# One token one vote

`kaal:entity:one-token-one-vote`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `one-token-one-vote`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 6 works, 2019 to 2024.

**2019**

- [3441904-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-021) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutocracy, because holders of a significant share of total token supply hold more power than the rest of the members.
  > A one-token-one-vote voting mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on-chain governance resembles a plutocracy.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2020**

- [3652481-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-030) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they allocate more power to holders of a large share of total token supply, leaving majority holders more powerful than all remaining holders combined.
  > Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one- token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3799320-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.
  > Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320
- [3981021-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-028) [mechanism/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vote voting mechanisms.
  > First, it overcomes the all too common polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes of one- token-one-vote voting mechanisms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2022**

- [4067783-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Braintrust demonstrates that innovation in work structure does not cure governance design: despite redefining work outcomes, it uses a suboptimal one token, one vote model that grants proportional control over network governance.
  > Despite its advances in innovation for redefining work outcomes, Braintrust uses a suboptimal governance model with a one token, one vote system for proportional control over how the network is governed.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783

**2024**

- [4685567-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4685567-025) [design/argued] -- Weighted reputation voting has key advantages over WEB2 and WEB3 one token one vote mechanisms because it aligns each donor community member's individual incentives while simultaneously calibrating those incentives with the interests of the overall community.
  > The use of weighted reputation voting has key advantages over other WEB2 and WEB3 one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. It aligns incentives for donor community members individually and at the same time calibrates their incentives with the overall community.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Impact Investing Innovation - From Impact 1.0 to 3.0 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4685567

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/one-token-one-vote.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.