# Non fungible assets

`kaal:entity:non-fungible-assets`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `non-fungible-assets`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2020 to 2021.

**2020**

- [3652481-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-020) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master the duality of incentives that a workable DAO governance design requires.
  > DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master this duality.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens because a third party is less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset such as reputation that was organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in the DAO's subject matter.
  > The corruptive elements of fungible assets/tokens are removed because third parties are less likely able to take over a non-fungible asset, such as reputation, that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in a given DAO subject matter.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3808873-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-038) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design for their own gain; merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
  > When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/non-fungible-assets.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.