain borrower risk taking because they can credibly threaten to cut off future lending, a disciplinary tool other intermediaries lack. > They have advantages in preventing risk taking by borrowers because they can use the threat of cutting off future lending to improve a borrower's behavior. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3405660-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-034) [mechanism/argued] -- Market discipline, internal ratings and supervisory review under the Basel Framework change bank lending practice and disclosure, which in turn lowers hedge fund leverage and mitigates moral hazard of the kind seen at LTCM. > Moral hazard problems are addressed because the Basel Framework guarantees, by introducing market discipline, internal ratings and supervisory review, a change in lending practice and disclosure. This, in turn, will further decrease the capital – leverage ratio of hedge funds. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 **2021** - [3782210-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In hierarchical structures where members are siloed and have few formal connections across tiers, letting service providers create the regulations produces moral hazard, because the provider has an incentive to weaken standards and regulations. > In a hierarchical structure, where members are siloed and have few formal connections with those immediately above and below their tier in the hierarchy, this leads to the moral hazard problem that the service pro- vider has an incentive to weaken the standards and regulations. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 **2024** - [4685567-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Impact markets that promote retrospective funding and resale of impact carry an inherent risk of incentivizing net negative ventures, because individuals can capture the benefit of positive impacts without bearing the cost when their actions produce negative impacts. > This risk stems from the potential for individuals to benefit from causing positive impacts without 46 bearing the costs if their actions result in negative impacts. Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567 **2025** - [5886442-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-019) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Hidden action, that is moral hazard, and hidden information, that is adverse selection, are not merely reduced in the agentic economy but rendered computationally impossible at the substrate level, because every intermediate computation is attested on chain or through zero knowledge proofs. > Every intermediate computation is attested on-chain or via zero-knowledge proofs. Hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (adverse selection) are not merely reduced. They are rendered computationally impossible at the substrate level Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442 **2026** - [6421319-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-019) [mechanism/argued] -- Hidden action and hidden information are not merely reduced but rendered computationally impossible at the substrate level, because every inference, parameter update, decision trace, and model weight in an autonomous agent is by design cryptographically attested, version controlled, and auditable in real time. > Hidden action and hidden information are not merely reduced. They are rendered computationally impossible at the substrate level. Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. 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