# On chain governance

`kaal:entity:on-chain-governance`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 16 claims that carry the concept tag `on-chain-governance`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

16 claims across 11 works, 2018 to 2025.

**2018**

- [3125827-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Any blockchain whose soft forks are decided through private communication between famous token holding whales is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems, which at least address centralized security risks deliberately.
  > Any blockchain subject to such governance is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems which pointedly address centralized security risks.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
- [3266953-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-038) [mechanism/argued] -- In the weighted directed acyclic graph precedent system, more reputation weight and salary flow to forum posts that other posts continuously reference, and as a precedent dissipates over time new precedent emerges naturally to replace the older one.
  > more reputation weight and salaries are allocated to posts on the Semada Forum that get continuously referenced by other posts. As a precedent dissipates over time, new precedence in the Semada Forum emerge naturally to replace older precedent.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**2019**

- [3402701-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-040) [design/argued] -- The authors recommend an SDAO governance design coordinated through reputation-weighted democratic governance, whose core objective is to create incentives that lead independent and selfish actors to collaborate productively toward a common goal.
  > In that paper we recommend an SDAO design coordinated through reputation-weighted democratic governance
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701
- [3441904-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-018) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution over the long run; without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.
  > Without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-021) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutocracy, because holders of a significant share of total token supply hold more power than the rest of the members.
  > A one-token-one-vote voting mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on-chain governance resembles a plutocracy.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-037) [mechanism/argued] -- A decentralized on chain precedent system makes reputation based DAO governance dynamic: a post or template that is increasingly referenced gains non fungible reputation weight and associated fungible salaries, while unused precedent dissipates over time.
  > As a post/template on the blockchain gets increasingly referenced by the DAO members and other users, it increases in non-fungible reputation weight and associated fungible salaries.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-040) [condition/argued] -- On chain governance is a necessity for most public blockchains because all existing blockchains need to calibrate soft forks for protocol upgrades.
  > On-chain governance is a necessity for most public blockchains. Because all existing blockchains need to calibrate soft forks for protocol upgrades, most public blockchain communities that value decentralization have considered on-chain governance for their protocol.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2020**

- [3652481-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Kaal accepts that the arguments against on chain governance remain strong: in an off chain model miners supply checks and balances over protocol changes, and on chain governance arguably removes those checks and balances.
  > Despite the ever-widening need for on-chain governance solutions, arguments against on-chain governance remain strong. In an off- chain governance model, miners provide checks and balances on power over protocol changes. On-chain governance arguably removes such checks and balances.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
- [3652481-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Only the most basic common denominator required to operate a fully functional Swiss Association can be run entirely on chain.
  > Therefore, only the most basic common denominator enabling the operation of a fully functional Swiss Association, runs entirely on- chain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3782214-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-005) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- No major blockchain is entirely decentralized, because all of them lack binding, coded, anonymous peer to peer governance; on chain and off chain governance experiments to date fall short of that standard.
  > At the moment, however, no major blockchain is entirely decentral- ized, because they all lack pure binding coded PCP anonymous governance.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214
- [3808859-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-040) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without basic decentralized infrastructure products in place, on-chain governance of blockchains is not possible or is only limitedly possible, and the blockchain ecosystem may not be able to grow without a core decentralized infrastructure such as a functioning public blockchain to build on.
  > Without such basic infrastructure products, on-chain governance of blockchains may not be or may only limitedly be possible.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859
- [3981021-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-015) [design/asserted] -- Because the CHARITYxDAO records governance on distributed ledger technology, all governance votes and endowment allocation decisions are fully publicly visible, auditable by the public at will, and immutable once on chain.
  > Through the use of DLT technology, all governance votes and endowment allocation decisions are fully publicly visible and can be audited by the public at will. Moreover, all onchain data is immutable and can be accessed by the public.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021
- [3981021-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-018) [mechanism/argued] -- On chain governance takes the donation out of the hands of the individual donor, who may one sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets, and puts the asset allocation and policing decisions into the hands of the community of voting associates.
  > the donation out of the hands of the individual donor (who may one-sidedly or mistakenly allocate assets to further the donor's donative intent). Instead, the asset allocation and policing decisions are put into the hands of the community of CHARITYxDAO VAs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2024**

- [4796714-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4796714-033) [definitional/asserted] -- In the proposed system the DAO's forum is an on-chain collection of uniquely identified posts that may cite earlier contributions, and this citation structure is what forms the Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph on which the governance model rests.
  > The DAO operates a forum as an on-chain collection of posts, each uniquely identified and possibly citing previous contributions. This forum forms a Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph (WDAG), facilitating organized discussion and citation among participants.
  Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714

**2025**

- [5095633-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5095633-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Linking every contributor action and every piece of data to on-chain governance elements within a structured graph is what enables real-time community oversight, iterative updates, and granular reputation tracking in the WDAG model.
  > By enabling every contributor action and piece of data to be linked to on-chain governance elements in a structured graph, the WDAG model supports real-time community oversight, iterative updates, and granular reputation tracking.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Artificial Intelligence The Final Frontier (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5095633
- [5225296-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5225296-007) [mechanism/argued] -- SPoS accelerates protocol innovation because embedding governance on-chain circumvents the off-chain coordination delays that characterize PoW and simpler PoS systems.
  > Moreover, SPoS's on-chain governance model accelerates innovation by circumventing the off-chain coordination delays that characterize PoW and simpler PoS systems.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/on-chain-governance.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.