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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:non-fungible-tokens",
 "name": "Non fungible tokens",
 "termCode": "non-fungible-tokens",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-038",
   "text": "Optimized DAO governance should pay members only indirectly, through fungible salary tokens issued in proportion to non fungible merit tokens, because the indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the design more attack resistant and stable in the long run.",
   "abstract": "The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack resistant and stable in the long run.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "bifurcated DAO designs with two disparate token types"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-041",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-041",
   "text": "Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens from voting because third parties are less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in the DAO subject matter.",
   "abstract": "The corruptive elements of fungible assets/tokens are removed because third parties are less likely able to take over a non-fungible assets, such as reputation, that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in a given DAO subject matter.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "voting by staking non fungible reputation tokens"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-020",
   "text": "Reputation tokens must have their power limited to their proper domain: for each different expertise there must be a separate type of non-interchangeable reputation token, so that a token carries power only within the DAO whose members hold that specific skill.",
   "abstract": "Reputation tokens need to have power limited to their proper domain, meaning that for each different expertise, there is a separate type of non-interchangeable reputa- tion token.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-012",
   "text": "The absence of proper decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator across DAO failures and rug pulls.",
   "abstract": "The lack of proper decentralized governance with non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator among DAO failures and rug pulls.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-014",
   "text": "Defending a DAO against attackers and looters, and punishing self-dealing, requires sustainable decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens rather than tradable voting power.",
   "abstract": "The takeover of the Build Finance DAO highlights the need for sustainable decentralized governance solutions with non-fungible tokens to defend the DAO from attackers/looters and punish self- dealing.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-017",
   "text": "Workable DAO governance should account for reputation with non-fungible tokens or weighted keys rather than fungible tokens, so that voting weight tracks reputation instead of purchasing power.",
   "abstract": "1. Non-fungible Tokens or weighted keys, among other electronic accounting methods as accounting for reputation score NOT fungible tokens",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "asserted",
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4855607-037",
   "text": "Issuing non fungible reputation tokens that represent voting power, access rights, or entitlement to a share of the project's success creates an economic structure in which participants are directly invested in the success of the RLHF process.",
   "abstract": "The web3 system as proposed herein can issue non-fungible reputation tokens that represent voting power, access rights, or entitlement to a share of the project's success. This creates an economic structure where participants are directly invested in the success of the RLHF process",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "RLHF communities where retention and sustained participation matter"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "eb0b3e62374b45a8fa888c6bde9725e606bcb46cf4b5e74a6e851d9f25099113",
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  }
 ],
 "description": "7 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'non-fungible-tokens'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}