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 "name": "One person one vote",
 "termCode": "one-person-one-vote",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-033",
   "text": "One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions.",
   "abstract": "Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4529715-018",
   "text": "One person one vote governance carries the risk of majority tyranny, in which the majority imposes its will on minority groups, and it is unsuited to decisions requiring specialized knowledge.",
   "abstract": "However, one person one vote governance also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for majority tyranny, where the majority can impose their will on minority groups.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715",
   "datePublished": "2023",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-001",
   "text": "One-person-one-vote in DAOs equalizes voting power across participants regardless of financial stake, but it creates the risk of majority tyranny.",
   "abstract": "This model ensures equal voting power for all participants, promoting democratic decision-making but potentially leading to majority tyranny.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5254152-030",
   "text": "A one person, one vote structure raises a DAO's resistance to 51 percent and sock puppet attacks, as reflected in TomiDAO's attack resistance score of 6 against a sample average of 3.65.",
   "abstract": "The one-person, one-vote model increases resistance to 51% and sock puppet attacks (A: 6).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152",
   "datePublished": "2024",
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 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'one-person-one-vote'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}