# Netherlands `kaal:entity:netherlands` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `netherlands`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 1 works, 2012 to 2012. **2012** - [2029983-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-020) [mechanism/argued] -- The WCAM's requirement that a court evaluate procedural and substantive fairness and the efficiency of the settlement lets the Dutch system avoid blackmail settlements, where a defendant pays simply to escape endless proceedings and reputational loss. > The WCAM, thus, avoids black- mail settlements in which a defendant offers a payment to get out of a class action to avoid the prospect of endless proceedings Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-021) [mechanism/argued] -- The Dutch unfair trade practice and misrepresentation provisions invoked in Fortis, taken together, approximate the legal protections available in the United States under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which makes the Dutch legal system a possible avenue for circumventing the restrictions imposed by Morrison. > Combined, these sections approximate legal protections available in the United States under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Given the comparability, the Dutch legal system could present a possible avenue for circumventing the restrictions imposed by the Morrison decision. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- In Converium the Amsterdam Court of Appeal declared an international collective settlement binding on the parties even though the class members had only tenuous connections to the Netherlands. > The Amsterdam Court of Appeal in its Converium decision declared an international collective settlement binding on the parties to a settlement where the class members had rather tenuous connections to the Netherlands (none of the defendants Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-023) [mechanism/argued] -- By approving U.S.-style fee arrangements, the Converium decision adds an important incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring claims in the Netherlands. > By allowing U.S.-style fee arrangements, the Converium decision adds an important incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring claims in the Netherlands. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Converium fee holding is a weak predictor of Dutch practice because lead counsel's work in that case was performed largely within the American legal system and by U.S. law firms, so it remains to be seen whether a case litigated in Dutch courts without U.S. exposure would yield a comparable fee structure. > remains to be seen whether a case that is litigated in Dutch courts without exposure to the U.S. legal system will yield a comparable fee structure. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-025) [empirical/argued] -- The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue for collective settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in mass litigation to bind all class members who do not opt out. > The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-026) [predictive/argued] -- Given the Fortis and Converium decisions, it is conceivable that Dutch courts will expand their extraterritorial reach beyond the enforcement of settlements to cases litigated as class actions. > Given the developments in the Fortis and Converium decisions, it is conceivable that Dutch courts could expand their exterritorial reach beyond settlements. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-027) [mechanism/argued] -- Because the Dutch Supreme Court's World Online presumption of reliance can be extended to ad hoc disclosure violations and misleading periodic reports, the Dutch legal system could compete effectively with the United States by lowering the crucial reliance threshold in securities actions. > These developments suggest that the Dutch legal system could effectively compete with the United States, at least as it pertains to lowering the crucial threshold re- quirement of reliance in securities actions. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The WCAM requirement that a court approved foundation pursue the action makes the Dutch regime more burdensome than the U.S. system, which requires only a lead plaintiff and class approval. > This WCAM re- quirement makes the Dutch regime somewhat more burdensome than the United States' system, which simply re- quires a lead plaintiff and class approval. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 - [2029983-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The WCAM's structural limits could reduce the number of successful settlements: while the largest cases such as Shell and Fortis give plaintiffs enough leverage to force large settlements, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in Dutch courts. > While the largest cases, such as Shell and Fortis, would probably still provide sufficient lev- erage for the plaintiffs to result in large settlements with de- fendants, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in Dutch courts. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/netherlands.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.