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 "name": "Non fungibility",
 "termCode": "non-fungibility",
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3266953-013",
   "text": "Reputation does not push a network toward centralization the way currency does, because reputation must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be turned into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods.",
   "abstract": "Reputation as a metric and store of value does not suffer the same consequences described above and does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, yet it cannot be turned into a fungible store of value that allows the exchange for goods etc.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "reputation held as a non transferable metric"
   ],
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3266953-021",
   "text": "Because Semada's Anchor Protocol uses reputation scores as a non fungible currency to qualify for block propagation, the resulting proof of reputation consensus is attack resistant, fully decentralized, scalable, and open to evolutionary protocol upgrades.",
   "abstract": "Unlike traditional PoS, PoR, e.g. Semada's Anchor Protocol, uses reputation scores as a non-fungible currency to qualify for block propagation. As such, the Anchor protocol (PoR) is attack resistant, fully decentralized, scalable and allows evolutionary protocol upgrades.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953",
   "datePublished": "2018",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3405401-024",
   "text": "Reputation used as a metric and store of value does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, and it cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods.",
   "abstract": "Reputation as a metric and store of value does not suffer the same consequences and does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, yet it cannot be turned into a fungible store of value that allows the exchange for goods etc.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "reputation is non fungible and non transferable"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3406323-035",
   "text": "Reputation avoids the recentralization dynamic that afflicts currencies because it must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods.",
   "abstract": "Reputation as a metric and store of value does not suffer the same consequences and does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, yet it cannot be turned into a fungible store of value that allows the",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-031",
   "text": "A reputation token is inherently worth more to the person who earned it than to someone who merely bought it, because of its secondary use in making future earnings, so reputation is harder to accumulate than cash and economies of scale are weakened.",
   "abstract": "A reputation token is inherently more valuable for a person who deserves it, than for someone who merely bought it, because of its secondary use in making future earnings.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "scope_conditions": [
    "non-fungible reputation tokens with individual slashable histories"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-029",
   "text": "Reputation voting has two advantages over one token one vote: it is non fungible, which avoids corruptive elements, and it aligns incentives for members individually and for the institution as a whole at the same time.",
   "abstract": "1) it is non-fungible which avoids corruptive elements, and 2) it optimally aligns incentives for DAO of DAOs members individually and at the same time aligns their incentives for the totality of the DAO of DAOs as an institution.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-024",
   "text": "Merit in the CHARITYxDAO is expressed by a non fungible reputation token that cannot be bought or sold, and voting is designed around staking those non fungible reputation tokens.",
   "abstract": "c. decisions in the CHARITYxDAO are made with a voting design that revolves around staking of non-fungible reputation tokens; d. non-fungibility of CHARITYxDAO reputation tokens; e.g. merit of a CHARITYxDAO VA is expressed by a non-fungible reputation token that cannot be bought or sold;",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-029",
   "text": "Reputation staking avoids the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, needs to be earned, and cannot be bought.",
   "abstract": "Second, the reputation staking design avoid the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non-fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, it needs to be earned and cannot be bought.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021",
   "datePublished": "2021",
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 "description": "8 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'non-fungibility'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
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