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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5225296-021",
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   "text": "Slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium in which rational validators adhere to honest behavior, because the expected cost of penalties exceeds any short-term gain available from misconduct.",
   "abstract": "game-theoretic models, which demonstrate that slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium wherein rational validators are incentivized to adhere to honest behavior, as the expected cost of penalties outweighs any potential short-term gains from misconduct",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296",
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   "text": "Weighted voting creates a Nash equilibrium favoring honest participation, because creating additional Sybil identities yields no extra voting power absent corresponding contributions.",
   "abstract": "Game-theoretic analysis indicates that this creates a Nash equilibrium where honest participation is incentivized, as creating Sybil identities yields no additional voting power without corresponding contributions",
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   "text": "Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, overestimates human computational capacity and perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design by justifying frictionless markets that never materialize in human systems.",
   "abstract": "Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, not only overestimates human computational capacity but perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design, justifying frictionless markets that never materialize in human systems.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442",
   "datePublished": "2025",
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   "text": "Policymakers who cling to Nashian ideals risk obsolescence, because the future demands governance that orchestrates agentic plenitude rather than governance that mitigates human imperfection.",
   "abstract": "Policymakers clinging to Nashian ideals risk obsolescence. The future demands governance that orchestrates agentic plenitude, not mitigates human imperfection.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442",
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   "text": "Under persistent reputation and multiplicative updates in the repeated game, honest evaluation is stronger than a one-shot focal point: it is the strategy that minimizes long-run regret for each validator and is the Nash equilibrium of the repeated expert aggregation game.",
   "abstract": "Honesty is the Nash equilibrium of the repeated expert aggregation game under multiplicative updates.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278",
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   "text": "Theorem 3b holds that under the integrated solution honest citation is a Nash equilibrium when validators assess citation accuracy and the marginal effect of citation accuracy on the honesty score exceeds the marginal gain from self-citation.",
   "abstract": "honest citation is a Nash equilibrium when validators assess citation accuracy and the marginal effect of citation accuracy on the honesty score exceeds the marginal gain from self-citation:",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
   "datePublished": "2026",
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   "text": "The equilibrium depends on a design requirement rather than an assumption: mechanism parameters must be chosen so that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs its positive effect on the value score, at which point increasing self-citation strictly decreases utility.",
   "abstract": "the mechanism parameters (θ = 0.6, reputation coefficient = 2) are chosen such that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs the positive effect on the value score.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518",
   "datePublished": "2026",
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   "text": "Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.",
   "abstract": "Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy. It becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319",
   "datePublished": "2026",
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 "description": "8 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'nash-equilibrium'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
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