# Negotiation

`kaal:entity:negotiation`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `negotiation`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2011 to 2019.

**2011**

- [1908473-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-030) [normative/argued] -- The second trigger voting rights increase should never actually be triggered; its function is to level the playing field between constituents, incentivize negotiation, and provide an alternative to reorganization.
  > The second trigger voting rights increase should never actually be triggered. Rather, it should help level the playing field between constituents and incentivize negotiation and provide an alternative to reorganization.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Negotiation of a governmental contract produces indirect information transfers, because the government can deduce from where the corporate wrongdoer places negotiating emphasis which governance shortcomings most need remedying.
  > Indirect information transfers and feedback effects may exist because the government may be able to deduce from the emphasis of the corporate wrongdoer's negotiations what particular governance shortcomings need par- ticular remedying.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2017**

- [2959730-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-006) [empirical/asserted] -- First time managers are disproportionately affected by the new fee environment: unlike in the recent past they are now often forced to share the business budget, such as rent and employee salaries, in order to justify a 1.5% management fee.
  > First-time or new managers are particularly affected by the new fee structure. Unlike in the recent past, first-time managers are now often forced to share the business budget (rent, employee salaries, etc.) to justify the 1.5% management fee.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730

**2019**

- [3405401-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-006) [mechanism/asserted] -- Automation in smart contracting reduces negotiation between counterparties to near minimal levels and removes almost all of the transaction costs typically associated with contracting.
  > Negotiation between counterparties is near minimal, transaction cost typically associated with contracting are almost entirely removed by the automation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/negotiation.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.