# One person one vote

`kaal:entity:one-person-one-vote`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `one-person-one-vote`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2021 to 2024.

**2021**

- [3782210-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions.
  > Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

**2023**

- [4529715-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One person one vote governance carries the risk of majority tyranny, in which the majority imposes its will on minority groups, and it is unsuited to decisions requiring specialized knowledge.
  > However, one person one vote governance also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for majority tyranny, where the majority can impose their will on minority groups.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**2024**

- [5254152-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-001) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- One-person-one-vote in DAOs equalizes voting power across participants regardless of financial stake, but it creates the risk of majority tyranny.
  > This model ensures equal voting power for all participants, promoting democratic decision-making but potentially leading to majority tyranny.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152
- [5254152-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-030) [mechanism/evidenced] -- A one person, one vote structure raises a DAO's resistance to 51 percent and sock puppet attacks, as reflected in TomiDAO's attack resistance score of 6 against a sample average of 3.65.
  > The one-person, one-vote model increases resistance to 51% and sock puppet attacks (A: 6).
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/one-person-one-vote.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.