# Non fungible tokens `kaal:entity:non-fungible-tokens` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 7 claims that carry the concept tag `non-fungible-tokens`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 7 claims across 4 works, 2019 to 2024. **2019** - [3441904-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-038) [design/argued] -- Optimized DAO governance should pay members only indirectly, through fungible salary tokens issued in proportion to non fungible merit tokens, because the indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the design more attack resistant and stable in the long run. > The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack resistant and stable in the long run. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 - [3441904-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-041) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens from voting because third parties are less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in the DAO subject matter. > The corruptive elements of fungible assets/tokens are removed because third parties are less likely able to take over a non-fungible assets, such as reputation, that is organically grown and maintained through actual expertise in a given DAO subject matter. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 **2021** - [3782210-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-020) [condition/argued] -- Reputation tokens must have their power limited to their proper domain: for each different expertise there must be a separate type of non-interchangeable reputation token, so that a token carries power only within the DAO whose members hold that specific skill. > Reputation tokens need to have power limited to their proper domain, meaning that for each different expertise, there is a separate type of non-interchangeable reputa- tion token. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 **2022** - [4067783-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-012) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The absence of proper decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator across DAO failures and rug pulls. > The lack of proper decentralized governance with non-fungible tokens is a key common denominator among DAO failures and rug pulls. Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783 - [4067783-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-014) [design/argued] -- Defending a DAO against attackers and looters, and punishing self-dealing, requires sustainable decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens rather than tradable voting power. > The takeover of the Build Finance DAO highlights the need for sustainable decentralized governance solutions with non-fungible tokens to defend the DAO from attackers/looters and punish self- dealing. Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783 - [4067783-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-017) [design/asserted] -- Workable DAO governance should account for reputation with non-fungible tokens or weighted keys rather than fungible tokens, so that voting weight tracks reputation instead of purchasing power. > 1. Non-fungible Tokens or weighted keys, among other electronic accounting methods as accounting for reputation score NOT fungible tokens Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783 **2024** - [4855607-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4855607-037) [design/argued] -- Issuing non fungible reputation tokens that represent voting power, access rights, or entitlement to a share of the project's success creates an economic structure in which participants are directly invested in the success of the RLHF process. > The web3 system as proposed herein can issue non-fungible reputation tokens that represent voting power, access rights, or entitlement to a share of the project's success. This creates an economic structure where participants are directly invested in the success of the RLHF process Wulf A. Kaal, How AI Models are Optimized Through Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4855607 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/non-fungible-tokens.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.